Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessCraft adoptium.net download link with dot-segment traversal
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DeliveryPhish victim into clicking trusted link
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ExploitBypass startsWith allowlist via URL normalisation
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ExecutionBrowser auto-downloads attacker-controlled binary
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ImpactVictim runs malicious JDK installer
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
ASVS 5.0
V15 - Secure Coding and Architecture Code integrity verification
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| Exploitation Conditions | Requires a victim to follow an attacker-crafted adoptium.net /[locale]/download URL whose 'link' query parameter embeds ../ dot-segments that resolve off the trusted-prefix allowlist (e.g. https://github.com/adoptium/temurin/../../attacker-org/malware/releases/download/v1/jdk.exe). No authentication, privileges, or non-default server configuration is needed - every deployment built from commit 0b24ea1 (2025-06-18) up to the fix in cbb53cf (2026-09-24) is affected. Limiting factors: the attack depends on user interaction (the victim must click the crafted link, typically delivered via phishing) and on the victim subsequently executing the downloaded binary to achieve code execution; the website has since been patched, so only the historical window is exposed. |
| Impact | Signals point to a real but moderate, non-urgent issue. The vendor CVSS of 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) treats this as network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated with high integrity impact and no confidentiality/availability impact - consistent with CWE-494 (untrusted download). However, the description explicitly requires a victim to follow a crafted adoptium.net link, which is user interaction (UI:R), so the vendor's UI:N appears optimistic and the effective exploitability is lower than 7.5 suggests. Exploitation probability signals are low and mutually consistent: EPSS is 0.11% (1st percentile), the CVE is NOT in CISA KEV, and no public exploit was identified (the referenced GitHub artifact is the fix commit with regression tests demonstrating the bypass, not a weaponized POC). There is no SSVC decision data in the input. The mitigating factor is that exploitation depends on social engineering plus the victim subsequently executing the downloaded binary; the aggravating factor is that the malicious download is served under the genuine adoptium.net 'Thank you for downloading' page, which strongly boosts phishing credibility and lends this a supply-chain/malware-delivery character. Net: a legitimate flaw worth patching, already fixed server-side, but not a high-priority emergency given low EPSS, no KEV, no public exploit, and the required user interaction. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker crafts an adoptium.net/[locale]/download URL whose 'link' parameter is e.g. https://github.com/adoptium/temurin/../../attacker-org/malware/releases/download/v1/jdk.exe; it passes the String.startsWith() allowlist check on the raw string but the browser normalises the ../ segments and resolves to an attacker repository. The victim clicks the link (e.g. via phishing), sees the authentic Temurin thank-you page, and their browser silently downloads the attacker's binary. No public exploit exists, but the fix commit includes test cases that demonstrate the dot-segment traversal bypass. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 16, 2026
URL validation bypass on the Eclipse Adoptium website (adoptium.net) lets an unauthenticated attacker craft a post-download link that passes the site's trusted-prefix check but resolves - after the browser's RFC 3986 dot-segment normalisation - to an arbitrary attacker-controlled repository, so a victim sees the genuine "Thank you for downloading Eclipse Temurin" page while their browser fetches a binary of the attacker's choosing. Every deployment built from commit 0b24ea1 (2025-06-18) up to the fix in commit cbb53cf (2026-09-24) is affected; the assessed vector is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N, meaning exploitation depends on a victim following a crafted adoptium.net link (typically via phishing) and then executing the downloaded file, so the integrity impact is real but user-interaction-gated. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and EPSS is very low (0.11%, 1st percentile), the vendor fix is available, and the advisory is public under GHSA-f228-m952-5r6w - a real but non-urgent issue whose exposure window has already closed on the hosted site.
RemediationAI
The primary fix is to deploy the adoptium.net code at or after commit cbb53cf4a41f068a70902217473d7e2fe5d6c6ad (2026-09-24), which replaces the String.startsWith() prefix check on the raw "link" parameter with WHATWG URL parsing: the link is parsed into a URL object, unparseable strings are rejected, and acceptance requires an exact origin match plus a pathname.startsWith() test against the already dot-segment-normalised pathname, with failsafes redirecting to /temurin/releases; the vendor advisory GHSA-f228-m952-5r6w and the Eclipse assignment record at https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/313 track this release. Operators of self-hosted or mirrored instances should treat any build in the 0b24ea1-cbb53cf range as vulnerable and upgrade or cherry-pick the commit; if an upgrade is not immediately possible, the interim workaround is to remove or disable the "link" query-parameter redirect on /[locale]/download (force it to serve the static /temurin/releases page), which trades away the convenience of pre-selected vendor mirrors but eliminates the open-redirect vector, or to normalise the URL server-side before comparison (resolve ../ segments with a standards-compliant parser and re-verify the resulting origin), which must be done carefully because ad-hoc string handling is exactly the failure mode here. End users cannot patch the site but should verify GPG signatures or SHA-256 checksums published on the official Adoptium release pages before running any downloaded JDK, since the malicious payload would otherwise be indistinguishable from a legitimate installer. Note the attack only works against unpatched deployments and still requires the victim to click a crafted link and then execute the fetched binary, so no server-side mitigation beyond fixing the redirect is available or needed.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The defect is a classic parser-differential / allowlist-bypass (CWE-494, download of code without integrity check) in the Next.js route /[locale]/download of the adoptium.net website. The page's client component reads a "link" query parameter and issues a meta http-equiv="refresh" navigation to it. Validation compared the raw parameter string against trusted prefixes using String.startsWith(), with an allowlist consisting of origin/path pairs such as https://github.com + /adoptium/temurin, https://cdn.azul.com + /zulu/, https://aka.ms + /download-jdk/, https://github.com + /ibmruntimes/, https://github.com + /dragonwell-project/ and https://developers.redhat.com + /. Because the comparison happened on the unnormalised string, a value like https://github.com/adoptium/temurin/../../attacker-org/malware/releases/download/v1/jdk.exe satisfied startsWith("https://github.com/adoptium/temurin") while the browser/WHA TWG URL parser collapsed the ../ segments so the real navigation target escaped /adoptium/ entirely. The fix in commit cbb53cf replaces the string check with WHATWG URL parsing - parsing the link into a URL object, returning false on parse failure, and requiring both an exact origin match and a pathname.startsWith() check on the already-normalised pathname - plus a safe fallback redirect to /temurin/releases for unparseable or off-allowlist values, as reflected in the added regression tests (client-redirects.test.tsx and the allowlist security tests in page.test.tsx). The underlying Temurin JDK binaries themselves are not affected; the vulnerability is in the website's download-redirect logic, which is why the CPE (cpe:2.3:a:eclipse_foundation:adoptium_temurin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*) and the EUVD entry (Adoptium Temurin 0 < 1f9753c) are best read as tracking the distribution site rather than the Java runtime.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Network-reachable and low-complexity (simple ../ bypass) with no auth, but the victim must follow a crafted link, so UI:R; impact is integrity-only (malicious download), hence C:N/A:N.
Primary rating from Vendor (eclipse).
CVSS VectorVendor: eclipse
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
In the Eclipse Adoptium website (adoptium.net), in every deployment built from commit 0b24ea1 (2025-06-18) up to the fix in commit cbb53cf (2026-09-24), the post-download page /[locale]/download takes a download URL from the "link" query parameter and automatically navigates to it with a meta http-equiv="refresh". The URL is checked against a list of trusted prefixes using String.startsWith() on the raw string, while the browser applies RFC 3986 dot-segment normalisation before navigating, so a value such as https://github.com/adoptium/temurin/../../attacker/malware/releases/download/v1/jdk.exe passes the check but resolves to an attacker-controlled repository. A victim who follows a crafted adoptium.net link is shown the genuine "Thank you for downloading Eclipse Temurin" page while their browser downloads a binary of the attacker's choosing
Executive ViewAI
Eclipse Adoptium's official website (adoptium.net) contains a URL validation bypass that allows attackers to craft links appearing to download legitimate Eclipse Temurin binaries but actually delivering malicious files of their choosing. Organizations relying on Eclipse Temurin for Java runtime environments could face supply chain compromise if users execute the downloaded malware, though there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis. Leadership should ensure download verification and user awareness, as the vendor patch is available.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
EUVD-2026-102088
GHSA-5w25-6xp6-x3fm
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB