EUVD-2026-76254
GHSA-3cwq-59j3-h9hj
Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
AC:H because exploitation requires a DS28E17 chip physically present plus a malicious I2C slave device attached to the 1-Wire bus - a non-default hardware configuration.
Primary rating from Vendor (Linux).
CVSS VectorVendor: Linux
Lifecycle Timeline
6DescriptionCVE.org
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
w1: ds28e17: reject an oversize length on an I2C block read
w1_f19_i2c_master_transfer() is the master_xfer for the DS28E17 1-Wire to I2C bridge. On an I2C_M_RECV_LEN read, it takes the length from the device. The downstream slave puts a length byte in buf[0]. The driver then reads that many bytes into buf[1] with w1_f19_i2c_read().
buf[0] is controlled by the device and can be 0 to 255. w1_f19_i2c_read() only rejects a zero count. The caller buffer is I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2, so 34 bytes. A length above 32 makes the read run past it, up to about 222 bytes out of bounds.
The SMBus core does check buf[0] against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX. That check runs after master_xfer returns. By then the write is already done. i2c-algo-bit rejects an oversize length before it copies, and returns -EPROTO.
Reject a length above I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX at both RECV_LEN sites, the same way i2c-algo-bit does.
AnalysisAI
Out-of-bounds kernel heap write in the Linux kernel's DS28E17 1-Wire-to-I2C bridge driver allows a local attacker controlling a malicious I2C slave device to write up to 222 bytes past a 34-byte kernel buffer. The driver's w1_f19_i2c_read() unconditionally trusts a device-supplied length byte (0-255) on I2C_M_RECV_LEN transactions, but the caller buffer is only I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2 bytes; the SMBus core's own BLOCK_MAX check runs only after the overwrite has already occurred. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires all of the following: (1) the w1_ds28e17 kernel module loaded on the target system; (2) a DS28E17 1-Wire-to-I2C bridge IC physically present and active on a 1-Wire bus; (3) a malicious or compromised I2C slave device connected downstream of the DS28E17 that returns a crafted length byte exceeding I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32) on a block read; (4) a local user (PR:L) able to initiate an I2C_M_RECV_LEN transaction through the adapter. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The vendor-supplied CVSS 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) overstates accessibility: AC:L implies no special configuration is needed, but exploitation concretely requires a DS28E17 1-Wire-to-I2C bridge chip physically present on the system and a malicious or compromised I2C slave device attached downstream - a substantial hardware prerequisite that makes AC:H more realistic. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Upgrade to a patched kernel: Linux 6.12.109, 6.18.50, 7.2.4, or 7.3-rc1 (or any later release in those series). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, audit systems inventory to identify which production and development machines include DS28E17 bridge hardware and document their current kernel versions. …
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