Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessCraft malicious CSV trace file
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DeliverySocial-engineer authorized user to import it
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ExploitXSS triggers while rendering Trace page
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ExecutionAttacker JavaScript runs in victim session
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ImpactPerform PLC operations within user's scope
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Output encoding, context-aware escaping
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Initial Access, Execution The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires an authenticated user holding the 'Read diagnostics' function right to manually import an attacker-crafted CSV trace file through the device's integrated web server Trace page; the malicious payload lives in the visual properties of calculated signals and only fires when that page renders. Limiting factors that reduce realistic risk: the device web server must be enabled and reachable, a specific privileged operator must be social-engineered into importing the file (UI:R), and any resulting PLC operations are bounded by that user's own authorization scope. There is no remote unauthenticated path against a default configuration - a human action by a rights-holding user is mandatory. |
| Impact | This is a medium-severity stored/DOM XSS (CWE-79, CVSS 6.1) in the integrated web server of Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 / ET 200SP / Drive Controller CPUs, where visual properties of calculated signals in imported CSV trace files are rendered on the Trace page without sanitization. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N) shows a network-reachable, low-complexity flaw with no attacker privileges but mandatory user interaction and a changed scope - the injected script runs in the victim's authenticated session and reaches PLC operations beyond the browser component. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the input, so the exploitation signal is weak: no public exploit identified at time of analysis. The PR:N rating reflects that the attacker needs no credentials of their own, but exploitation is gated entirely on social-engineering a specific operator who holds the 'Read diagnostics' function right into importing a crafted file - a meaningful real-world limiter that the raw network vector understates. SSVC decision data (exploitation/automatable/technical-impact) was not supplied; based on the mechanics, exploitation is not automatable (requires per-victim interaction) and technical impact is partial. Net: a legitimate issue to patch in OT/ICS fleets, but practically targeted and user-dependent rather than a wormable, mass-exploitable priority. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker crafts a CSV trace file whose calculated-signal visual properties embed malicious JavaScript, then convinces an operator who holds the 'Read diagnostics' right to import it via the device's web Trace page. When the page renders the signal, the script executes in the operator's authenticated session and issues PLC operations through the web server within that user's authorization. No public exploit code was identified, and success depends on the user interaction and low attack complexity reflected in the CVSS vector. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 13, 2026
Stored cross-site scripting in the integrated web server of Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500, ET 200SP and SIMATIC Drive Controller CPUs allows an attacker to bury JavaScript inside the visual properties of calculated signals in a crafted CSV trace file, which then executes in the browser session of anyone who imports that file and opens the Trace page. Exploitation is neither remote nor automatic: the CPU web server must be enabled and reachable, and a social-engineered operator holding the 'Read diagnostics' function right must import the file (CVSS 6.1, UI:R, PR:N), after which any resulting PLC operations are confined to that operator's own authorization scope. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Siemens has published advisory SSA-591731 (https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-591731.html), which should be consulted for the exact fixed firmware or product update versions for each listed CPU family; the input data does not specify a fix version, so patch availability cannot be confirmed here and the advisory is the authoritative source. Because exploitation requires a human import step and a reachable web server, the highest-value compensating controls are: disable the integrated web server on any CPU that does not need the diagnostics/Trace function (Trade-off: loss of browser-based diagnostics, trace viewing and remote monitoring); if the web server must stay enabled, restrict reachability of its HTTP/HTTPS ports to a dedicated, firewalled engineering VLAN or jump host so untrusted users and internet-adjacent networks cannot load the Trace page (Trade-off: added engineering friction and a single point of access to maintain); treat CSV trace files as untrusted input and only import files generated by a trusted engineering station or received over a verified channel, since the payload is invisible until the Trace page renders it; and review assignment of the 'Read diagnostics' function right so that only personnel who genuinely need trace/diagnostic access hold it (Trade-off: reduces the pool of users who can perform diagnostics, so plan for a small on-call group). Browser-side hardening (script blockers, running diagnostics sessions in a dedicated profile) reduces but does not eliminate the impact, because the injected script executes in the CPU web server's origin and can still drive PLC operations within the victim's authorization. No vendor-released patch version, and no public exploit code or active exploitation, is confirmed from the provided data; monitor the Siemens advisory for firmware updates and apply them as soon as they are published.
Affected VersionsENISA
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause is CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation), manifesting as stored/DOM cross-site scripting in the diagnostic web interface of Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 family controllers. Trace functionality in these CPUs lets engineers record signal values to CSV files and re-import them for graphical analysis on the device's built-in Trace page; the affected firmware fails to validate and sanitize the visual properties of calculated signals carried in those imported CSV files before rendering them, so attacker-supplied markup is emitted into the DOM. Because the page is served from the CPU's own web server origin, the injected script inherits that origin and the victim's authenticated session, which is why the CVSS vector scores S:C (scope changed) and allows attacker-controlled JavaScript to invoke PLC operations through the web server as the logged-in user. The CPE data enumerates the exposed hardware and firmware products, including SIMATIC Drive Controller CPU 1504D TF and 1507D TF, ET 200SP CPUs 1510SP(-1 PN), 1510SP F-1 PN, 1512SP(-1 PN) and 1512SP F-1 PN, plus the wider S7-1500 portfolio (1511 through 1518 including F, T, TF, C, PRO, ODK and MFP variants), S7-1500 Software Controllers 1507S/1508S, SIMATIC S7-PLCSIM Advanced, and SIPLUS ruggedized equivalents. The attack surface is the classic engineering/diagnostics access path rather than the control network itself.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Attacker needs no own credentials (PR:N) but must get a privileged user to import a file (UI:R); injected script crosses from browser to PLC operations, so S:C with low C/I and no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (siemens).
CVSS VectorVendor: siemens
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Affected devices do not properly validate and sanitize visual properties of calculated signals contained in imported CSV trace files before rendering them on the Trace page.
This could allow an attacker to social engineer an authorized user who holds the function right “Read diagnostics” into importing a specially crafted trace file. Successful exploitation could allow attacker-controlled JavaScript to execute in the user’s browser session and perform PLC operations through the web server within the scope of the user’s authorization.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Cross-Site Scripting occurs when an application accepts untrusted data and sends it to a web browser without proper validation or encoding.
Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) in Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 and ET 200SP controller families allows authenticated attac
Stored cross-site scripting in Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 controller family web interface allows authenticated high-privile
Denial of service in Siemens industrial networking equipment allows remote unauthenticated attackers to crash affected d
Cross-site scripting in the integrated web server of Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500, ET 200SP, and SIMATIC Drive Controller CPU
Stored cross-site scripting in the integrated web server of Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500, ET 200SP, Drive Controller and S7-1
Importing a maliciously crafted trace file into the integrated web server of a Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 (and closely rela
Cross-site scripting (XSS) in Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 PLC family firmware upload interface allows authenticated attacker
Stored cross-site scripting (CWE-79) in the integrated web server Trace page of Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500, ET 200SP, and S
Reflected cross-site scripting in the integrated web server of a broad range of Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500, ET 200SP, and D
Stored/DOM cross-site scripting (CWE-79, CVSS 6.1, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N) in the web-based Trace
Cross-site scripting (CWE-79) in the integrated web server of Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500, ET 200SP, and SIMATIC Drive Contr
EUVD-2026-98382
GHSA-76mf-cjqf-w77p
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
VulDB
Exploit-DB