Monthly
Nonce reuse in wolfEngine's AES-CCM implementation for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 allows a network-positioned adversary to recover plaintext across records and forge authentication tags within a session. The root defect is that wolfEngine reads the explicit CCM nonce from the uninitialized record input buffer rather than deriving it from the TLS sequence number in the Additional Authenticated Data, producing a constant nonce for every record under the same key. Exposure is sharply constrained: AES-CCM cipher suites must be explicitly selected (non-default), only wolfEngine is affected (wolfProvider is not), and TLS 1.3 is entirely outside scope. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis; the vendor-released fix is wolfEngine 1.4.1.
AES-GCM nonce reuse in wolfEngine before 1.4.1 allows a network-positioned passive adversary to fully recover encrypted plaintext and forge authentication tags across all TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 sessions. The 8-byte explicit nonce is generated once at TLS write-key setup and never incremented per record, meaning every GCM record within a connection shares an identical (key, nonce) pair - a catastrophic misuse of authenticated encryption. AES-CCM cipher suites, TLS 1.3, and non-TLS uses of AES-GCM are explicitly unaffected; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Nonce reuse in wolfProvider before 1.2.2 completely breaks AES-GCM confidentiality and integrity guarantees for every TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 connection using that cipher suite. Because the 8-byte explicit nonce is set once at key establishment and never incremented, every record in a session is encrypted under an identical (key, nonce) pair - the classical 'forbidden attack' condition where XORing two ciphertexts yields the XOR of the plaintexts, and the GHASH authentication key can be algebraically recovered to enable tag forgery. No active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV, and no public proof-of-concept has been identified at time of analysis; however, the attack is well-understood cryptography with no special tooling required beyond captured traffic.
AES-GCM nonce reuse in ePA3-Service-OpenSource (all versions prior to 1.3.0) allows a network-positioned attacker to recover plaintext patient health records and forge authenticated VAU protocol messages. The frozen `request_counter` in `VAUProtokoll.py` causes every outgoing message to be encrypted under the same nonce-key pair, breaking AES-GCM's fundamental security guarantee. No public exploit code is confirmed at time of analysis, but the underlying Joux forbidden attack is well-documented in cryptographic literature, and the affected data - Germany's national electronic patient records - carries exceptional regulatory and clinical sensitivity.
AES-GCM nonce exhaustion in Kong Event Gateway 1.0.0-1.1.1 and 1.2.0 allows an authorized consumer to recover partial message plaintext when the AWS IAM encryption feature is enabled and key rotation has not occurred. Because keys are only rotated on gateway reboot, a producer sustaining a high message rate can exhaust the NIST SP 800-38D-recommended random nonce limit (~2^32 encryptions), making nonce collisions statistically likely and enabling ciphertext XOR attacks. No public exploit exists and the vulnerability is not in CISA KEV; the CVSS 4.0 score of 2.3 reflects the narrow, condition-heavy exploitation path.
Sensitive key material can be exposed in Qualcomm Snapdragon platforms because AES-GCM key wrapping is performed with a hardcoded/static initialization vector instead of a unique per-call nonce. A local, low-privileged attacker who can collect multiple wrapped outputs can exploit the resulting IV/nonce reuse to recover confidentiality and forge integrity of wrapped keys. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is disclosed via Qualcomm's July 2026 security bulletin.
Plaintext recovery of webflow conversation state in Apereo CAS (versions 7.3.0 up to but not including 8.0.0-RC6) lets remote unauthenticated attackers decrypt sensitive login-flow data by exploiting AES-GCM nonce reuse. Because the server encrypts client-side webflow execution tokens with a fixed all-zero initialization vector under a single long-lived key, an attacker can harvest multiple tokens from the public login page and apply known-plaintext/keystream-reuse analysis to break confidentiality (and, given GCM's nonce-reuse properties, integrity of the token). Publicly available exploit code exists; the flaw was reported by VulnCheck and carries a CVSS 4.0 base of 9.3, though no CISA KEV listing or EPSS score is provided.
Nonce reuse in ImageMagick's AES-CTR cipher implementation exposes encrypted image plaintext to recovery attacks. The PasskeyEncipherImage method in ImageMagick before 7.1.2-22 reuses nonces when performing AES in Counter mode, violating the fundamental security requirement that a nonce be used exactly once per key. A network-accessible attacker who can collect multiple ciphertexts produced with the same passkey and nonce can XOR the outputs to cancel the shared keystream and partially or fully recover encrypted image content. No active exploitation has been identified (not in CISA KEV), and no public exploit code is known at time of analysis.
Keystream reuse in wolfSSL's streaming AES-GCM API exposes ciphertext to partial plaintext recovery when a single session accumulates more than 64 GiB of data, violating NIST SP 800-38D counter limits due to unguarded internal counter wrap. All wolfSSL versions are affected per wildcard CPE (cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*), with the flaw present in both AES-GCM and AES-CCM streaming paths. Exploitation is constrained to local access with low privileges, high attack complexity, and the operationally unusual prerequisite of processing tens of gigabytes in a single uninterrupted streaming session; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Authentication bypass in Discuz! X5.0 releases 20260320 through 20260501 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access database backup and restore functionality exposed by dbbak.php. The flaw stems from a shared cryptographic key (CWE-323) between UCenter integration and the backup API, which lets an attacker abuse an encryption oracle in logging_ctl::logging_more() to mint legitimately signed authorization tokens, and chain a race condition to impersonate arbitrary users. Publicly available exploit code exists and an upstream fix has been published on Gitee.
Nonce reuse in wolfEngine's AES-CCM implementation for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 allows a network-positioned adversary to recover plaintext across records and forge authentication tags within a session. The root defect is that wolfEngine reads the explicit CCM nonce from the uninitialized record input buffer rather than deriving it from the TLS sequence number in the Additional Authenticated Data, producing a constant nonce for every record under the same key. Exposure is sharply constrained: AES-CCM cipher suites must be explicitly selected (non-default), only wolfEngine is affected (wolfProvider is not), and TLS 1.3 is entirely outside scope. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis; the vendor-released fix is wolfEngine 1.4.1.
AES-GCM nonce reuse in wolfEngine before 1.4.1 allows a network-positioned passive adversary to fully recover encrypted plaintext and forge authentication tags across all TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 sessions. The 8-byte explicit nonce is generated once at TLS write-key setup and never incremented per record, meaning every GCM record within a connection shares an identical (key, nonce) pair - a catastrophic misuse of authenticated encryption. AES-CCM cipher suites, TLS 1.3, and non-TLS uses of AES-GCM are explicitly unaffected; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Nonce reuse in wolfProvider before 1.2.2 completely breaks AES-GCM confidentiality and integrity guarantees for every TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 connection using that cipher suite. Because the 8-byte explicit nonce is set once at key establishment and never incremented, every record in a session is encrypted under an identical (key, nonce) pair - the classical 'forbidden attack' condition where XORing two ciphertexts yields the XOR of the plaintexts, and the GHASH authentication key can be algebraically recovered to enable tag forgery. No active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV, and no public proof-of-concept has been identified at time of analysis; however, the attack is well-understood cryptography with no special tooling required beyond captured traffic.
AES-GCM nonce reuse in ePA3-Service-OpenSource (all versions prior to 1.3.0) allows a network-positioned attacker to recover plaintext patient health records and forge authenticated VAU protocol messages. The frozen `request_counter` in `VAUProtokoll.py` causes every outgoing message to be encrypted under the same nonce-key pair, breaking AES-GCM's fundamental security guarantee. No public exploit code is confirmed at time of analysis, but the underlying Joux forbidden attack is well-documented in cryptographic literature, and the affected data - Germany's national electronic patient records - carries exceptional regulatory and clinical sensitivity.
AES-GCM nonce exhaustion in Kong Event Gateway 1.0.0-1.1.1 and 1.2.0 allows an authorized consumer to recover partial message plaintext when the AWS IAM encryption feature is enabled and key rotation has not occurred. Because keys are only rotated on gateway reboot, a producer sustaining a high message rate can exhaust the NIST SP 800-38D-recommended random nonce limit (~2^32 encryptions), making nonce collisions statistically likely and enabling ciphertext XOR attacks. No public exploit exists and the vulnerability is not in CISA KEV; the CVSS 4.0 score of 2.3 reflects the narrow, condition-heavy exploitation path.
Sensitive key material can be exposed in Qualcomm Snapdragon platforms because AES-GCM key wrapping is performed with a hardcoded/static initialization vector instead of a unique per-call nonce. A local, low-privileged attacker who can collect multiple wrapped outputs can exploit the resulting IV/nonce reuse to recover confidentiality and forge integrity of wrapped keys. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is disclosed via Qualcomm's July 2026 security bulletin.
Plaintext recovery of webflow conversation state in Apereo CAS (versions 7.3.0 up to but not including 8.0.0-RC6) lets remote unauthenticated attackers decrypt sensitive login-flow data by exploiting AES-GCM nonce reuse. Because the server encrypts client-side webflow execution tokens with a fixed all-zero initialization vector under a single long-lived key, an attacker can harvest multiple tokens from the public login page and apply known-plaintext/keystream-reuse analysis to break confidentiality (and, given GCM's nonce-reuse properties, integrity of the token). Publicly available exploit code exists; the flaw was reported by VulnCheck and carries a CVSS 4.0 base of 9.3, though no CISA KEV listing or EPSS score is provided.
Nonce reuse in ImageMagick's AES-CTR cipher implementation exposes encrypted image plaintext to recovery attacks. The PasskeyEncipherImage method in ImageMagick before 7.1.2-22 reuses nonces when performing AES in Counter mode, violating the fundamental security requirement that a nonce be used exactly once per key. A network-accessible attacker who can collect multiple ciphertexts produced with the same passkey and nonce can XOR the outputs to cancel the shared keystream and partially or fully recover encrypted image content. No active exploitation has been identified (not in CISA KEV), and no public exploit code is known at time of analysis.
Keystream reuse in wolfSSL's streaming AES-GCM API exposes ciphertext to partial plaintext recovery when a single session accumulates more than 64 GiB of data, violating NIST SP 800-38D counter limits due to unguarded internal counter wrap. All wolfSSL versions are affected per wildcard CPE (cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*), with the flaw present in both AES-GCM and AES-CCM streaming paths. Exploitation is constrained to local access with low privileges, high attack complexity, and the operationally unusual prerequisite of processing tens of gigabytes in a single uninterrupted streaming session; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Authentication bypass in Discuz! X5.0 releases 20260320 through 20260501 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access database backup and restore functionality exposed by dbbak.php. The flaw stems from a shared cryptographic key (CWE-323) between UCenter integration and the backup API, which lets an attacker abuse an encryption oracle in logging_ctl::logging_more() to mint legitimately signed authorization tokens, and chain a race condition to impersonate arbitrary users. Publicly available exploit code exists and an upstream fix has been published on Gitee.