Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-reachable Panel but AC:H and UI:R reflect required content-structure knowledge, social engineering, and a click before save; C/I:H for session compromise, A:N as availability is unaffected.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/getkirby/kirby).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/getkirby/kirby
Lifecycle Timeline
8DescriptionCVE.org
TL;DR
This vulnerability affects Kirby sites that use the writer field in any blueprint.
It was possible to include a scripting link as the target of a link (or email link). This link target would then be clickable by the user who entered it.
A successful attack commonly requires knowledge of the content structure by the attacker as well as social engineering of a user with access to the Panel. The attack *cannot* be automated.
In Kirby's default configuration, the vulnerability is limited to self-XSS and *cannot* directly affect other users or visitors of the site. Panel plugins that are directly using the <k-writer> component may also be affected by stored XSS if they don't sanitize the resulting HTML before saving it to the content.
This vulnerability is of high severity for affected sites.
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Introduction
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a type of vulnerability that allows attackers to execute any kind of JavaScript code inside the Panel session of the same or other users. In the Panel, a harmful script can, for example, trigger requests to Kirby's API with the permissions of the victim.
*Self* cross-site scripting (self-XSS) typically involves a user inadvertently executing malicious code within their own context, often through social engineering techniques. This can occur when a user is tricked into pasting and executing malicious JavaScript code into the browser's developer console, address bar or form fields.
In a *stored* XSS attack, the malicious payload is saved into the content data and has the potential to affect other users or site visitors.
Such vulnerabilities are critical if you might have potential attackers in your group of authenticated Panel users. They can escalate their privileges if they get access to the Panel session of an admin user. Depending on your site, other JavaScript-powered attacks are possible.
Affected components
The writer field allows users to input formatted text, including links to arbitrary URLs and email addresses. Its link and email marks are therefore a target for XSS attacks.
As the vulnerability is in the writer mark components, it also affects all uses of the <k-writer> component in Panel plugins.
Impact
In affected releases, the link and email marks did not prevent XSS payloads from being submitted to the writer field's content data:
- The
linkmark allowed users to enter JavaScript URLs using the "custom" URL type. These URLs would already be sanitized by the backend before storing the malicious link in the content file. However, the link may be clicked by the same user who entered it before the content is saved. - The
emailmark was also vulnerable to injected JavaScript URLs. However, it was not possible to perform the attack via the Panel user interface due to email validation. The attack needed to be performed via a side channel such as the browser console.
The vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious links into content. If the authenticated user clicked such a link before saving the content, the malicious script code would then be executed in their browser.
Patches
The problem has been patched in Kirby 4.9.4 and Kirby 5.4.4. Please update to one of these or a later version to fix the vulnerability.
In all of the mentioned releases, we have added more robust validation against dangerous URL schemes that are entered in the affected writer marks.
AnalysisAI
Cross-site scripting in Kirby CMS's Panel writer field (versions <= 4.9.3 and 5.0.0-alpha.1 through 5.4.3) lets an authenticated user inject a JavaScript-scheme URL into the link or email marks that executes in their own browser session when clicked before the content is saved. In Kirby's default configuration this is limited to self-XSS requiring social engineering, but Panel plugins that embed the <k-writer> component without sanitizing HTML before storage can be escalated to stored XSS affecting other users. There is no public exploit and it is not in CISA KEV; the vendor rates it high severity for affected sites.
Technical ContextAI
Kirby is a PHP flat-file CMS whose administrative Panel provides a rich-text 'writer' field built on the Vue-based <k-writer> component. The field exposes 'link' and 'email' marks that let users attach URLs to text. The flaw is a CWE-83 issue (improper neutralization of script in a web page attribute): the client-side mark components accepted 'custom' URL types and email values containing javascript: scheme URLs and rendered them as clickable hrefs in the editing surface. While Kirby's backend sanitizes such URLs before writing them to the content file, the unsanitized link remained live and clickable in the browser during the editing session prior to save. Because the vulnerability lives in the shared writer mark components, every consumer of <k-writer> - including third-party Panel plugins - inherits the exposure. Affected packages are identified by CPE pkg:composer/getkirby_cms (Composer package getkirby/cms).
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patches exist: upgrade to Kirby 5.4.4 (https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/5.4.4) for the 5.x line, or to Kirby 4.9.4 (https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/4.9.4) as a backport for 4.x installs that cannot yet move to 5; the vendor recommends upgrading to Kirby 5 where possible. These releases add more robust validation against dangerous URL schemes entered in the writer marks. If immediate patching is not possible, reduce exposure by limiting Panel access to trusted users and enforcing least-privilege roles so that untrusted accounts cannot edit writer-field content (trade-off: restricts legitimate content workflows), and by advising editors never to click links inside a writer field before saving (weak, behavior-dependent control). For custom Panel plugins that use <k-writer>, add server-side HTML sanitization of the writer output before persisting it to content, which prevents the stored-XSS escalation but requires plugin code changes. Refer to the advisory at https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/security/advisories/GHSA-rhj6-r49h-5932 for details.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-42671
GHSA-rhj6-r49h-5932