Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Primary rating from Vendor (INCIBE) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: INCIBE
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Incorrect permission settings on a critical resource in Suprema BioStar 2 (versions 2.9.3 through 2.9.11) that allow backup files to be publicly exposed when the administrator configures their path within the NGINX webroot. This vulnerability allows an attacker with network access to directly download backup ZIP files via ‘http(s)://[server]/download/…’ without requiring authentication. This exposes highly sensitive information that can lead to server impersonation, unauthorized access to databases, and lateral movement.
AnalysisAI
Unauthenticated backup file disclosure in Suprema BioStar 2 server (versions 2.9.3 through 2.9.11) allows remote attackers to download sensitive backup ZIP archives directly via predictable '/download/' URLs when the administrator places the backup path inside the NGINX webroot. The exposed archives can contain database credentials and cryptographic material enabling server impersonation, database compromise, and lateral movement. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but SSVC rates the flaw as automatable with total technical impact and CVSS 4.0 scores it 10.0.
Technical ContextAI
Suprema BioStar 2 is a widely deployed web-based access control and biometric authentication platform that ships with an embedded NGINX web server to host its management UI and APIs. The root cause is CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource): when an administrator configures the backup destination directory underneath the NGINX document root, NGINX's default static-file handling serves those files to any HTTP client without invoking the application's authentication layer. Because backups contain a full snapshot of the access-control database (user records, biometric template references, configuration, and likely secrets), the misconfiguration converts a routine operational task into an unauthenticated data exfiltration channel reachable over the standard web port.
RemediationAI
Apply the vendor-released patch referenced in the INCIBE-CERT advisory at https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-supremas-biostar (patch availability is confirmed but the exact fixed version is not stated in the supplied data, so consult Suprema directly to confirm the target release before upgrading from any 2.9.3-2.9.11 build). As an immediate compensating control, move the backup destination directory outside the NGINX document root so static-file handling cannot reach it, which fully eliminates the exposure with no functional side effects beyond updating backup tooling paths. If the path cannot be relocated quickly, add an NGINX 'location /download/' block that returns 403 or requires authentication - this blocks the attack but will also break any legitimate workflow that depends on direct download URLs. Rotate any credentials, API keys, or database secrets contained in previously exposed backups, since patching does not undo prior disclosures.
More in Biostar 2 Server
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-33282
GHSA-3fmq-xr93-jqc5