Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Network-reachable but gated by an existing user session and replayable request_uri (AC:H); attacker must be a registered OAuth client (PR:L); impact limited to duplicate auth codes, so C:L/I:L and A:N.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
A flaw was found in the Pushed Authorization Request PAR implementation of Keycloak. The issue occurs when the silent authentication path prompt=none is used, which allows the authorization process to skip certain steps if a user is already logged in. Due to this bypass, the security rule that ensures a pushed request URI is used only once is not enforced. An attacker could potentially reuse a request URI to obtain multiple authorization codes for a user who is already signed in, violating security standards like FAPI-2.
AnalysisAI
Keycloak's Pushed Authorization Request implementation can allow an authenticated OAuth client to reuse a previously pushed request_uri when the prompt=none silent-authentication path is used, resulting in multiple authorization codes for an already signed-in user. Exploitation requires a live victim session, PAR enabled, and an authenticated low-privilege client (PR:L), with high attack complexity and limited impact; CVSS is 4.2. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires all of the following: the Keycloak/Red Hat SSO server must support and use Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR); the attacker must be an authenticated/registered OAuth client capable of pushing and replaying a request_uri (PR:L); the targeted user must already have an active login session so the silent-authentication prompt=none path is taken; and the attacker must obtain a valid, still-usable PAR request_uri for that session. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | This is a genuine but low-priority protocol-conformance flaw, not a high-impact breach. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch version is identified in the provided intelligence at time of analysis; monitor the Red Hat advisory at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-96446 and Bugzilla https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2539284 for updated Keycloak and Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 packages. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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Same weakness CWE-862 – Missing Authorization
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allVendor StatusVendor
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-85221
GHSA-j24v-wv3r-fjch