CVE-2026-33744

Description

## Summary The `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`. ## Affected Component - `src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:85-89` - `.format(packages=" ".join(packages))` into shell command - `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/templates/base_debian.j2:13` - `{{ __options__system_packages | join(' ') }}` - `src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:174` - No validation on `system_packages` - All distro install commands in `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/__init__.py` ## Affected Versions All versions supporting `docker.system_packages` in `bentofile.yaml`, confirmed on 1.4.36. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Create a project directory with: **service.py:** ```python import bentoml @bentoml.service class MyService: @bentoml.api def predict(self) -> str: return "hello" ``` **bentofile.yaml:** ```yaml service: "service:MyService" docker: system_packages: - "curl && id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned #" ``` 2. Run: ```bash bentoml build ``` 3. Examine the generated Dockerfile at `~/bentoml/bentos/my_service/<tag>/env/docker/Dockerfile`. Line 41 will contain: ```dockerfile RUN apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef curl && id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned # ``` 4. Running `bentoml containerize my_service:<tag>` will execute `id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned` as root during the Docker build. ## Root Cause The `system_packages` field values are treated as package names (data) by the user but are string-formatted directly into shell commands in the Dockerfile: ```python # images.py:85-89 self.commands.append( CONTAINER_METADATA[self.distro]["install_command"].format( packages=" ".join(packages) # No escaping ) ) ``` Where `install_command` is `"apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef {packages}"`. A `bash_quote` filter (wrapping `shlex.quote`) exists in the codebase and is registered in both Jinja2 environments, but it is only applied to environment variable values, never to `system_packages`. ## Impact 1. **Malicious repositories**: An attacker publishes an ML project with a crafted `bentofile.yaml`. Anyone who clones and builds it gets arbitrary code execution during `docker build`. 2. **CI/CD compromise**: Automated pipelines running `bentoml containerize` on PRs that modify `bentofile.yaml` are vulnerable. 3. **BentoCloud**: If BentoCloud builds images from user-supplied `bentofile.yaml`, this could achieve RCE on cloud infrastructure. 4. **Supply chain**: Shared bentos or model repos in the BentoML ecosystem can contain malicious configs. ## Suggested Fix ### Option 1: Input validation (recommended) Add a regex validator to `system_packages` in `build_config.py`: ```python import re VALID_PACKAGE_NAME = re.compile(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+\-_:]*$') def _validate_system_packages(instance, attribute, value): if value is None: return for pkg in value: if not VALID_PACKAGE_NAME.match(pkg): raise BentoMLException( f"Invalid system package name: {pkg!r}. " "Package names may only contain alphanumeric characters, " "dots, plus signs, hyphens, underscores, and colons." ) system_packages: t.Optional[t.List[str]] = attr.field( default=None, validator=_validate_system_packages ) ``` ### Option 2: Output escaping Apply `shlex.quote()` to each package name before interpolation in `images.py:system_packages()` and apply the `bash_quote` Jinja2 filter in `base_debian.j2`.

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