Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Network endpoint reachable by any logged-in member (PR:L, AC:L, UI:N); arbitrary cross-tenant record modification gives I:H, with only incidental C:L and no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
NextCRM is open-source customer relationship management (CRM) software. Versions prior to 0.12.0 have a Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA/IDOR) vulnerability exists in the CRM contact and target update endpoints. The application fails to verify if the authenticated user has ownership of the specific resource being modified. This allows any authenticated user (even with a standard member role) to arbitrarily modify sensitive CRM contacts and targets belonging to other users or organizations (cross-tenant data tampering). Version 0.12.0 fixes the issue.
AnalysisAI
Cross-tenant data tampering in NextCRM (open-source CRM) before version 0.12.0 lets any authenticated user - including low-privilege 'member' accounts - modify CRM contacts and targets owned by other users or organizations. The contact and target update endpoints trust a client-supplied resource identifier without checking ownership, so an attacker who is a legitimate tenant on the instance can overwrite records outside their scope. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, and the flaw is not listed in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
NextCRM is a Next.js-based open-source customer relationship management application (CPE cpe:2.3:a:pdovhomilja:nextcrm-app). The root cause is CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, a form of Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA/IDOR): the update handlers for contacts and targets accept an object identifier from the request and apply the change without verifying that the identifier belongs to the requesting user or their organization. In a multi-tenant CRM this collapses the tenant boundary at the object level - server-side authorization is performed at the authentication layer (is the caller logged in) but not at the per-record ownership layer.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to NextCRM 0.12.0 or later, which adds the missing ownership/authorization checks on the contact and target update endpoints; this is the primary and recommended fix per advisory GHSA-mg5f-m89f-4gmc (https://github.com/pdovhomilja/nextcrm-app/security/advisories/GHSA-mg5f-m89f-4gmc). Where an immediate upgrade is not possible, compensating controls include restricting instance membership to trusted users only and reducing the number of low-privilege 'member' accounts, since exploitation requires an authenticated account; enabling audit logging on contact/target modifications to detect cross-tenant tampering; and, if the deployment supports it, placing the update endpoints behind stricter per-organization access controls at a reverse proxy or middleware layer. The trade-off is that these controls limit blast radius and improve detection but do not close the underlying IDOR, so they are stopgaps until 0.12.0 is deployed.
More in Nextcrm App
View allPrivilege escalation via broken access control in NextCRM (open-source CRM by pdovhomilja) before version 0.12.0 lets an
Broken access control in NextCRM 0.12.1 lets a low-privileged authenticated user with a valid MCP Bearer API token (`nxt
Improper privilege enforcement in NextCRM 0.12.1 lets any authenticated low-privileged user create, modify, archive, or
Same technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-46108