Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain valid user credentials
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DeliveryIdentify Really Simple Security 2FA enabled
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ExploitSend crafted request to unprotected 2FA REST endpoint
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ExecutionReceive authenticated WordPress session cookie
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PersistAccess account bypassing email OTP
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ImpactEscalate to admin actions if privileged
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Authentication mechanism validation
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Defense Evasion, Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | The attacker must already possess a valid username and password for a target WordPress account on a site running Really Simple Security before 9.5.10.1 with its email-based two-factor authentication feature enabled - the bug specifically defeats the second factor, so stage-one credentials are a hard prerequisite. The Really Simple Security 2FA module must be active (the plugin must be installed and 2FA configured for the target user) and the WordPress REST API must be reachable to the attacker. CVSS AC:H reflects the dependency on already having valid credentials, which limits opportunistic mass exploitation but makes the flaw highly impactful against any account whose password has leaked. |
| Impact | The CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H produces a 7.5 base score reflecting network reachability, no user interaction, and full CIA impact, tempered by high attack complexity and a low-privilege prerequisite - that PR:L is misleading at face value because it really represents possession of a valid password rather than an existing application role, which is precisely the scenario this plugin's 2FA is meant to defeat. The combination of publicly available exploit code from WPScan, a released vendor patch, and the plugin's massive WordPress install base meaningfully raises real-world risk above what the 7.5 score alone implies, particularly for sites whose users have been exposed in credential dumps or phishing campaigns. CISA KEV listing is not indicated in the input and EPSS data is not provided, so widespread automated exploitation cannot be confirmed; the practical priority is high for any site relying on this plugin as a compensating control against credential reuse. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker obtains a WordPress user's password through credential stuffing, phishing, or a prior breach, then instead of completing the email OTP step required by Really Simple Security's 2FA, sends a crafted request directly to one of the two unprotected REST endpoints to receive a valid authenticated session cookie. A public PoC exists via WPScan, lowering the skill barrier; if the compromised account is an administrator, the attacker can install malicious plugins, exfiltrate data, or deface the site. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jun 02, 2026
Two-factor authentication bypass in the Really Simple Security WordPress plugin before 9.5.10.1 allows attackers who already possess a valid username and password to hijack a fully authenticated WordPress session without completing the email OTP challenge. Two REST endpoints in the plugin's 2FA flow fail to enforce the second-factor challenge, effectively neutralizing the MFA protection the plugin is marketed to provide. Publicly available exploit code exists (WPScan), and a vendor patch has been released.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade the Really Simple Security plugin to version 9.5.10.1 or later via the WordPress plugin updater or by downloading from the vendor; this is the only complete fix and should be applied immediately given the public PoC. As a temporary compensating control until the update can be deployed, administrators can deactivate the Really Simple Security 2FA feature and enforce an alternative MFA plugin, or restrict access to /wp-json/ REST routes via web server rules or a WAF - note that broadly blocking wp-json will break legitimate REST API functionality including block editor and headless integrations, so scope rules to the specific 2FA endpoints when possible. Forcing a password reset for privileged users is advisable since the bug means any leaked password is effectively a full account compromise. See https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/1de69ef9-6226-4292-8e36-b331a37f043e/ for technical details.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Really Simple Security (formerly Really Simple SSL) is one of the most widely deployed WordPress security plugins, offering hardening features including email-based two-factor authentication implemented through WordPress REST API endpoints. The underlying weakness is CWE-287 (Improper Authentication): two REST endpoints in the 2FA workflow accept and process authentication state transitions without validating that the user has successfully completed the email OTP step, so an attacker holding stage-one credentials can pivot to a fully authenticated session by calling those endpoints directly rather than going through the normal challenge flow. The affected CPE (cpe:2.3:a:unknown:really_simple_security:*) covers all versions prior to 9.5.10.1.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from Vendor (WPScan) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: WPScan
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
The Really Simple Security WordPress plugin before 9.5.10.1 does not enforce the second-factor challenge in two of its two-factor authentication REST endpoints, allowing an attacker who knows a user's password to obtain a WordPress authentication session for that user without completing the email OTP challenge.
Executive ViewAI
The Really Simple Security WordPress plugin versions before 9.5.10.1 contain a critical two-factor authentication bypass that allows attackers with valid credentials to completely circumvent MFA and hijack authenticated user sessions. This vulnerability directly undermines the core security defense administrators deployed this plugin to provide, leaving all WordPress sites running vulnerable versions exposed to account takeover. With publicly available exploit code already in circulation, organizations should prioritize immediate patching as part of their incident prevention strategy.
Vendor-released patch: Really Simple Security 9.5.10.1
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
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EUVD-2026-33882
GHSA-g33r-3vq8-q6f4
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB