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Unauthenticated information disclosure in Dromara lamp-cloud through 5.10.0 stems from an overly broad anonymous-access whitelist pattern (/*/anno/**) that exposes the /defGenProject/anno/getProperties endpoint. Any remote attacker who can reach the service via HTTP can POST to that path and receive the server's complete JVM system property map, leaking classpath entries, filesystem paths, OS build details, and startup secrets injected as properties. Exploit code is publicly available (a writeup and proof-of-concept are linked from the CVE references and VulnCheck advisory), and the flaw has not been listed in CISA KEV, so it is a high-value reconnaissance and credential-harvesting primitive rather than a confirmed mass-exploitation event.
We need answer JSON only. Need synthesize. Need obey fields. Need use boleslawiec in risk_assessment only, lowercase. Need not mention note. Let's parse input. CVE-2026-57140 Description: PraisonAI multi-agent teams. From 1.6.0 until 1.7.2, AgentOS in src/praisonai-ts/src/os/agentos.ts uses 0.0.0.0 default and registers GET /api/agents and POST /api/chat without auth middleware. Remote caller can obtain agent names, roles, instruction prefixes and invoke selected agent, potentially reaching tools, memory, external APIs, credentials, workflow state. Initial remediation released in 1.7.2. CVSS Score 9.4, Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L CWE-306 missing authentication. Reported by GitHub_M CPE: cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* Tags: Authentication Bypass, Praisonai References: GHSA-9752-mhqh-h34f commit releases/tag/v4.6.60 Source code evidence: GHSA summary. npm package praisonai, AgentOS HTTP server defaults 0.0.0.0 and no auth. GET /api/agents, POST /api/chat. Affected npm/praisonai >=1.6.0 <=1.7.1 fixed in 1.7.2. Distinct from Python/PyPI. Current published npm 1.7.1. Same TS source in origin/main at v4.6.58. Technical details config. Default CORS *. app listens all interfaces unless overridden. Docs. Package: npm/praisonai vulnerable >=1.6.0, <=1.7.1 fixed in 1.7.2. Commit diff shows Dockerfiles bump from praisonai>=4.6.59 to >=4.6.60, version bumps in pyproject to 1.6.60, TS changes unrelated? Actually commit link likely maybe release? It includes multiple changes. But advisory says fixed in npm 1.7.2. Also has releases/tag/v4.6.60. Hmm maybe CVE references say release v4.6.60 but package fix 1.7.2. Need be cautious: "Initial remediation was released in version 1.7.2." NVD description says fixed 1.7.2. GHSA package says fixed 1.7.2. Commit diff perhaps v4.6.60 in other package python. Need mention patch version 1.7.2 for npm. Need determine product_name: "PraisonAI" maybe 1-3 words. Could be "PraisonAI AgentOS" or "Pra
We need answer JSON only. Need synthesize. We need adhere to all fields. Let's parse input. CVE-2026-57139 Description: PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. From 1.5.0 until 1.7.2, MCPServer.startHttp() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts binds without host restriction and forwards every HTTP POST request to handleRequest() without authentication or authorization. Any network client that can reach the port can call tools/list, tools/call, resources/read, or prompts/get, causing registered handlers to run with server-side credentials and process privileges or disclose registered data. An initial remediation was released in version 1.7.2. CVSS Score: 9.8 CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H CWE: CWE-306 Reported by GitHub_M CPE: cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* Tags: Authentication Bypass, Praisonai References: advisory GHSA, commit, release tag v4.6.60 Source evidence GHSA says package npm/praisonai vulnerable >=1.5.0 <=1.7.1 fixed 1.7.2. Also references release tag v4.6.60 maybe Python? Need note discrepancy? CVE description says initial remediation in 1.7.2. Fix version 1.7.2 for npm package. Release tag 4.6.60 is maybe different packaging. Need mention. Need product_name: "PraisonAI" likely 1 word but okay. They ask 1-3 words exact product. Could be "PraisonAI" maybe "PraisonAI MCPServer"? primary product. Use "PraisonAI". Summary: original synthesis, not copy. Start with impact verb and product. Need mention actively exploited? Input KEV absent? No KEV field. POC? no explicit POC. EPSS? not given. We can say no public exploit identified. But need not mention if missing? It asks if POC exists and EPSS risk if notable. We don't have EPSS. So "No public exploit identified at time of analysis; EPSS not provided." Need maybe avoid. "Unauthenticated remote code execution in PraisonAI's TypeScript MCPServer..." Wait CVE is missing auth leading to invoking tools, could cause RCE? CVSS C/I/A H but description says handlers run wit
Unauthenticated MCP tool invocation in PraisonAI (praisonaiagents 0.6.0–1.6.58 and praisonai 3.10.0–4.6.58) lets a malicious website use DNS rebinding to reach a local or internal ToolsMCPServer SSE endpoint on /sse and /messages/, enumerate registered tools, and invoke them with the server user's privileges. The legacy SSE wrapper performs no Host, Origin, or authentication enforcement, while the newer Streamable HTTP transport rejects the same hostile Origin with HTTP 403, isolating the flaw to the legacy SSE path. An initial remediation ships in praisonaiagents
Unauthenticated retrieval of Stripe Checkout Session objects in the MarcosCamara01 Ecommerce Template (before commit 91e273c) exposes buyer personally identifiable information to anyone holding a session id. The GET handler at /api/stripe/checkout_sessions calls stripe.checkout.sessions.retrieve() and returns the full object — buyer name, email, phone, billing address, amount paid and internal userId — without ever calling auth.api.getSession() or verifying that the session belongs to the caller, even though sibling endpoints such as POST /api/stripe/payment already enforced authentication. Exploitation is not confirmed in the wild and no public exploit code was identified, but the session_id is written into the buyer's own success_url (/result?session_id={CHECKOUT_SESSION_ID}), so it leaks through Referer headers, analytics, access logs and shared-machine browser history, making the flaw practically reachable rather than purely theoretical.
Authentication bypass in ESPHome Device Builder (the esphome-device-builder package powering the `dashboard` subcommand of the ghcr.io/esphome/esphome container) versions before 1.0.12 silently disables dashboard authentication on upgrade for operators who had protected it with the legacy bare $USERNAME/$PASSWORD environment variables. A rename to $ESPHOME_USERNAME/$ESPHOME_PASSWORD (PR #265) dropped the old names with no fallback, so `using_password` becomes false and both the REST auth middleware and WebSocket login gate switch off, leaving the dashboard open to anyone who can reach its port. Because a compromised dashboard caller can compile arbitrary code and read/write config and data directories, this is effectively unauthenticated RCE; publicly available exploit/PoC code exists, though it is not in CISA KEV (SSVC exploitation: none).
Missing authentication on Krayin CRM's admin mail ingest route lets any remote, unauthenticated attacker POST crafted RFC 2822 messages to /admin/mail/inbound-parse and plant arbitrary emails — including forged replies stitched into existing conversation threads — in victim CRM inboxes on every release through 2.2.6. VulnCheck reports proof-of-concept exploit code (SSVC Exploitation: PoC) and the attack is fully automatable, but the issue is not listed in CISA KEV, so active in-the-wild abuse is not confirmed; the CVSS v4.0 base score is 8.8, driven by high integrity impact with no confidentiality impact and only limited availability impact.
We need answer JSON only. Need analyze CVE. Need be careful. We need synthesize. Let's inspect all data. CVE-2026-57127 PraisonAI. Description: multi-agent teams system. Prior 4.6.58, recipe serve installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or JWTAuthMiddleware when operator selects api-key or JWT authentication, but each middleware forwards requests when PRAISONAI_API_KEY or PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET and the corresponding recipe value are absent. Unauthenticated clients can then reach recipe execution, input, output surfaces and may trigger connected tools despite operator explicitly enabling authentication. Fixed in 4.6.58. CVSS 9.8 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. CWE-306. Patch: Available vendor. Reported by GitHub_M. CPE cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* . Tags: Authentication Bypass, Praisonai, Mervinpraison. SSVC: Exploitation: poc, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-77615. Affected versions EUVD: ["PraisonAI < 4.6.48"] (but description says prior 4.6.58 fixed in 4.6.58; EUVD says <4.6.48? conflict maybe). References: GHSA, commit, release v4.6.58. Source evidence: GHSA advisory. Package pip/praisonai vulnerable <=4.6.48 fixed in 4.6.59? Wait source code evidence says Package pip/praisonai — vulnerable: <= 4.6.48 — fixed in: 4.6.59. That's inconsistent with description fixed 4.6.58 and advisory maybe. Need mention conflict. The CVE description says prior to 4.6.58 fixed in 4.6.58. EUVD says affected <4.6.48. source evidence says fixed in 4.6.59, vulnerable <=4.6.48. Actually maybe typo. We must synthesize with all data. Need not correct? Could state discrepancy. Need produce fields plain text strings. product_name: "PraisonAI" 1-3 words. Summary original synthesis, do not start with vulnerability. Need mention impact and product. Could start "Unauthenticated clients can reach PraisonAI recipe execution..." That is specific impact verb? "Unauthenticated clients can reach..." Good. Mention active exploitation? KEV not provided
We need answer JSON only. Need synthesize. Need careful with fields. Let's parse input. CVE-2026-57123 PraisonAI agents MCP SSE server missing auth. Product_name: "PraisonAI Agents"? Specific product or service. Package praisonaiagents. Use 1-3 words. "PraisonAI Agents" or "praisonaiagents". likely "PraisonAI Agents". Need summary original synthesis not paraphrase. Start with impact verb and product. Must mention actively exploited? KEV absent? Input no KEV field. SSVC exploitation none. POC? Source says proof of concept static AST analysis, but not public exploit? Tags no POC. So "no public exploit identified at time of analysis" maybe. EPSS not provided. We can say EPSS unknown/not provided. Summary: Unauthenticated tool execution via MCP SSE endpoint in PraisonAI Agents prior to 1.6.59 binds 0.0.0.0 and exposes /sse and /messages without auth/origin checks; attacker can list/invoke registered tools leading to RCE depending tools. Fixed in 1.6.59. Need mention POC? The GHSA includes static proof, but not public exploit code? "Proof of concept: Static proof" - not actual exploit code. So no public exploit identified? There is a static proof, but not public exploit. We should be precise: "only static source-code proof provided; no functioning public exploit identified". KEV no. Use phrase. Need technical_context: underlying Python MCP SSE transport, Starlette app, uvicorn binding to 0.0.0.0; mcp_security.py dead code. CWE-306. CPE affected: cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonaiagents:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. Explain. risk_assessment: CVSS 9.8 network low no priv, EPSS not available. SSVC none, automatable yes, technical impact total. Compare. Real risk high if tools with file/shell/code exec; but if no tools or only benign maybe lower. Need explicit missing EPSS. Maybe "CVSS 9.8 but no EPSS or KEV; SSVC automatable yes total but no exploitation observed; severity depends registered tools." State missing. "No EPSS score provided; KEV absent" etc. affected_products: pip/praiso
We need answer in JSON only. Need parse all data. Need produce fields exactly. Need analyze CVE-2026-57125. We need craft original synthesis. Product_name: "PraisonAI" likely. Summary: unauthenticated RCE in PraisonAI Jobs API via crafted agent_yaml approve field bypassing @require_approval execute_command. Fixed 4.6.59 and praisonaiagents 1.6.59. KEV? Input doesn't mention KEV. SSVC Exploitation: poc, so public exploit exists? POC in advisory. No KEV. Patch available. EPSS? Not provided. Need mention no EPSS data. CVSS 9.8. CWE-306 Missing Authentication. Need risk assessment compare signals, state missing EPSS. Exploitation status: "publicly available exploit code exists" since SSVC poc. Product_name one to three words: "PraisonAI". Need technical_context: underlying Python multi-agent framework; POST /api/v1/runs Jobs API in praisonai; YAML agent workflow parser in praisonaiagents; ContextVar-based approval; execute_command critical tool; CWE-306 missing authentication; CPE exact mervinpraison:praisonai and praisonaiagents. Explain root cause. References GHSA, commit. Risk assessment: CVSS 9.8 AV:N AC:L PR:N UI:N S:U C:H I:H A:H indicates remote unauthenticated, low complexity no interaction, total CIA. SSVC: Exploitation poc, Automatable yes, Technical impact total. Patch available from vendor. No KEV/EPSS provided. Public POC lowers barrier; however actual exploitation not confirmed. Need mention missing/conflicting? No conflict maybe patch has exact versions. EPSS missing. Need state "CVSS and SSVC align on critical risk." But note "no EPSS score provided". It is a real priority if internet-exposed Jobs API. Could be "high-CVSS and high-real-risk where exposed, but deployment prevalence unknown / maybe moderate; no proactive exploitation signals". Need not infer KEV. "No KEV listing in supplied data." Use phrases allowed. Affected_products: PraisonAI < 4.6.59, praisonaiagents < 1.6.59. CPEs cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* and cpe:2.3:a:me
Unauthenticated information disclosure in Dromara lamp-cloud through 5.10.0 stems from an overly broad anonymous-access whitelist pattern (/*/anno/**) that exposes the /defGenProject/anno/getProperties endpoint. Any remote attacker who can reach the service via HTTP can POST to that path and receive the server's complete JVM system property map, leaking classpath entries, filesystem paths, OS build details, and startup secrets injected as properties. Exploit code is publicly available (a writeup and proof-of-concept are linked from the CVE references and VulnCheck advisory), and the flaw has not been listed in CISA KEV, so it is a high-value reconnaissance and credential-harvesting primitive rather than a confirmed mass-exploitation event.
We need answer JSON only. Need synthesize. Need obey fields. Need use boleslawiec in risk_assessment only, lowercase. Need not mention note. Let's parse input. CVE-2026-57140 Description: PraisonAI multi-agent teams. From 1.6.0 until 1.7.2, AgentOS in src/praisonai-ts/src/os/agentos.ts uses 0.0.0.0 default and registers GET /api/agents and POST /api/chat without auth middleware. Remote caller can obtain agent names, roles, instruction prefixes and invoke selected agent, potentially reaching tools, memory, external APIs, credentials, workflow state. Initial remediation released in 1.7.2. CVSS Score 9.4, Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L CWE-306 missing authentication. Reported by GitHub_M CPE: cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* Tags: Authentication Bypass, Praisonai References: GHSA-9752-mhqh-h34f commit releases/tag/v4.6.60 Source code evidence: GHSA summary. npm package praisonai, AgentOS HTTP server defaults 0.0.0.0 and no auth. GET /api/agents, POST /api/chat. Affected npm/praisonai >=1.6.0 <=1.7.1 fixed in 1.7.2. Distinct from Python/PyPI. Current published npm 1.7.1. Same TS source in origin/main at v4.6.58. Technical details config. Default CORS *. app listens all interfaces unless overridden. Docs. Package: npm/praisonai vulnerable >=1.6.0, <=1.7.1 fixed in 1.7.2. Commit diff shows Dockerfiles bump from praisonai>=4.6.59 to >=4.6.60, version bumps in pyproject to 1.6.60, TS changes unrelated? Actually commit link likely maybe release? It includes multiple changes. But advisory says fixed in npm 1.7.2. Also has releases/tag/v4.6.60. Hmm maybe CVE references say release v4.6.60 but package fix 1.7.2. Need be cautious: "Initial remediation was released in version 1.7.2." NVD description says fixed 1.7.2. GHSA package says fixed 1.7.2. Commit diff perhaps v4.6.60 in other package python. Need mention patch version 1.7.2 for npm. Need determine product_name: "PraisonAI" maybe 1-3 words. Could be "PraisonAI AgentOS" or "Pra
We need answer JSON only. Need synthesize. We need adhere to all fields. Let's parse input. CVE-2026-57139 Description: PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. From 1.5.0 until 1.7.2, MCPServer.startHttp() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts binds without host restriction and forwards every HTTP POST request to handleRequest() without authentication or authorization. Any network client that can reach the port can call tools/list, tools/call, resources/read, or prompts/get, causing registered handlers to run with server-side credentials and process privileges or disclose registered data. An initial remediation was released in version 1.7.2. CVSS Score: 9.8 CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H CWE: CWE-306 Reported by GitHub_M CPE: cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* Tags: Authentication Bypass, Praisonai References: advisory GHSA, commit, release tag v4.6.60 Source evidence GHSA says package npm/praisonai vulnerable >=1.5.0 <=1.7.1 fixed 1.7.2. Also references release tag v4.6.60 maybe Python? Need note discrepancy? CVE description says initial remediation in 1.7.2. Fix version 1.7.2 for npm package. Release tag 4.6.60 is maybe different packaging. Need mention. Need product_name: "PraisonAI" likely 1 word but okay. They ask 1-3 words exact product. Could be "PraisonAI" maybe "PraisonAI MCPServer"? primary product. Use "PraisonAI". Summary: original synthesis, not copy. Start with impact verb and product. Need mention actively exploited? Input KEV absent? No KEV field. POC? no explicit POC. EPSS? not given. We can say no public exploit identified. But need not mention if missing? It asks if POC exists and EPSS risk if notable. We don't have EPSS. So "No public exploit identified at time of analysis; EPSS not provided." Need maybe avoid. "Unauthenticated remote code execution in PraisonAI's TypeScript MCPServer..." Wait CVE is missing auth leading to invoking tools, could cause RCE? CVSS C/I/A H but description says handlers run wit
Unauthenticated MCP tool invocation in PraisonAI (praisonaiagents 0.6.0–1.6.58 and praisonai 3.10.0–4.6.58) lets a malicious website use DNS rebinding to reach a local or internal ToolsMCPServer SSE endpoint on /sse and /messages/, enumerate registered tools, and invoke them with the server user's privileges. The legacy SSE wrapper performs no Host, Origin, or authentication enforcement, while the newer Streamable HTTP transport rejects the same hostile Origin with HTTP 403, isolating the flaw to the legacy SSE path. An initial remediation ships in praisonaiagents
Unauthenticated retrieval of Stripe Checkout Session objects in the MarcosCamara01 Ecommerce Template (before commit 91e273c) exposes buyer personally identifiable information to anyone holding a session id. The GET handler at /api/stripe/checkout_sessions calls stripe.checkout.sessions.retrieve() and returns the full object — buyer name, email, phone, billing address, amount paid and internal userId — without ever calling auth.api.getSession() or verifying that the session belongs to the caller, even though sibling endpoints such as POST /api/stripe/payment already enforced authentication. Exploitation is not confirmed in the wild and no public exploit code was identified, but the session_id is written into the buyer's own success_url (/result?session_id={CHECKOUT_SESSION_ID}), so it leaks through Referer headers, analytics, access logs and shared-machine browser history, making the flaw practically reachable rather than purely theoretical.
Authentication bypass in ESPHome Device Builder (the esphome-device-builder package powering the `dashboard` subcommand of the ghcr.io/esphome/esphome container) versions before 1.0.12 silently disables dashboard authentication on upgrade for operators who had protected it with the legacy bare $USERNAME/$PASSWORD environment variables. A rename to $ESPHOME_USERNAME/$ESPHOME_PASSWORD (PR #265) dropped the old names with no fallback, so `using_password` becomes false and both the REST auth middleware and WebSocket login gate switch off, leaving the dashboard open to anyone who can reach its port. Because a compromised dashboard caller can compile arbitrary code and read/write config and data directories, this is effectively unauthenticated RCE; publicly available exploit/PoC code exists, though it is not in CISA KEV (SSVC exploitation: none).
Missing authentication on Krayin CRM's admin mail ingest route lets any remote, unauthenticated attacker POST crafted RFC 2822 messages to /admin/mail/inbound-parse and plant arbitrary emails — including forged replies stitched into existing conversation threads — in victim CRM inboxes on every release through 2.2.6. VulnCheck reports proof-of-concept exploit code (SSVC Exploitation: PoC) and the attack is fully automatable, but the issue is not listed in CISA KEV, so active in-the-wild abuse is not confirmed; the CVSS v4.0 base score is 8.8, driven by high integrity impact with no confidentiality impact and only limited availability impact.
We need answer JSON only. Need analyze CVE. Need be careful. We need synthesize. Let's inspect all data. CVE-2026-57127 PraisonAI. Description: multi-agent teams system. Prior 4.6.58, recipe serve installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or JWTAuthMiddleware when operator selects api-key or JWT authentication, but each middleware forwards requests when PRAISONAI_API_KEY or PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET and the corresponding recipe value are absent. Unauthenticated clients can then reach recipe execution, input, output surfaces and may trigger connected tools despite operator explicitly enabling authentication. Fixed in 4.6.58. CVSS 9.8 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. CWE-306. Patch: Available vendor. Reported by GitHub_M. CPE cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* . Tags: Authentication Bypass, Praisonai, Mervinpraison. SSVC: Exploitation: poc, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. ENISA EUVD: EUVD-2026-77615. Affected versions EUVD: ["PraisonAI < 4.6.48"] (but description says prior 4.6.58 fixed in 4.6.58; EUVD says <4.6.48? conflict maybe). References: GHSA, commit, release v4.6.58. Source evidence: GHSA advisory. Package pip/praisonai vulnerable <=4.6.48 fixed in 4.6.59? Wait source code evidence says Package pip/praisonai — vulnerable: <= 4.6.48 — fixed in: 4.6.59. That's inconsistent with description fixed 4.6.58 and advisory maybe. Need mention conflict. The CVE description says prior to 4.6.58 fixed in 4.6.58. EUVD says affected <4.6.48. source evidence says fixed in 4.6.59, vulnerable <=4.6.48. Actually maybe typo. We must synthesize with all data. Need not correct? Could state discrepancy. Need produce fields plain text strings. product_name: "PraisonAI" 1-3 words. Summary original synthesis, do not start with vulnerability. Need mention impact and product. Could start "Unauthenticated clients can reach PraisonAI recipe execution..." That is specific impact verb? "Unauthenticated clients can reach..." Good. Mention active exploitation? KEV not provided
We need answer JSON only. Need synthesize. Need careful with fields. Let's parse input. CVE-2026-57123 PraisonAI agents MCP SSE server missing auth. Product_name: "PraisonAI Agents"? Specific product or service. Package praisonaiagents. Use 1-3 words. "PraisonAI Agents" or "praisonaiagents". likely "PraisonAI Agents". Need summary original synthesis not paraphrase. Start with impact verb and product. Must mention actively exploited? KEV absent? Input no KEV field. SSVC exploitation none. POC? Source says proof of concept static AST analysis, but not public exploit? Tags no POC. So "no public exploit identified at time of analysis" maybe. EPSS not provided. We can say EPSS unknown/not provided. Summary: Unauthenticated tool execution via MCP SSE endpoint in PraisonAI Agents prior to 1.6.59 binds 0.0.0.0 and exposes /sse and /messages without auth/origin checks; attacker can list/invoke registered tools leading to RCE depending tools. Fixed in 1.6.59. Need mention POC? The GHSA includes static proof, but not public exploit code? "Proof of concept: Static proof" - not actual exploit code. So no public exploit identified? There is a static proof, but not public exploit. We should be precise: "only static source-code proof provided; no functioning public exploit identified". KEV no. Use phrase. Need technical_context: underlying Python MCP SSE transport, Starlette app, uvicorn binding to 0.0.0.0; mcp_security.py dead code. CWE-306. CPE affected: cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonaiagents:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. Explain. risk_assessment: CVSS 9.8 network low no priv, EPSS not available. SSVC none, automatable yes, technical impact total. Compare. Real risk high if tools with file/shell/code exec; but if no tools or only benign maybe lower. Need explicit missing EPSS. Maybe "CVSS 9.8 but no EPSS or KEV; SSVC automatable yes total but no exploitation observed; severity depends registered tools." State missing. "No EPSS score provided; KEV absent" etc. affected_products: pip/praiso
We need answer in JSON only. Need parse all data. Need produce fields exactly. Need analyze CVE-2026-57125. We need craft original synthesis. Product_name: "PraisonAI" likely. Summary: unauthenticated RCE in PraisonAI Jobs API via crafted agent_yaml approve field bypassing @require_approval execute_command. Fixed 4.6.59 and praisonaiagents 1.6.59. KEV? Input doesn't mention KEV. SSVC Exploitation: poc, so public exploit exists? POC in advisory. No KEV. Patch available. EPSS? Not provided. Need mention no EPSS data. CVSS 9.8. CWE-306 Missing Authentication. Need risk assessment compare signals, state missing EPSS. Exploitation status: "publicly available exploit code exists" since SSVC poc. Product_name one to three words: "PraisonAI". Need technical_context: underlying Python multi-agent framework; POST /api/v1/runs Jobs API in praisonai; YAML agent workflow parser in praisonaiagents; ContextVar-based approval; execute_command critical tool; CWE-306 missing authentication; CPE exact mervinpraison:praisonai and praisonaiagents. Explain root cause. References GHSA, commit. Risk assessment: CVSS 9.8 AV:N AC:L PR:N UI:N S:U C:H I:H A:H indicates remote unauthenticated, low complexity no interaction, total CIA. SSVC: Exploitation poc, Automatable yes, Technical impact total. Patch available from vendor. No KEV/EPSS provided. Public POC lowers barrier; however actual exploitation not confirmed. Need mention missing/conflicting? No conflict maybe patch has exact versions. EPSS missing. Need state "CVSS and SSVC align on critical risk." But note "no EPSS score provided". It is a real priority if internet-exposed Jobs API. Could be "high-CVSS and high-real-risk where exposed, but deployment prevalence unknown / maybe moderate; no proactive exploitation signals". Need not infer KEV. "No KEV listing in supplied data." Use phrases allowed. Affected_products: PraisonAI < 4.6.59, praisonaiagents < 1.6.59. CPEs cpe:2.3:a:mervinpraison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* and cpe:2.3:a:me