What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-55863?

CVE-2026-55863 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 5.3 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N.

Is there a patch available for CVE-2026-55863?

Yes, a patch is available for CVE-2026-55863. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

motionEye CVE-2026-55863

MEDIUM

Missing Authorization (CWE-862)

2026-06-23 https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye

GHSA-j67x-q29f-qcvv

Docker Authentication Bypass Python SSRF

5.3

CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY

5.3 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

vuln.today AI

5.3 MEDIUM

Fully network-accessible unauthenticated endpoint; integrity impact only since camera actions do not expose confidential data or directly deny service.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

None

Integrity

Low

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jun 23, 2026 - 19:03 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jun 23, 2026 - 19:03 vuln.today

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

The ActionHandler.post() method in motionEye has no authentication decorator, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to trigger camera actions including snapshots, recording start/stop, and configured action scripts (PTZ controls, alarm triggers, etc.).

Vulnerability Details

File: motioneye/handlers/action.py - ActionHandler.post() line 36 CWE: CWE-862 - Missing Authorization CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N = 5.3 Medium

Vulnerable Code

python

class ActionHandler(BaseHandler):
    async def post(self, camera_id, action):
# ← NO @BaseHandler.auth() decorator
        camera_id = int(camera_id)
        if camera_id not in config.get_camera_ids():
            raise HTTPError(404, 'no such camera')
        ...
        if action == 'snapshot':
            await self.snapshot(camera_id)
# executed without auth
            return
        elif action == 'record_start':
            return self.record_start(camera_id)
        elif action == 'record_stop':
            return self.record_stop(camera_id)

        action_commands = config.get_action_commands(local_config)
        command = action_commands.get(action)
        ...
        self.run_command_bg(command)
# executes predefined shell scripts

Compare with other handlers that correctly require authentication:

python

@BaseHandler.auth(admin=True)
# ← properly protected
async def delete(self, camera_id, filename):
    ...

Steps to Reproduce

Deploy motionEye with at least one camera configured
Send unauthenticated POST:

POST /action/1/snapshot HTTP/1.1
Host: motioneye-host:8765
Content-Length: 0

Observe {} (HTTP 200) response - snapshot triggered without any credentials

For action scripts (lock, unlock, alarm_on, alarm_off, light_on, etc.):

POST /action/1/alarm_on HTTP/1.1
Host: motioneye-host:8765

Impact

Unauthenticated attacker can trigger camera snapshots on demand
Unauthenticated attacker can start/stop video recording
If action scripts are configured by admin: attacker can trigger PTZ movement, alarm control, lighting changes - physical security bypass
Via remote cameras: SSRF by triggering action on a remote motionEye server

Verification

Dynamically confirmed on v0.43.1 in Docker lab - POST /action/2/snapshot with no credentials returns HTTP 200 {}. Server log shows the action was processed (failed only because motion daemon was not running for the test camera, not due to an auth rejection).

Recommended Fix

python

class ActionHandler(BaseHandler):
    @BaseHandler.auth()
# add authentication requirement
    async def post(self, camera_id, action):
        ...

AnalysisAI

Unauthenticated remote action execution in motionEye (pip/motioneye < 0.44.0) exposes every camera action endpoint - snapshots, recording start/stop, and administrator-configured shell scripts - to any attacker who can reach port 8765, due to a missing @BaseHandler.auth() decorator on ActionHandler.post(). Dynamically confirmed on v0.43.1 in a Docker lab environment; exploitation requires only a single HTTP POST with no credentials, headers, or user interaction. …

Unlock full vulnerability intelligence

Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
Attack chain visualization
Remediation with exact patch versions
Threat intelligence from 22 sources
Personal watchlist & email alerts

Continue with Google Continue with GitHub

Free forever · No credit card required

Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access

Discover motionEye on port 8765

Delivery

Send unauthenticated POST to /action/<camera_id>/<action>

Exploit

Server skips auth check due to missing decorator

Execution

Execute built-in camera action or configured shell script

Impact

Trigger physical security control or pivot via SSRF

Access

Discover motionEye on port 8765

Delivery

Send unauthenticated POST to /action/<camera_id>/<action>

Exploit

Server skips auth check due to missing decorator

Execution

Execute built-in camera action or configured shell script

Impact

Trigger physical security control or pivot via SSRF

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation	The motionEye web interface must be reachable from the attacker's network on the configured port (default 8765) - this is the only prerequisite for the baseline snapshot/record_start/record_stop impact. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment	The CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N yields a 5.3 Medium score, reflecting a low-complexity, fully network-accessible, unauthenticated attack with limited integrity-only impact. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario	An attacker scans for motionEye instances listening on TCP port 8765 and sends a single unauthenticated HTTP POST to /action/1/alarm_on with no headers or body - the server responds HTTP 200 and executes the alarm_on shell script configured by the administrator, potentially silencing a physical alarm or disabling a door lock. If the target has remote camera connections configured, the attacker can chain requests to trigger actions on internal motionEye servers not otherwise reachable, achieving SSRF-based lateral movement. …
Remediation	Upgrade to motionEye version 0.44.0 or later, which applies the @BaseHandler.auth() decorator to ActionHandler.post(), aligning it with the authorization pattern used by other protected handlers. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.