Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
The AgentService.loadAgentFromFile method uses the js-yaml library to parse YAML files without disabling dangerous tags (such as !!js/function and !!js/undefined). This allows an attacker to craft a malicious YAML file that, when parsed, executes arbitrary JavaScript code. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by uploading a malicious agent definition file via the API endpoint, leading to remote code execution (RCE) on the server.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the YAML deserialization process. The js-yaml library's load function is used without specifying a safe schema (e.g., JSON_SCHEMA or DEFAULT_SAFE_SCHEMA). This enables the parsing of JavaScript functions and other dangerous types. When a malicious YAML file containing a !!js/function tag is parsed, the function is evaluated, leading to arbitrary code execution.
The vulnerable code is located in src/agents/agent.service.ts at line 55.
PoC
An attacker can create a malicious agent YAML file with the following content:
!!js/function >
function(){ require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/pwned') }Then, upload this file as an agent definition via the API endpoint that uses AgentService.loadAgentFromFile. When the agent is loaded (either during startup or via an API call that triggers loading), the payload will execute the command touch /tmp/pwned, demonstrating arbitrary code execution.
Impact
This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker (if the API endpoint is unprotected) or an authenticated attacker with the ability to upload agent definitions to execute arbitrary code on the server. This can lead to complete compromise of the server, data theft, or further network penetration.
Recommended Fix
Replace the unsafe load method with a safe alternative. Specifically, use the load method with a safe schema, such as JSON_SCHEMA or DEFAULT_SAFE_SCHEMA. For example:
import yaml from 'js-yaml';
import { JSON_SCHEMA } from 'js-yaml';
// In the loadAgentFromFile method
const agent = yaml.load(fileContent, { schema: JSON_SCHEMA });Alternatively, if the application requires only a subset of YAML features, consider using the safeLoad method from an older version (though note it was deprecated). The key is to avoid loading tags that can execute code.
Additionally, validate and sanitize all user input, especially file uploads. Ensure that agent definition files are only uploaded by trusted users and consider storing them in a secure location with proper access controls.
AnalysisAI
Unsafe YAML deserialization in PraisonAI allows remote code execution through malicious agent definition files. The AgentService.loadAgentFromFile method uses js-yaml.load without safe schema restrictions, permitting dangerous tags like !!js/function that execute arbitrary JavaScript. Unauthenticated attackers can upload crafted YAML files via API endpoints to achieve complete server compromise. Affects PraisonAI prior to v4.5.115. Publicly available exploit code exists via proof-of-concept demonstrating command execution.
Technical ContextAI
Root cause is CWE-502 unsafe deserialization in src/agents/agent.service.ts line 55. The js-yaml library's load function accepts YAML with executable tags when invoked without JSON_SCHEMA or DEFAULT_SAFE_SCHEMA restrictions. Crafted !!js/function tags trigger Node.js child_process execution during parse operations. CVSS vector PR:N confirms unauthenticated exploitation path through file upload handlers.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: Upgrade to PraisonAI version 4.5.115 or later, available at https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.115. Primary fix replaces yaml.load with safe schema: use yaml.load(fileContent, { schema: JSON_SCHEMA }) or yaml.safeLoad alternative to prevent executable tag parsing. Workaround: Implement strict input validation on agent file uploads, restrict upload privileges to trusted administrators only, and consider disabling dynamic agent loading until patched. Review existing agent definition files for malicious YAML tags. Consult vendor advisory: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-32vr-5gcf-3pw2
Same weakness CWE-502 – Deserialization of Untrusted Data
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-20638
GHSA-32vr-5gcf-3pw2