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Node.js CVE-2026-39859

| EUVD-2026-20611 MEDIUM
Path Traversal (CWE-22)
2026-04-08 https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs GHSA-v273-448j-v4qj
6.3
CVSS 4.0
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CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

4
EUVD ID Assigned
Apr 08, 2026 - 15:16 euvd
EUVD-2026-20611
Analysis Generated
Apr 08, 2026 - 15:16 vuln.today
Patch released
Apr 08, 2026 - 15:16 nvd
Patch available
CVE Published
Apr 08, 2026 - 15:04 nvd
MEDIUM 6.3

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 18 npm packages depend on liquidjs (10 direct, 8 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 10.25.5.

DescriptionNVD

liquidjs 10.25.0 documents root as constraining filenames passed to renderFile() and parseFile(), but top-level file loads do not enforce that boundary.

The published npm package liquidjs@10.25.0 on Linux 6.17.0 with Node v22.22.1. A Liquid instance configured with an empty temporary directory as root still returned the contents of /etc/hosts when renderFile('/etc/hosts') was called. I have not exhaustively checked older releases yet; 10.25.0 is the latest tested version.

Root cause:

  • src/parser/parser.ts:83-85 calls loader.lookup(file, LookupType.Root, ...) and then reads the returned file.
  • src/fs/loader.ts:38 passes type !== LookupType.Root into candidates().
  • For LookupType.Root, enforceRoot is false, so src/fs/loader.ts:47-66 accepts resolved absolute paths and fallback results without any contains() check.

This appears adjacent to the March 10, 2026 fix for CVE-2026-30952, which hardened include / render / layout but not the top-level file-loading APIs.

Proof of concept:

javascript
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');

const safeRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'liquidjs-safe-root-'));
const engine = new Liquid({ root: [safeRoot], extname: '.liquid' });

engine.renderFile('/etc/hosts').then(console.log);

Expected result: a path outside root should be rejected. Actual result: /etc/hosts is rendered successfully.

Impact: any application that treats root as a sandbox boundary and forwards attacker-controlled template names into renderFile() or parseFile() can disclose arbitrary local files readable by the server process.

Suggested fix: apply the same containment checks used for partial/layout lookups to LookupType.Root, and reject absolute or fallback paths unless they remain within an allowed root. A regression test should verify that renderFile('/etc/hosts') fails when root points to an unrelated directory.

AnalysisAI

Path traversal in liquidjs 10.25.0 allows local file disclosure when renderFile() or parseFile() receives absolute paths or traversal sequences, despite the root parameter being documented as a sandbox boundary. An attacker controlling template filenames passed to these APIs can read arbitrary files accessible to the Node.js process, such as /etc/hosts or sensitive configuration files. …

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CVE-2026-39859 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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