Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessAuthenticate with any backend session
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DeliverySend frontend request with rex_version or rex_history_date
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ExploitBypass category/clang authorization checks
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ExecutionEnumerate arbitrary article_id and clang
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ImpactRead unpublished, historic, or deleted content
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Authorization checks on every request
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Privilege Escalation The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Prerequisites are concrete. Working-version preview (structure/version, rex_version=1): requires only any live backend PHP session - gated solely by rex_backend_login::hasSession(), which does not run checkLogin(), so even a media-pool-only account with no structure permission, and even a deactivated user whose session still exists, can read the working version of any article in any language. History preview (structure/history, rex_history_date=…): requires the global history[article_rollback] permission but still ignores the target article's category and clang, exposing snapshots (including deleted content) outside the user's mountpoint. Both paths require the respective plugin to be installed and activated (both ship with core and are enabled by default) and a working version or snapshot to exist for the target article. LIMITING factors: a valid authenticated backend session is mandatory (no unauthenticated exploitation), impact is confined to confidentiality, and only REDAXO core before 5.21.4 is affected; no victim interaction or cross-site vector is involved. |
| Impact | Signals point to a genuine but moderate priority. The supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N) scores 7.1 (High): network-reachable, low complexity, no user interaction, but it requires privileges (PR:L) - i.e. an authenticated backend account - and impacts confidentiality only (VC:H; VI:N/VA:N). The GHSA advisory confirms this is a missing-authorization/broken-access-control issue (CWE-862, CWE-200), not an unauthenticated flaw. No CISA KEV listing is present in the input and no EPSS score was provided, so exploitation-probability signals are absent rather than low - treat them as unknown. No working exploit code is referenced (the two advisories are write-ups, not PoC code), so this is: no public exploit identified at time of analysis. The vendor priority Decision label is 'this_week', consistent with a patched, authenticated-only confidentiality bug that is nonetheless systematically enumerable. Net: this is a real issue warranting prompt patching within the week, but it is not a drop-everything emergency - the authenticated-only prerequisite (PR:L) and confidentiality-only impact meaningfully limit real-world blast radius compared with the raw High score. The main aggravating factor is that both previews can be enumerated over article_id and clang, turning a single-object leak into systematic exposure of all unpublished, historic, and deleted content. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A low-privilege backend user - even an account created only for the media pool with no structure permission at all - sends an ordinary frontend request appending rex_version=1 with an arbitrary article_id to render and read the unpublished working version of any article in any language; an editor additionally holding history[article_rollback] sets rex_history_date to read historic and previously-deleted snapshots outside their mountpoint. No public exploit code is referenced (only vendor/VulnCheck advisories), and with AV:N/AC:L/UI:N the request is trivial to issue once a backend session exists. No victim interaction or cross-site vector is needed. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 28, 2026
Missing authorization in REDAXO core before 5.21.4 lets any authenticated backend user read the unpublished working version of any article by sending rex_version=1 to the structure/version preview, and lets users holding the history[article_rollback] permission read historic snapshots, including content that has since been deleted, through the structure/history preview using rex_history_date. Impact is confidentiality only; the article and clang are taken from freely chosen request parameters and can be enumerated, so exposure is systematic rather than a single object. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and the vendor-released fix is version 5.21.4.
RemediationAI
Upgrade REDAXO core to 5.21.4 or later (composer/redaxo/source >= 5.21.4), the vendor-released release that adds the missing category and clang permission checks to both preview modes; details are in GHSA-v4m9-jvvr-83cx. Where upgrading cannot be done immediately, deactivating the structure/version and structure/history plugins removes both affected preview code paths, at the cost of losing version preview and history preview functionality, and restricting the history[article_rollback] permission limits the history path - but note that this does not close the working-version path, which any authenticated backend session can reach, and that rex_backend_login::hasSession() means deactivated accounts and stale PHP sessions retain access until those sessions are actually terminated.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The two preview features live in the core plugins structure/version and structure/history, which switch the rendered slice revision at the ART_INIT extension point. That point is fired in the constructor of rex_article_content_base before setArticleId() runs, so neither the target article nor its category is known at the moment the revision is switched, and the category and clang permission checks are never performed - the root cause is CWE-862 missing authorization, with information exposure (CWE-200) as the consequence. The working-version path is gated only by rex_backend_login::hasSession(), which merely looks for a user id in the session namespace and does not run checkLogin(), so session lifetime and idle timeout, the user's status and a password change do not invalidate the preview; because every constructed article content object is switched to the working revision, articles embedded into templates via REX_ARTICLE[id=…] also render their working versions. The history path is gated only by the global history[article_rollback] permission, so an editor with a mountpoint on a single category can read snapshots of articles outside that mountpoint, including slices deleted in the meantime. Both paths require the respective plugin to be installed and activated (both ship with the core) and a working version or snapshot to exist for the target article; neither involves victim interaction or a cross-site vector.
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- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Authenticated backend session required (PR:L) over a network-reachable frontend request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/UI:N); only confidentiality is affected (C:H) via systematic article_id/clang enumeration, with no scope change.
Primary rating from Vendor (vulncheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: vulncheck
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
REDAXO core before 5.21.4 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the structure/version and structure/history frontend preview modes, which do not check category or clang permissions for the previewed article. Any backend user, or one holding history[article_rollback], can set rex_version or rex_history_date with arbitrary article_id values to read unpublished working versions and historic or deleted content.
Technical POC Analysis
CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) in REDAXO core; the advisory also tags CWE-200 as the effect.
Full technical POC analysis - root cause, step-by-step exploitation and patch breakdown - is part of the Pro and Business plans.
Executive ViewAI
A high-severity authorization flaw in REDAXO core (before version 5.21.4) allows any authenticated backend user to read unpublished draft content of articles, and users with the history[article_rollback] permission to access deleted historical snapshots, potentially exposing sensitive or confidential information across all articles. Since exploitation requires only a low-privileged account and the exposed content is systematically enumerable, this poses a material confidentiality risk to the organization's editorial and business data, warranting immediate leadership attention.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
EUVD-2026-110793
GHSA-f7g4-vhhq-7w9x
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB