CVE-2026-45070
MEDIUMLifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionNVD
Description
Symfony\Component\Mime\Header\ParameterizedHeader (and the related parameter handling reachable from Symfony\Component\Mime\Header\Headers) is responsible for serializing structured headers such as Content-Type and Content-Disposition, which carry key=value parameters (e.g. Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="x").
RFC 2045 / RFC 5322 require parameter *names* to be tokens: a restricted ASCII subset that excludes whitespace, CR/LF, and the tspecials set. Symfony's parameter handling validates and properly encodes parameter *values*, but does not validate parameter *names*: the supplied name is emitted verbatim into the serialized header.
A caller that derives a parameter name from untrusted input, e.g. an application that lets a user influence a Content-Disposition parameter name, can include \r\n or other non-token bytes inside the name, terminating the current header and injecting additional headers in the rendered message. This is the classic CRLF / header-injection primitive applied to the parameter-name slot.
Resolution
ParameterizedHeader now rejects parameter names that contain bytes outside the RFC token character class.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Fabian Fleischer for reporting the issue and Alexandre Daubois for fixing it.
AnalysisAI
Header injection in Symfony's Mime component (symfony/mime) enables attackers to inject arbitrary MIME headers into serialized email messages when an application passes untrusted input as a parameter name to ParameterizedHeader. The component correctly encodes parameter values per RFC 2045/5322 but emits parameter names verbatim, meaning CRLF sequences in a user-influenced parameter name terminate the current header line and allow arbitrary new headers to be appended. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-vqc8-7275-q272