PipesHub CVE-2026-119710

Requires a valid authenticated session/token for the PipesHub API carrying the crawl:write OAuth scope (PR:L); no user interaction and no connector:delete scope are needed because the schedule route skips both the scope check and the connector-lock guard. The attacker must target a connectorId they can already pass validateConnectorAccess for - their own personal connector, or a team connector if they are an org admin - so the vulnerability escalates a low-privilege crawl:write token into connector destruction rather than allowing arbitrary deletion of any tenant's connectors. Exploitation is limited to affected versions >= 0.3.0 and <= 0.9.1; 0.10.0 and later take the event action from the stored connector instance and drop malformed event names, closing the vector. The path parameter safe-guard allows a dot through, which is what permits the web.delete injection.

This is a genuine authorization/access-control bypass (CWE-862/863, also CWE-20) in PipesHub, rated 7.1 by the vendor via CVSS 4.0 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H). The signals are internally consistent and point to a real but bounded priority: network-reachable API, low complexity, no user interaction, but it requires an authenticated token carrying the crawl:write scope (PR:L), so it is not remote-unauthenticated. The impact is destructive - deletion of connector instances plus purging of indexed records and embeddings - hence high availability impact and low integrity impact, with no confidentiality exposure. A detailed, executed proof-of-concept is published in the vendor's own GHSA advisory (verbatim request/response steps reproducing deletion), which raises practical exploitability for anyone who already holds a low-privilege token. There is no CISA KEV listing and no EPSS score was provided in the input, so there is no evidence of active or widespread exploitation at time of analysis; the vuln.today decision label is 'this_week', consistent with a patched, PoC-backed, non-KEV flaw. Net: a credible insider/low-privilege-token escalation-to-destruction issue worth prompt patching, not an emergency internet-wide exposure. One nuance to verify operationally: the schedule route still runs validateConnectorAccess on the connectorId, so the attacker can only destroy connectors they are already authorized to touch (own personal connectors, or team connectors if admin) - the bypass is of the connector:delete scope and lock guard, not of connector ownership.

An authenticated PipesHub user (or a compromised/over-scoped integration token) that holds only the crawl:write scope sends a normal schedule request but sets the :connector path segment to a value like web.delete. The service builds the event web.delete.resync, the Python consumer reads the second segment as the action, and runs the delete handler - destroying the targeted connector instance along with its graph records and vector embeddings, without ever needing the connector:delete scope or passing the connector-lock guard. A working, executed PoC with verbatim HTTP steps is published in the vendor GHSA advisory.