WarehousePG CVE-2026-96538

Requires a valid authenticated WarehousePG 7.x (before 7.6.0-WHPG) database login of any role - no superuser, no GRANT, and no special privilege are needed because the affected functions have PUBLIC EXECUTE. File create/overwrite(append)/rename/delete under the data and log directories and log-filename enumeration work immediately for any such role. The escalation to arbitrary code execution as the postgres OS user additionally requires a server restart or configuration reload after postgresql.auto.conf is modified (attacker may wait for a routine restart or induce a reload). Limiting factors: only WHPG 7.x is affected (6.x enforces an internal superuser check), and the attacker must already possess database credentials, so this is authenticated privilege escalation rather than pre-auth compromise.

This is a genuine high-priority issue for anyone running WarehousePG 7.x. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H, score 8.7) is well-supported by the description: any authenticated low-privilege database role can call the ungated file functions over the network with low complexity, and the documented path from file write to appending postgresql.auto.conf yields arbitrary code execution as the postgres OS user - full confidentiality, integrity, and availability loss. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or standalone exploit POC was provided in the input, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis'; however, the vendor advisory and the merged fix PR#305 (including a regression test demonstrating that a regular role is denied while pg_write_server_files members succeed) fully document the vulnerable code path, making a working exploit trivial to reconstruct. The only meaningful barrier is that the attacker needs a valid database login (PR:L) - this is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE flaw, not a pre-auth internet-facing one, which tempers real-world mass-exploitation risk but keeps it critical in any multi-tenant or shared-credential deployment. Root cause is confirmed by source: the REVOKE that contrib/adminpack applies was never carried into WHPG core when catalog entries were repointed to adminpack-derived implementations during the Greenplum→PostgreSQL 12 merge.

An attacker with any ordinary (non-superuser) WarehousePG login - a data analyst account, an application service role, or a compromised low-privilege credential - connects to the database and calls pg_file_write() to append 'shared_preload_libraries' or 'archive_command' directives to postgresql.auto.conf in the data directory. On the next server restart or configuration reload, the injected directive causes the loading of an attacker-controlled library or command, yielding arbitrary code execution as the postgres OS user. No public standalone exploit is identified, but the fix PR and its regression test make the code path fully reproducible.