Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Hard-coded secret extractable from public firmware yields unauthenticated network forgery (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N), granting full read/write to mesh control (C:H/I:H) with no availability impact per the vendor vector.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Cudy WR3000 2.0 running firmware before 2.5.24 contains a hard-coded JWT HMAC signing secret vulnerability in the Mosquitto MQTT broker's authentication plugin that allows unauthenticated attackers to forge valid JWT tokens by extracting the secret from the firmware image. Attackers can use the extracted secret to craft arbitrary JWT tokens and authenticate to the MQTT broker without legitimate credentials, gaining unauthorized access to the device's mesh networking interface.
AnalysisAI
Authentication bypass in the Cudy WR3000 2.0 router (firmware before 2.5.24) lets unauthenticated remote attackers forge valid JWT tokens by reusing a hard-coded HMAC signing secret embedded in the firmware image, granting illegitimate access to the device's Mosquitto MQTT broker and mesh-networking control interface. Because the secret is static across all units of this model, any attacker who obtains one firmware image can authenticate against every deployed device. …
Unlock full vulnerability intelligence
- Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
- Attack chain visualization
- Remediation with exact patch versions
- Threat intelligence from 22 sources
- Personal watchlist & email alerts
Free forever · No credit card required
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires only network reachability to the device's Mosquitto MQTT broker and possession of the firmware-embedded JWT HMAC secret, which any attacker can extract from the freely downloadable WR3000 2.0 firmware image - no legitimate credentials, no user interaction, and no non-default configuration are needed (PR:N/UI:N/AC:L). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | All primary signals point the same direction: the CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) describes a network-reachable, low-complexity, zero-privilege, zero-interaction attack, and the hard-coded-secret root cause means exploitation is deterministic rather than probabilistic once the firmware is analyzed. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Upgrade to firmware version 2.5.24 or later, in which the vulnerability is fixed (Vendor-released patch: firmware 2.5.24), obtainable from the Cudy download center at https://www.cudy.com/en-us/pages/download-center/wr3000-2-0; consult the VulnCheck advisory at https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/cudy-wr3000-hard-coded-jwt-secret-authentication-bypass-via-mqtt for details. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, identify and inventory all Cudy WR3000 2.0 devices currently deployed and document their network role and criticality to mesh operations. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
More in Wr3000 2 0
View allSame weakness CWE-798 – Use of Hard-coded Credentials
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-62417
GHSA-jw4g-pv34-hp37