CVE-2026-33166

HIGH
2026-03-18 https://github.com/allure-framework/allure2 GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw
8.6
CVSS 3.1
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CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Patch Released
Mar 31, 2026 - 21:13 nvd
Patch available
Analysis Generated
Mar 18, 2026 - 20:00 vuln.today
CVE Published
Mar 18, 2026 - 19:53 nvd
HIGH 8.6

Description

### Summary The Allure report generator is vulnerable to an arbitrary file read via path traversal when processing test results. An attacker can craft a malicious result file (-result.json, -container.json, or .plist) that points an attachment source to a sensitive file on the host system. During report generation, Allure will resolve these paths and include the sensitive files in the final report. ### Details The vulnerability exists in several plugins where attachment paths are resolved using unvalidated user input. The code uses Path.resolve() without normalizing the path or checking if the resulting file remains within the intended results directory. Affected Files and Lines: Allure2Plugin.java (Line 264): `final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource());` Allure1Plugin.java (Line 328): `final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource());` XcTestPlugin.java (Line 181): `attachments.resolve(String.format("Screenshot_%s.%s", uuid, ext))` Since `resolve()` allows absolute paths or ../ sequences to escape the base directory, any file readable by the process can be exfiltrated. ### PoC 1) Create a directory named allure-results. 2) Create a file malicious-result.json inside it: ``` { "uuid": "poc-traversal", "name": "Path Traversal PoC", "status": "passed", "attachments": [ { "name": "Sensitive Data", "source": "../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd", "type": "text/plain" } ] } ``` 3) run `allure generate allure-results -o allure-report` 4) The content of `/etc/passwd` will now be present in `allure-report/data/attachments/`. ### Impact This is a High Severity vulnerability. In CI/CD environments (GitHub Actions, Jenkins), an attacker submitting a Pull Request can exfiltrate server secrets, cloud credentials, or environment configuration files stored on the runner disk. It also may affect custom Allure web services where users can upload results, allowing them to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem. Allure TestOps is not affected.

Analysis

Path traversal in Allure report generator for Jenkins allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the host system by crafting malicious test result files with specially crafted attachment paths. The vulnerability stems from insufficient path validation when processing attachments during report generation, enabling sensitive files to be included in generated reports. …

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Remediation

Within 24 hours: audit all CI/CD pipelines using Allure to identify exposure points, particularly those processing external contributions; disable Allure report generation for untrusted sources if feasible. Within 7 days: implement input validation on test result files before Allure processing, isolate Allure execution in restricted containers with minimal file system access, and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed. …

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Priority Score

43
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +0.0
CVSS: +43
POC: 0

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CVE-2026-33166 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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