CVE-2026-32632

Description

## Summary Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. ## Details The MCP endpoint now has explicit host-based transport security: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py self.mcp_allowed_hosts = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1"] ... return TransportSecuritySettings( allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts, allowed_origins=allowed_origins, ) ``` However, the main FastAPI application for REST/WebUI/token routes is initialized without any host validation middleware: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py self._app = FastAPI(default_response_class=GlancesJSONResponse) ... self._app.add_middleware( CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_origins', default=["*"]), allow_credentials=config.get_bool_value('outputs', 'cors_credentials', default=True), allow_methods=config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_methods', default=["*"]), allow_headers=config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_headers', default=["*"]), ) ... if self.args.password and self._jwt_handler is not None: self._app.include_router(self._token_router()) self._app.include_router(self._router()) ``` There is no `TrustedHostMiddleware`, no comparison against the configured bind host, and no allowlist enforcement for HTTP `Host` values on the REST/WebUI surface. The default bind configuration also exposes the service on all interfaces: ```python # glances/main.py parser.add_argument( '-B', '--bind', default='0.0.0.0', dest='bind_address', help='bind server to the given IPv4/IPv6 address or hostname', ) ``` This combination means the HTTP service will typically be reachable from the victim machine under an attacker-selected hostname once DNS is rebound to the Glances listener. The token endpoint is also mounted on the same unprotected FastAPI app: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py def _token_router(self) -> APIRouter: ... router.add_api_route(f'{base_path}/token', self._api_token, methods=['POST'], dependencies=[]) ``` ## Why This Is Exploitable In a DNS rebinding attack: 1. The attacker serves JavaScript from `https://attacker.example`. 2. The victim visits that page while a Glances instance is reachable on the victim network. 3. The attacker's DNS for `attacker.example` is rebound from the attacker's server to the Glances IP address. 4. The victim browser now sends same-origin requests to `https://attacker.example`, but those requests are delivered to Glances. 5. Because the Glances REST/WebUI app does not validate the `Host` header or enforce an allowed-host policy, it serves the response. 6. The attacker-controlled JavaScript can read the response as same-origin content. The MCP code already acknowledges this threat model and implements host-level defenses. The REST/WebUI code path does not. ## Proof of Concept This issue is code-validated by inspection of the current implementation: - REST/WebUI/token are all mounted on a plain `FastAPI(...)` app - no `TrustedHostMiddleware` or equivalent host validation is applied - default bind is `0.0.0.0` - MCP has separate rebinding protection, showing the project already recognizes the threat model In a live deployment, the expected verification is: ```bash # Victim-accessible Glances service glances -w # Attacker-controlled rebinding domain first resolves to attacker infra, # then rebinds to the victim-local Glances IP. # After rebind, attacker JS can fetch: fetch("http://attacker.example:61208/api/4/status") .then(r => r.text()) .then(console.log) ``` And if the operator exposes Glances without `--password` (supported and common), the attacker can read endpoints such as: ```bash GET /api/4/status GET /api/4/all GET /api/4/config GET /api/4/args GET /api/4/serverslist ``` Even on password-enabled deployments, the missing host validation still leaves the REST/WebUI/token surface reachable through rebinding and increases the value of chains with other authenticated browser issues. ## Impact - **Remote read of local/internal REST data:** DNS rebinding can expose Glances instances that were intended to be reachable only from a local or internal network context. - **Bypass of origin-based browser isolation:** Same-origin policy no longer protects the API once the browser accepts the attacker-controlled rebinding host as the origin. - **High-value chaining surface:** This expands the exploitability of previously identified Glances issues involving permissive CORS, credential-bearing API responses, and state-changing authenticated endpoints. - **Token surface exposure:** The JWT token route is mounted on the same host-unvalidated app and is therefore also reachable through the rebinding path. ## Recommended Fix Apply host allowlist enforcement to the main REST/WebUI FastAPI app, similar in spirit to the MCP hardening: ```python from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware allowed_hosts = config.get_list_value( 'outputs', 'allowed_hosts', default=['localhost', '127.0.0.1'], ) self._app.add_middleware(TrustedHostMiddleware, allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts) ``` At minimum: - reject requests whose `Host` header does not match an explicit allowlist - do not rely on `0.0.0.0` bind semantics as an access-control boundary - document that reverse-proxy deployments must set a strict host allowlist ## References - `glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py` - `glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py` - `glances/main.py`

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