Which versions of Baileys are affected by CVE-2026-48063?

The Baileys WhatsApp Web library (versions prior to 6.7.22 and 7.0.0-rc.12) contains a critical message spoofing vulnerability allowing unauthenticated remote actors to forge messages and corrupt…. A patch is available.

Is there a public PoC exploit available for CVE-2026-48063?

Yes, a public proof-of-concept exploit is available for CVE-2026-48063. Prioritise patching immediately. EPSS: 0.0%.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-48063?

Within 24 hours, inventory all applications and services using Baileys versions < 6.7.22 or 7.0.0-rc.1 through < 7.0.0-rc.12, including transitive dependencies across the portfolio. Within 7 days, upgrade to patched versions (6.7.22 or later, or 7.0.0-rc.12 or later), validating compatibility in staging before production rollout. Within 30 days, confirm deployment across all affected systems, audit application logs for anomalous message activity indicative of spoofing exploitation, and implement message-source verification checks if systems rely on WhatsApp messages for business logic or automation decisions.

Baileys CVE-2026-48063

Q: What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-48063?

CVE-2026-48063 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.3 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

EUVD-2026-52440 CRITICAL

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing (CWE-290)

2026-06-10 https://github.com/WhiskeySockets/Baileys

GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg

Authentication Bypass

9.3

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/WhiskeySockets/Baileys

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/WhiskeySockets/Baileys) PRIMARY

9.3 CRITICAL

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

vuln.today AI

8.2 HIGH

Remote, no auth or interaction, and easily triggered (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); core impact is message/state spoofing so I:H, sync jamming gives A:L, and no real data disclosure so C:N.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/WhiskeySockets/Baileys).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/WhiskeySockets/Baileys

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Updated

Aug 03, 2026 - 21:28 vuln.today

v2 (cvss_changed)

Re-analysis Queued

Aug 03, 2026 - 21:22 vuln.today

cvss_changed

CVSS changed

Aug 03, 2026 - 21:22 NVD

9.3 (CRITICAL)

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jun 10, 2026 - 20:00 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jun 10, 2026 - 20:00 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

Impact

Any baileys session under the latest version (< 7.0.0-rc12, and < 6.7.22) can be sent a malicious payload via the placeholderResendMessage and trigger a fake messages.upsert event with a fake message key and payload. This allows anyone to spoof messages. The same exploit also allows an attacker to corrupt the app state sync system by sending fake key shares, and also allows for history sync spoofing which also serves the same problem, injecting fake previous context or "on-demand" sync.

Patches

https://github.com/WhiskeySockets/Baileys/commit/3beb08eecfcb4e65722e674034bd84fb11a9de35 This commit has patched the issue, and a version tag has been released under 7.0.0 (6.7.22) for those still on Baileys v6. A new Baileys version, v7.0.0-rc12, has been released to remediate this.

Workarounds

There are no real workarounds other than dropping messages.upsert events that contain a requestId field, turning off automatic history sync (shouldSyncHistoryMessage: () => false) in socket config. There are no workarounds for the app state sync jamming.

AnalysisAI

Message and history-sync spoofing in the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm baileys / @whiskeysockets/baileys, versions < 6.7.22 and 7.0.0-rc.1 through < 7.0.0-rc12) lets any remote party send a crafted protocolMessage through the placeholderResendMessage path to fire a fake messages.upsert event with an attacker-chosen message key and payload. This permits arbitrary message spoofing, injection of fake history/on-demand sync context, and corruption of the app-state sync system via forged app-state key shares. Publicly available exploit code exists (proof-of-concept gist); there is no evidence of active exploitation and EPSS is negligible at 0.02%.

Technical ContextAI

Baileys is a TypeScript/Node.js library that speaks the WhatsApp Web multi-device protocol directly over WebSocket, widely used to build WhatsApp bots and integrations. The flaw sits in src/Utils/process-message.ts, which dispatches protocolMessage sub-types. Certain sub-types are only ever legitimately generated by the account's own paired devices - HISTORY_SYNC_NOTIFICATION, APP_STATE_SYNC_KEY_SHARE, LID_MIGRATION_MAPPING_SYNC, and PEER_DATA_OPERATION_REQUEST_RESPONSE_MESSAGE - yet the code processed them regardless of origin. This maps to CWE-290 (Authentication Bypass by Spoofing): the receiver trusts the claimed identity/origin of the message instead of verifying that self-only control messages actually came from the user's own device (fromMe). The patch mirrors whatsmeow's handleProtocolMessage guard by dropping these self-only types when message.key.fromMe is false.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Baileys 6.7.22 (v6 users) or 7.0.0-rc12 (v7 release-candidate users), both of which contain the fix commit 3beb08eecfcb4e65722e674034bd84fb11a9de35 (https://github.com/WhiskeySockets/Baileys/commit/3beb08eecfcb4e65722e674034bd84fb11a9de35); see advisory GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg. If you cannot upgrade immediately, the vendor states there are no complete workarounds, but partial mitigations are: drop incoming messages.upsert events that carry a requestId field (blunts the placeholderResendMessage spoofing path, at the cost of losing legitimate resend/placeholder handling), and disable automatic history sync by setting shouldSyncHistoryMessage: () => false in the socket config (prevents history-sync spoofing but disables automatic backfill of prior conversation history). Note explicitly that there is no workaround for the app-state sync jamming via fake key shares - only the patch resolves that - so upgrading is the sole reliable remediation.