Tandoor Recipes CVE-2026-59967

The attacker must hold a valid authenticated account that is a member of the SAME shared Space as the victim (PR:L), and the victim must have a pending BookmarkletImport record in that Space. The specific trigger is submitting another member's BookmarkletImport primary key to POST /api/recipe-from-source/; because the pre-2.6.10 code filtered only by pk (and implicitly Space) without checking created_by, cross-member access succeeds. Limiting factors: exploitation is confined to co-tenants of a shared Space, requires authentication, and only affects versions prior to 2.6.10 - single-user or non-shared Space deployments are not exposed, and there is no user interaction or non-default configuration required beyond having multiple members in a Space.

This is a medium-severity authorization flaw (IDOR/BOLA, CWE-639) with a CVSS 3.1 score of 5.4 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L), and the real-world risk signals are consistent and modest. The CVSS vector requires low privileges (PR:L), meaning an authenticated account that is a member of the same shared Space is a hard prerequisite - this is not remote-unauthenticated. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or POC was provided in the intelligence, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis'; the absence of these signals, combined with the low-to-medium confidentiality and availability impact (C:L/A:L, no integrity impact), indicates this is a genuine but non-urgent authorization bug rather than a high-priority mass-exploitation threat. The attack is logically simple (sequential primary-key enumeration) and the patch is confirmed in the vendor commit, so the main residual risk is insider/cross-tenant abuse within multi-member Spaces rather than internet-wide attack. No conflicting signals were observed: the network attack vector is accurate because the endpoint is a web API, but it is gated by shared-Space membership, which the raw AV:N does not convey - treat the practical blast radius as limited to co-tenants.

A legitimate user who shares a Tandoor Recipes Space with a victim guesses or increments the sequential BookmarkletImport primary key belonging to the victim and submits it to POST /api/recipe-from-source/. The endpoint returns the victim's stored URL and captured page content (disclosing potentially private/authenticated content) and then unconditionally deletes the victim's pending import. No public exploit code was identified, but the attack requires only a valid account in the same Space and trivial ID enumeration.