Nginx
CVE-2026-40575
CRITICAL
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Impact
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.
Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:
- OAuth2 Proxy is configured with
--reverse-proxy - and at least one rule is defined with
--skip_auth_routesor the legacy--skip-auth-regex
OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when --reverse-proxy is enabled and --skip-auth-route or --skip-auth-regex is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application.
This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session.
Patches
This issue is addressed as part of the newly introduced --trusted-proxy-ip flag in v7.15.2. If you leave it unset, OAuth2 Proxy will continue to trust ALL source IPs (0.0.0.0/0) for backwards compatibility, which means a client may still be able to spoof forwarded headers. Therefore after upgrading we urge you to use the new --trusted-proxy-ip flag to set the IPs or CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies that are allowed to send X-Forwarded-* headers and furthermore implement the mitigation steps outlined below to properly configure your load balancer infrastructure.
Mitigation
- Strip any client-provided
X-Forwarded-Uriheader at the reverse proxy or load balancer level - Explicitly overwrite
X-Forwarded-Uriwith the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 Proxy
Example nginx mitigation for the auth subrequest:
location /internal-auth/ {
internal;
# Ensure external users can't access this path
# Make sure the OAuth2 Proxy knows where the original request came from.
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
# set the value to the actual $request_uri and therefore strip any user provided X-Forwarded-Uri
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;
proxy_pass http://oauth2-proxy:4180/;
}- Restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy
- Remove or narrow
--skip-auth-route/--skip-auth-regexrules where possible
AnalysisAI
Authentication bypass in OAuth2 Proxy allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access protected resources by spoofing the X-Forwarded-Uri header when the service is configured with --reverse-proxy and at least one skip-auth route or regex. This issue, addressed in version 7.15.2, remains exploitable if the new --trusted-proxy-ip flag is not set, requiring operators to strip or overwrite the dangerous header at the reverse proxy layer. No active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code has been identified, and EPSS estimates a low 0.08% probability of exploitation.
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Same weakness CWE-290 – Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Critical| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x