CVE-2026-32887

| EUVD-2026-13818 HIGH
2026-03-20 https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g
7.4
CVSS 3.1
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CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

4
Patch Released
Mar 31, 2026 - 21:13 nvd
Patch available
Analysis Generated
Mar 20, 2026 - 20:46 vuln.today
EUVD ID Assigned
Mar 20, 2026 - 20:46 euvd
EUVD-2026-13818
CVE Published
Mar 20, 2026 - 20:34 nvd
HIGH 7.4

Description

## Versions - `effect`: 3.19.15 - `@effect/rpc`: 0.72.1 - `@effect/platform`: 0.94.2 - Node.js: v22.20.0 - Vercel runtime with Fluid compute - Next.js: 16 (App Router) - `@clerk/nextjs`: 6.x ## Root cause Effect's `MixedScheduler` batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a **single** microtask or timer callback. The `AsyncLocalStorage` context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle - **not** the request that owns the fiber being resumed. ### Detailed mechanism #### 1. Scheduler batching (`effect/src/Scheduler.ts`, `MixedScheduler`) ```typescript // MixedScheduler.starve() - called once when first task is scheduled private starve(depth = 0) { if (depth >= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) { setTimeout(() => this.starveInternal(0), 0) // timer queue } else { Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() => this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) // microtask queue } } // MixedScheduler.starveInternal() - drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call private starveInternal(depth: number) { const tasks = this.tasks.buckets this.tasks.buckets = [] for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) { for (let i = 0; i < toRun.length; i++) { toRun[i]() // ← Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context } } // ... } ``` `scheduleTask` only calls `starve()` when `running` is `false`. Subsequent tasks accumulate in `this.tasks` until `starveInternal` drains them all. The `Promise.then()` (or `setTimeout`) callback inherits the ALS context from whichever call site created it - i.e., whichever request's fiber first set `running = true`. **Result:** Under concurrent load, fiber continuations from Request A and Request B execute inside the same `starveInternal` call, sharing a single ALS context. If Request A triggered `starve()`, then Request B's fiber reads Request A's ALS context. #### 2. `toWebHandlerRuntime` does not propagate ALS (`@effect/platform/src/HttpApp.ts:211-240`) ```typescript export const toWebHandlerRuntime = <R>(runtime: Runtime.Runtime<R>) => { const httpRuntime: Types.Mutable<Runtime.Runtime<R>> = Runtime.make(runtime) const run = Runtime.runFork(httpRuntime) return <E>(self: Default<E, R | Scope.Scope>, middleware?) => { return (request: Request, context?): Promise<Response> => new Promise((resolve) => { // Per-request Effect context is correctly set via contextMap: const contextMap = new Map<string, any>(runtime.context.unsafeMap) const httpServerRequest = ServerRequest.fromWeb(request) contextMap.set(ServerRequest.HttpServerRequest.key, httpServerRequest) httpRuntime.context = Context.unsafeMake(contextMap) // But the fiber is forked without any ALS propagation: const fiber = run(httpApp as any) // ← ALS context is NOT captured or restored }) } } ``` Effect's own `Context` (containing `HttpServerRequest`) is correctly set per-request. But the **Node.js ALS context** - which frameworks like Next.js, Clerk, and OpenTelemetry rely on - is not captured at fork time or restored when the fiber's continuations execute. #### 3. The dangerous pattern this enables ```typescript // RPC handler - runs inside an Effect fiber const handler = Effect.gen(function*() { // This calls auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server, which reads from ALS const { userId } = yield* Effect.tryPromise({ try: async () => auth(), // ← may read WRONG user's session catch: () => new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Auth failed" }) }) return yield* repository.getUser(userId) }) ``` The `async () => auth()` thunk executes when the fiber continuation is scheduled by `MixedScheduler`. At that point, the ALS context belongs to an arbitrary concurrent request. ## Reproduction scenario ``` Timeline (two concurrent requests to the same toWebHandler endpoint): T0: Request A arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestA) → Promise executor runs synchronously → httpRuntime.context set to A's context → fiber A forked, runs first ops synchronously → fiber A yields (e.g., at Effect.tryPromise boundary) → scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberA_continuation) → running=false → starve() called → Promise.resolve().then(drain) ↑ ALS context captured = Request A's context T1: Request B arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestB) → Promise executor runs synchronously → httpRuntime.context set to B's context → fiber B forked, runs first ops synchronously → fiber B yields → scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberB_continuation) → running=true → task queued, no new starve() T2: Microtask fires → starveInternal() runs → Drains fiberA_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✓ → Drains fiberB_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✗ ← WRONG USER ``` ## Minimal reproduction ```typescript import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks" import { Effect, Layer } from "effect" import { RpcServer, RpcSerialization, Rpc, RpcGroup } from "@effect/rpc" import { HttpServer } from "@effect/platform" import * as S from "effect/Schema" // Simulate a framework's ALS (like Next.js / Clerk) const requestStore = new AsyncLocalStorage<{ userId: string }>() class GetUser extends Rpc.make("GetUser", { success: S.Struct({ userId: S.String, alsUserId: S.String }), failure: S.Never, payload: {} }) {} const MyRpc = RpcGroup.make("MyRpc").add(GetUser) const MyRpcLive = MyRpc.toLayer( RpcGroup.toHandlers(MyRpc, { GetUser: () => Effect.gen(function*() { // Simulate calling an ALS-dependent API inside an Effect fiber const alsResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({ try: async () => { const store = requestStore.getStore() return store?.userId ?? "NONE" }, catch: () => { throw new Error("impossible") } }) return { userId: "from-effect-context", alsUserId: alsResult } }) }) ) const RpcLayer = MyRpcLive.pipe( Layer.provideMerge(RpcSerialization.layerJson), Layer.provideMerge(HttpServer.layerContext) ) const { handler } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(MyRpc, { layer: RpcLayer }) // Simulate two concurrent requests with different ALS contexts async function main() { const results = await Promise.all([ requestStore.run({ userId: "user-A" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest("GetUser"))), requestStore.run({ userId: "user-B" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest("GetUser"))), ]) // Parse responses and check if alsUserId matches the expected user // Under the bug: both responses may show "user-A" (or one shows the other's) for (const res of results) { console.log(await res.json()) } } ``` ## Impact | Symptom | Severity | |---------|----------| | `auth()` returns wrong user's session | **Critical** - authentication bypass | | `cookies()` / `headers()` from Next.js read wrong request | **High** - data leakage | | OpenTelemetry trace context crosses requests | **Medium** - incorrect traces | | Works locally, fails in production | Hard to diagnose - only manifests under concurrent load | ## Workaround Capture ALS-dependent values **before** entering the Effect runtime and pass them via Effect's own context system: ```typescript // In the route handler - OUTSIDE the Effect fiber (ALS is correct here) export const POST = async (request: Request) => { const { userId } = await auth() // ← Safe: still in Next.js ALS context // Inject into request headers or use the `context` parameter const headers = new Headers(request.headers) headers.set("x-clerk-auth-user-id", userId ?? "") const enrichedRequest = new Request(request.url, { method: request.method, headers, body: request.body, duplex: "half" as any, }) return webHandler(enrichedRequest) } // In Effect handlers - read from HttpServerRequest headers instead of calling auth() const getAuthenticatedUserId = Effect.gen(function*() { const req = yield* HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest const userId = req.headers["x-clerk-auth-user-id"] if (!userId) return yield* Effect.fail(new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Auth required" })) return userId }) ``` ## Suggested fix (for Effect maintainers) ### Option A: Propagate ALS context through the scheduler Capture the `AsyncLocalStorage` snapshot when a fiber continuation is scheduled, and restore it when the continuation executes: ```typescript // In MixedScheduler or the fiber runtime import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks" scheduleTask(task: Task, priority: number) { // Capture current ALS context const snapshot = AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot() this.tasks.scheduleTask(() => snapshot(task), priority) // ... } ``` `AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()` (Node.js 20.5+) returns a function that, when called, restores the ALS context from the point of capture. This ensures each fiber continuation runs with its originating request's ALS context. **Trade-off:** Adds one closure allocation per scheduled task. Could be opt-in via a `FiberRef` or scheduler option. ### Option B: Capture ALS at `runFork` and restore per fiber step When `Runtime.runFork` is called, capture the ALS snapshot and associate it with the fiber. Before each fiber step (in the fiber runtime's `evaluateEffect` loop), restore the snapshot. **Trade-off:** More invasive but provides correct ALS propagation for the fiber's entire lifetime, including across `flatMap` chains and `Effect.tryPromise` thunks. ### Option C: Document the limitation and provide a `context` injection API If ALS propagation is intentionally not supported, document this prominently and provide a first-class API for `toWebHandler` to accept per-request context. The existing `context?: Context.Context<never>` parameter on the handler function partially addresses this, but it requires callers to know about the issue and manually extract values before entering Effect. ## Related - Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage` docs: https://nodejs.org/api/async_context.html - `AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()`: https://nodejs.org/api/async_context.html#static-method-asynclocalstoragesnapshot - Next.js uses ALS for `cookies()`, `headers()`, `auth()` in App Router - Similar issue pattern in other fiber-based runtimes (e.g., ZIO has `FiberRef` propagation for this) ## POC replica of my setup ``` // Create web handler from Effect RPC // sharedMemoMap ensures all RPC routes share the same connection pool const { handler: webHandler, dispose } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(DemoRpc, { layer: RpcLayer, memoMap: sharedMemoMap, }); /** * POST /api/rpc/demo */ export const POST = async (request: Request) => { return webHandler(request); }; registerDispose(dispose); ``` ### Used util functions ``` /** * Creates a dispose registry that collects dispose callbacks and runs them * when `runAll` is invoked. Handles both sync and async dispose functions, * catching errors to prevent one failing dispose from breaking others. * * @internal Exported for testing - use `registerDispose` in application code. */ export const makeDisposeRegistry = () => { const disposeFns: Array<() => void | Promise<void>> = [] const runAll = () => { for (const fn of disposeFns) { try { const result = fn() if (result && typeof result.then === "function") { result.then(undefined, (err: unknown) => console.error("Dispose error:", err)) } } catch (err) { console.error("Dispose error:", err) } } } const register = (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => { disposeFns.push(dispose) } return { register, runAll } } export const registerDispose: (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => void = globalValue( Symbol.for("@global/RegisterDispose"), () => { const registry = makeDisposeRegistry() if (typeof process !== "undefined") { process.once("beforeExit", registry.runAll) } return registry.register } ) ``` ### The actual effect that was run within the RPC context that the bug was found ``` export const getAuthenticatedUserId: Effect.Effect<string, UnauthorizedError> = Effect.gen(function*() { const authResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({ try: async () => auth(), catch: () => new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Failed to get auth session" }) }) if (!authResult.userId) { return yield* Effect.fail( new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Authentication required" }) ) } return authResult.userId }) ```

Analysis

Node.js applications using Effect library versions 3.19.15 and earlier with @effect/rpc 0.72.1 and @effect/platform 0.94.2 are vulnerable to context confusion due to improper AsyncLocalStorage handling in the MixedScheduler, allowing attackers to access sensitive data from other concurrent requests through race conditions. An attacker can exploit the batching mechanism to read or modify context belonging to different requests processed in the same microtask cycle, potentially leading to data leakage between users in multi-tenant environments. …

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Remediation

Within 24 hours: Inventory all applications using Effect, @effect/rpc, and @effect/platform packages and assess exposure in production environments. Within 7 days: Implement compensating controls including request isolation patterns, disable concurrent request processing if feasible, and increase monitoring for suspicious cross-user data access. …

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Priority Score

37
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +0.0
CVSS: +37
POC: 0

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CVE-2026-32887 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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