Tianji CVE-2026-55239

The attacker must hold a valid authenticated account on a Tianji workspace; the lowest-possible role - a read-only viewer - is sufficient, because workspaceProcedure authorizes any workspace member to reach the affected analytics queries. Exploitation requires supplying a crafted timezone value either through analytics request data or the 'timezone' HTTP header, which getDateQuery() interpolates into raw SQL via Prisma.sql() without parameter binding. No non-default configuration, feature flag, or user interaction is needed - the vulnerable code path is reachable in a stock installation. The sole limiting factor is the need for workspace membership (PR:L): fully anonymous, unauthenticated exploitation is NOT possible, which meaningfully constrains exposure on single-user or tightly-invited instances versus open-signup or many-tenant deployments.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base 8.8) is internally consistent with the description: a network-reachable SQL injection (CWE-89) requiring only low privileges - any authenticated workspace member, explicitly including a read-only viewer - and no user interaction, yielding full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact on the shared PostgreSQL database. The low PR:L requirement is the key driver: this is not a pre-auth flaw, but the trust boundary it crosses is very low because even read-only viewers can trigger it, effectively nullifying Tianji's role separation. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, SSVC decision data, or public POC was provided in the input; per the precision rules this is therefore 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' However, the vendor security advisory (GHSA-v9jm-vvrj-53c4) and a reviewable fix commit are published, and the injection mechanism (unparameterized timezone interpolation reachable via an HTTP header) is low-complexity and well understood, so working exploitation is realistically straightforward to reconstruct from the patch. Net assessment: this is a genuine priority for any organization running a multi-tenant or multi-user Tianji instance, tempered only by the facts that it requires a valid low-privilege account (not internet-wide anonymous exploitation) and that Tianji's real-world deployment footprint is modest. The absence of EPSS/KEV signals reflects missing data, not evidence of low risk - do not read it as reassurance.

An attacker holding (or able to obtain) any authenticated workspace account on a Tianji instance - even a read-only viewer invite - sends an analytics request with a crafted timezone HTTP header. The malicious timezone string is interpolated unparameterized into raw SQL by getDateQuery(), letting the attacker read or alter credentials, API keys, and other tenants' data in the shared PostgreSQL database, or crash the service. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but the fix commit publicly reveals the vulnerable interpolation pattern.