CVE-2026-40353

MEDIUM
2026-04-16 https://github.com/wger-project/wger GHSA-6f54-qjvm-wwq3
5.1
CVSS 4.0
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CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
P
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

2
CVSS Changed
Apr 17, 2026 - 22:22 NVD
5.1 (MEDIUM)
Analysis Generated
Apr 16, 2026 - 01:50 vuln.today

DescriptionNVD

Stored XSS via Unescaped License Attribution Fields

Summary

The AbstractLicenseModel.attribution_link property in wger/utils/models.py constructs HTML strings by directly interpolating user-controlled fields (license_author, license_title, license_object_url, license_author_url, license_derivative_source_url) without any escaping. The resulting HTML is rendered in the ingredient view template using Django's |safe filter, which disables auto-escaping. An authenticated user can create an ingredient with a malicious license_author value containing JavaScript, which executes when any user (including unauthenticated visitors) views the ingredient page.

Severity

High (CVSS 3.1: ~7.6)

  • Low-privilege attacker (any authenticated non-temporary user)
  • Stored XSS - persists in database
  • Triggers on a public page (no authentication needed to view)
  • Can steal session cookies, perform actions as other users, redirect to phishing

CWE

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Affected Components

Vulnerable Property

File: wger/utils/models.py:88-110

python
@property
def attribution_link(self):
    out = ''
    if self.license_object_url:
        out += f'<a href="{self.license_object_url}">{self.license_title}</a>'
    else:
        out += self.license_title
# NO ESCAPING
    out += ' by '
    if self.license_author_url:
        out += f'<a href="{self.license_author_url}">{self.license_author}</a>'
    else:
        out += self.license_author
# NO ESCAPING
    out += f' is licensed under <a href="{self.license.url}">{self.license.short_name}</a>'
    if self.license_derivative_source_url:
        out += (
            f'/ A derivative work from <a href="{self.license_derivative_source_url}">the '
            f'original work</a>'
        )
    return out

Unsafe Template Rendering

File: wger/nutrition/templates/ingredient/view.html

  • Line 171: {{ ingredient.attribution_link|safe }}
  • Line 226: {{ image.attribution_link|safe }}

Writable Entry Point

File: wger/nutrition/views/ingredient.py:154-175

python
class IngredientCreateView(WgerFormMixin, CreateView):
    model = Ingredient
    form_class = IngredientForm
# includes license_author field

URL: login_required(ingredient.IngredientCreateView.as_view()) - any authenticated non-temporary user.

Form fields (from wger/nutrition/forms.py:295-313): includes license_author (TextField, max_length=3500) - no sanitization.

Models Affected

6 models inherit from AbstractLicenseModel:

  • Exercise, ExerciseImage, ExerciseVideo, Translation (exercises module)
  • Ingredient, Image (nutrition module)

Only the Ingredient and nutrition Image models' attribution links are currently rendered with |safe in templates.

Root Cause

  1. attribution_link constructs raw HTML by string interpolation of user-controlled fields without calling django.utils.html.escape() or django.utils.html.format_html()
  2. The template renders the result with |safe, bypassing Django's auto-escaping
  3. The license_author field in IngredientForm has no input sanitization
  4. The set_author() method only sets a default value if the field is empty - it does not sanitize user-provided values

Reproduction Steps (Verified)

Prerequisites

  • A wger instance with user registration enabled (default)
  • An authenticated user account (non-temporary)

Steps

  1. Register/login to a wger instance
  2. Create a malicious ingredient via the web form at /en/nutrition/ingredient/add/:
  • Set Name to any valid name (e.g., "XSS Form Verified")
  • Set Energy to 125, Protein to 10, Carbohydrates to 10, Fat to 5 (energy must approximately match macros)
  • Set Author(s) (license_author) to:
     <img src=x onerror="alert(document.cookie)">
  • Submit the form - the form validates and saves successfully with no sanitization
  1. View the ingredient page (public URL, no auth needed):
  • Navigate to the newly created ingredient's detail page
  • The XSS payload executes in the browser

Verified PoC Output

The rendered HTML in the ingredient detail page (line 171 of ingredient/view.html) contains:

html
<small>
     by <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> is licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en">CC-BY-SA 3</a>
</small>

The <img> tag with onerror handler is injected directly into the page DOM and executes JavaScript when the browser attempts to load the non-existent image.

Alternative API Path (ExerciseImage)

For users who are "trustworthy" (account >3 weeks old + verified email):

bash
# Upload exercise image with XSS in license_author
curl -X POST https://wger.example.com/api/v2/exerciseimage/ \
  -H "Authorization: Token <token>" \
  -F "exercise=1" \
  -F "[email protected]" \
  -F 'license_author=<img src=x onerror="alert(document.cookie)">' \
  -F "license=2"

Note: ExerciseImage's attribution_link is not currently rendered with |safe in exercise templates, but the data is stored with XSS payloads and would execute if any template renders it with |safe in the future. The API serializer also returns the unescaped attribution_link data, which could cause XSS in API consumers (mobile apps, SPAs).

Impact

  • Session hijacking: Steal admin session cookies to gain full control
  • Account takeover: Modify other users' passwords or email addresses
  • Data theft: Access other users' workout plans, nutrition data, and personal measurements
  • Worm-like propagation: Malicious ingredient could inject XSS that creates more malicious ingredients
  • Phishing: Redirect users to fake login pages

Suggested Fix

Replace the attribution_link property with properly escaped HTML using Django's format_html():

python
from django.utils.html import format_html, escape

@property
def attribution_link(self):
    parts = []

    if self.license_object_url:
        parts.append(format_html('<a href="{}">{}</a>', self.license_object_url, self.license_title))
    else:
        parts.append(escape(self.license_title))

    parts.append(' by ')

    if self.license_author_url:
        parts.append(format_html('<a href="{}">{}</a>', self.license_author_url, self.license_author))
    else:
        parts.append(escape(self.license_author))

    parts.append(format_html(
        ' is licensed under <a href="{}">{}</a>',
        self.license.url, self.license.short_name
    ))

    if self.license_derivative_source_url:
        parts.append(format_html(
            '/ A derivative work from <a href="{}">the original work</a>',
            self.license_derivative_source_url
        ))

    return mark_safe(''.join(str(p) for p in parts))

Alternatively, remove the |safe filter from the templates and escape in the property, though this would break the anchor tags.

References

AnalysisAI

Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) in wger fitness application allows authenticated users to inject malicious JavaScript via unescaped license attribution fields in ingredient and image models, which executes when any visitor views the affected page. The vulnerability persists in the database and can be exploited to steal session cookies, perform unauthorized actions as other users, or conduct phishing attacks. …

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CVE-2026-40353 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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