EUVD-2026-11645
GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionNVD
soroban-poseidon provides Poseidon and Poseidon2 cryptographic hash functions for Soroban smart contracts. Poseidon V1 (PoseidonSponge) accepts variable-length inputs without injective padding. When a caller provides fewer inputs than the sponge rate (inputs.len() < T - 1), unused rate positions are implicitly zero-filled. This allows trivial hash collisions: for any input vector [m1, ..., mk] hashed with a sponge of rate > k, hash([m1, ..., mk]) equals hash([m1, ..., mk, 0]) because both produce identical pre-permutation states. This affects any use of PoseidonSponge or poseidon_hash where the number of inputs is less than T - 1 (e.g., hashing 1 input with T=3). Poseidon2 (Poseidon2Sponge) is not affected.
AnalysisAI
Insufficient input padding in soroban-poseidon's Poseidon V1 hash function enables attackers to forge hash collisions by appending zeros to shorter inputs, allowing distinct messages to produce identical hashes when the input count is less than the sponge rate. This vulnerability affects any Soroban smart contract relying on PoseidonSponge or poseidon_hash for cryptographic integrity, potentially compromising authentication, signature verification, or other security mechanisms that depend on hash uniqueness. …
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RemediationAI
Within 24 hours: Inventory all systems and contracts using soroban-poseidon and identify critical blockchain applications. Within 7 days: Implement input validation and checksums independent of Poseidon hashing, disable PoseidonSponge V1 if alternative hash functions are available, and establish enhanced monitoring for suspicious contract transactions. …
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