ToolJet CVE-2026-82873

Exploitation requires a valid authenticated ToolJet account at any privilege level (CVSS PR:L confirmed by the provided CVSS 4.0 vector). For the cross-workspace schema disclosure vector, the attacker must supply a body-provided organization_id referencing a target workspace they are not a member of - the endpoint processes this parameter without server-side workspace membership validation. For the intra-workspace app definition bypass, the attacker must be a legitimate member of a workspace and reference app identifiers for definitions restricted by granular per-app export permissions. Exploitation is constrained by: (1) mandatory authenticated account - unauthenticated access is not possible per PR:L; (2) need to know or enumerate valid target organization_id values for cross-workspace attacks. No special non-default server configuration is required beyond a standard multi-workspace ToolJet deployment.

The CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.3 (Medium) is reasonable and consistent with the described impact: network-accessible, low-complexity exploitation (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N) requiring a low-privilege authenticated account (PR:L), with limited confidentiality impact on both the vulnerable system and a subsequent system (VC:L/SC:L), and no integrity or availability impact. No EPSS data was provided and the vulnerability is absent from the CISA KEV catalog; no public exploit code has been identified. Despite the moderate score, the cross-workspace schema disclosure carries disproportionate business risk in multi-tenant SaaS or enterprise ToolJet deployments where workspace isolation is a contractual and compliance requirement - leaking table schemas reveals data models and potentially sensitive column names across organizational boundaries. The intra-workspace per-app export bypass is lower severity but still violates the least-privilege model enforced by granular permissions. The authentication prerequisite (PR:L) limits opportunistic mass exploitation but does not meaningfully protect against insider threats or compromised low-privilege accounts.

An authenticated ToolJet user in Workspace A sends a crafted POST request to /api/v2/resources/export with a JSON body containing an organization_id belonging to Workspace B, which they have no legitimate membership in. The server processes the export request without checking workspace membership, returning TooljetDB table schema metadata - table names, column definitions, and data model structure - belonging to Workspace B's tenants. No public proof-of-concept code has been identified, but the attack requires only standard HTTP tooling and valid low-privilege credentials.